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This book emerged from a multinational research project originally called 
“New Actors and Innovative Approaches to Peacebuilding.” With the 
support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, six research institutions embarked in 2014 
on a two-year effort to investigate the role of the rising powers in the 
Global South in aiding and supporting other countries to attain and sus-
tain peace.
The institutions were the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban; the Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta; the Istanbul Policy Center 
(IPC) in Istanbul; the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
in Oslo; the School of International Service of American University in 
Washington DC; and the United Service Institution of India (USI) in 
New Delhi. We explicitly sought to create an opportunity for critical 
thinkers from rising powers and more traditional thought-centers to shed 
light on their own government’s practices and approaches, and to bring 
those ideas into international fora.
The project sought to answer one central question: What exactly is new 
and innovative about the peacebuilding approach of the new actors from 
the Global South, and what results are they having? Building on this ques-
tion, we sought to achieve three more specific objectives:
Preface
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 1. To provide a structured analysis of the values, content, and impact 
of recent peacebuilding initiatives of rising powers, comparing them 
to one another and to approaches by Western donors and interna-
tional organizations.
 2. To offer new theoretical claims about the role of the rising powers 
in peacebuilding, rooted in empirical work.
 3. To make key policy audiences aware of alternative approaches and 
their empirical records and theoretical underpinnings.
The latter objective reflects the policy goals of the project, whereby the 
partners sought to educate one another in their own concept and activi-
ties, and then to stimulate exchanges of ideas about these approaches with 
more traditional centers of thought regarding peacebuilding. Ultimately, 
the project sought to influence the exchange of ideas among rising pow-
ers in the Global South and between Northern and Southern centers of 
policy. We held insightful (and fun) seminars in Jakarta, Istanbul, Addis 
Ababa (in conjunction with the African Union), New York, Washington 
DC, Brussels, and The Hague to advance these policy aims.
This book reflects the outcome of the former two project objectives. 
It captures the inputs of the project partners and a few additional intel-
lects, offering in-depth, comparative studies of the rising powers, with case 
examples, aimed at also contributing to mid-level theoretical generaliza-
tions about these phenomena. We hope you enjoy the results.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Why Examine Rising Powers’ 
Role in Peacebuilding?
Cedric de Coning and Charles T. Call
Despite progress since the Cold War in reaching negotiated settlements in 
civil wars, efforts to consolidate peace with effective governance have 
proven challenging in places as diverse as the Congo, Afghanistan, Haiti, 
Iraq, Central Africa, and the Middle East. Two decades ago international 
peacebuilding was understood as a centrally coordinated package of inter-
ventions aimed at resolving a conflict by addressing its root causes. 
International institutions were thought to have acquired the scientific 
knowledge and the practical expertise to “build” peace (Chandler 2012). 
The problem—recurring violent conflict—was usually located in weak and 
failing states in the Global South, and the solutions required that these 
states adopt liberal state practices—democratic politics, free-market poli-
cies, and rights-based approaches to Rule of Law—that have proven suc-
cessful in the Western state-formation experience.
C. de Coning (*) 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway 
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Over the last decade this shared understanding of peacebuilding has 
been significantly eroded. The belief in the transformative power of 
 international peacebuilding has waned because many of the interventions 
undertaken over the preceding period, and especially those in the Balkans, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and in Africa’s Great Lakes and Horn regions, are 
widely understood to have been ineffective. It is increasingly less clear 
what type of problems, if any, can be resolved through international peace-
building, and how intrusive and prescriptive such interventions should be 
(Richmond 2015).
Peacebuilding “successes” in Central America, Southern and West 
Africa, and the Balkans are plagued by problems such as criminal violence, 
corruption, political exclusion, or continued instability (Call and Wyeth 
2008). The failure of peacebuilding to deliver sustained peace has com-
bined with a push from rising powers against Western dominance, to pro-
duce a turn to the Global South as a source for more legitimate and 
effective responses to mass organized violence in the world.
At the same time, debates over and institutions associated with peace-
building have become a central focus of post-conflict contestation. A 
United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission created in 2005 is the 
sole UN organ where Northern and Southern UN member states come 
together to discuss peace and security issues outside of the General 
Assembly (Jenkins 2013). While parts of the UN’s peacebuilding architec-
ture, such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund, proved innovative and effec-
tive,1 the performance overall of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture has 
not met expectations (de Coning and Stamnes 2016). Two major UN 
reviews were undertaken in 2015, one taking stock of peace operations 
and the other assessing the peacebuilding architecture (Report of the 
High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
2015; Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Architecture 2015). Both shied away from embrac-
ing the concept of peacebuilding and instead opted for the new emerging 
but still vague concept of sustaining peace. As a result of these reviews, 
adjustments are being introduced to both the concept of peacebuilding 
and to how, especially, the UN Peacebuilding Commission functions.
Peacebuilding also emerged as an important new dimension in the 
negotiations over the post-2015 development agenda (Richmond and 
Tellidis 2013) and resulted in peacebuilding-related issues featuring in 
several of the goals of the new sustainable development goals of Agenda 
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2030, including especially in Goal 16, which aims to promote peaceful 
and inclusive societies for sustainable development, to provide access to 
justice for all, and to build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions 
at all levels.
In another development, a group of 19 self-identified fragile states like 
East Timor and Liberia have been at the forefront of the New Deal 
(International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2017; Wyeth 
2012, 7–12). It seeks to transform the way international assistance to 
these countries is managed by placing the countries themselves in the driv-
er’s seat when it comes to determining what causes their fragility, setting 
their own priorities, planning their own paths to resilience, and managing 
the relationship with their international partners.
Onto this stage new actors like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa) (de Coning et al. 2014) and a number of other promi-
nent regional powers in the Global South like Indonesia and Turkey have 
emerged as new “donors” that advance their own political and technical 
approaches to peacebuilding (de Carvalho and de Coning 2013). Many of 
these countries have established development cooperation agencies that 
prioritize South-South technical assistance, new less conditional modes of 
operating, appropriate peer-provided guidance on political processes, and 
a celebration of national ownership and empowerment (Mawdsley 2012). 
These Southern approaches are seen by many as technically more appro-
priate and thus a further improvement to the liberal Western model 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2012). They are also seen as an alternative or antidote 
to dominant liberal approaches (Campbell et al. 2011). These approaches 
seem to answer the first of the two core deficiencies cited about current 
approaches: that they are Western dominated and that they ignore local 
contextual dynamics and opportunities.
Although there is a growing literature about the development roles and 
approaches of the rising powers, the research on their roles and approaches 
to peacebuilding is still underdeveloped. This book aims to make a contri-
bution to this field because the entry of the rising powers into the peace-
building field is likely to have significant implications for how the UN and 
other international and regional organizations, as well as both the tradi-
tional donors and the recipient countries, view peacebuilding in the future. 
Will the entry of the rising powers into the field of peacebuilding funda-
mentally alter how we understand and undertake peacebuilding a decade 
or more from now?
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Our Aim with this BOOk
With this book, we seek to answer the following central question: What 
exactly is new and innovative about the peacebuilding approach of the ris-
ing powers from the Global South, and what are the implications of these 
new approaches for peacebuilding?
A number of related questions help to further inform our central ques-
tion, such as: How are these rising powers changing the peacebuilding 
landscape? What influence are they having on the way the African Union 
(AU), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union 
(EU), United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
and traditional bilateral donors [Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD)] are approaching peacebuilding? To what 
degree does the engagement of rising powers with fragile states have peace-
building objectives (theories of change aiming to influence relapse into 
violent conflict)? How do these rising powers differentiate between devel-
opment and peacebuilding? How does the change model (theory of 
change) used by these rising powers differ from the Western liberal peace-
building model? To what degree are peacebuilding projects undertaken by 
these rising powers locally grounded and owned? To what degree are their 
projects perceived to be successful by the recipient countries (people and 
governments)? What innovations, lessons learned, and best practices have 
come about as a result of the entry of the rising powers into the peacebuild-
ing field? To what degree are these rising powers concerned with results, 
and what kind of monitoring and evaluation systems do they employ?
In our efforts to answer these questions, we provide a structured, criti-
cal analysis of the values, intent, and content of the peacebuilding initia-
tives of a number of rising powers. We compare them to one another and 
to the approaches of the UN and the EU. In our analysis, we offer new 
theoretical claims about the role of the Global South in peacebuilding, 
rooted in our empirical work on Somalia, Afghanistan, and Myanmar as 
well as on the specific policies and approaches of Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
South Africa, and Turkey.
Our ApprOAch
We have selected five rising powers for this book, namely Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey. The rising power concept is ambigu-
ous. All of these countries are regional powers, and some have been long-
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standing important or middle powers on the global stage. Some like Brazil 
have sought a more high-profile role over the past decade, whereas others 
like Indonesia have sought a low-profile role. We have opted to use the 
rising power concept as indicative of one of the characteristics that these 
countries have in common, that is their influence in the global order is 
increasing, or their influence (soft and hard power) has been on the rise. 
In some cases, such as Brazil and Turkey, domestic instability has caused 
turbulence for foreign policy as well. Yet the overall status of these coun-
tries as rising powers remains pertinent. This aspect is especially relevant in 
the context of this study in that their influence on peacebuilding is now 
starting to be felt. Up to now these countries had little or no influence on 
how peacebuilding was understood or practiced, apart from participating 
in debates at the UN, and even there, such debates were not initiated or 
framed by these countries.
Our hypothesis is that as their influence on global governance increases 
over time, their approaches to peacebuilding may significantly influence 
how peacebuilding will be understood and practiced in global governance 
in the future. If so, then what can we know now about how these coun-
tries understand and practice peacebuilding that may give us an indication 
of how they may influence the future of peacebuilding?
An alternative hypothesis we explore is that the rising powers’ under-
standing and approach to peacebuilding may change as they engage more 
with peacebuilding in ways similar to that of the traditional donors. For 
instance, the more the rising powers engage in development cooperation 
type initiatives with the aim of contributing to international peace and secu-
rity, the more they will come under pressure—domestically and interna-
tionally—to assess the effectiveness of their approach to peacebuilding. The 
rise of these countries may thus not only result in them influencing how 
peacebuilding is viewed as part of global governance in future, but the pres-
sures and experiences of doing so may also influence how these countries 
themselves view and approach peacebuilding nationally. According to this 
hypothesis, the experience of taking up not just national responsibility but 
also international responsibility for global peace and security will influence 
the understanding of concepts like peacebuilding within the rising powers. 
It may result in their approaches to peacebuilding adjusting over time and 
arriving at a position that is much closer to where the traditional approach 
to peacebuilding is today than their current approaches. If so, we will 
explore if we can see any indications at this stage that would support such 
a maturing to a global responsibility hypothesis.
 INTRODUCTION: WHY EXAMINE RISING POWERS’ ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING? 
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These specific countries have been selected to represent a sample of the 
rising power phenomenon. We are not making an argument that these 
countries are THE rising powers, but rather that they represent a sample, 
including leading examples of rising powers from Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, the Middle East, and South East Asia. Three of these countries—
Brazil, India, and South Africa—are members of the BRICS, and three are 
also members of another South-South cooperation forum called IBSA 
(India, Brazil, and South Africa) (Abdenur et  al. 2014; Piccone 2015; 
Stuenkel 2014). Countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey are obvi-
ously important players in their regional context and have global impact 
on several issues, whilst India is among the major global economic and 
political actors.
Most of our contributors are researchers from these countries. We have 
consciously opted to select contributors that can assist the reader to under-
stand these countries’ approaches to peacebuilding in the context and nar-
rative articulated by these countries themselves, rather than offer a Western 
interpretation. The book thus includes chapters on each of these coun-
tries—Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey—that explore 
how peacebuilding is understood in these countries, including in the con-
text of their local experience, history, and culture. Each of these chapters 
also explains what kind of peacebuilding activities these countries under-
take and discuss a few specific examples. In this way, the book will provide 
a more systematic understanding of the commonalities, differences, and 
heretofore unexposed patterns in the origins and shifts of rising powers’ 
roles in peacebuilding.
Most of our contributors have worked extensively with (or inside) orga-
nizations like the UN and the AU, governments like India, South Africa, 
and the USA, non-governmental organizations, universities and think 
tanks, as well as in operations and programs in the field. This understand-
ing of key audiences and actual peacebuilding and related activities has 
greatly facilitated the aim of helping infuse the learning and perspectives 
of these rising powers into global policies and practices, thereby recogniz-
ing that peacebuilding practice rests in multiple domains and levels.
The book explicitly wrestles with understanding the strategic goals and 
interests of these rising powers. Rather than making assumptions about 
the roles and motives of these countries on their new roles, the book 
explores the various complex motives and political divisions within these 
rising powers that drive their roles and approaches. Further, the book ana-
lyzes the multiple coalitions and actors within these countries, and their 
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expressions in operations abroad offer an understanding of how much 
programs reflect national cultures or philosophical approaches. In addi-
tion, the book shows how ephemeral they may be depending on the gov-
ernment in power and its internal political calculations, and the bureaucratic 
politics of these countries’ approaches. Without adopting strict public 
policy theoretical frameworks, the book interrogates these internal politi-
cal and economic dimensions behind the rising powers’ diverse and evolv-
ing roles in peacebuilding.
The fact that researchers from these rising powers critically interpret and 
analyze their own experiences ensures that the values, perspectives, and 
approaches of these rising powers are explicitly compared. Throughout the 
various chapters, our contributors explore the assumptions that underlie 
our chosen approaches, helping hone in on what exactly is distinctive and 
innovative about Northern and Southern approaches to peacebuilding.
In addition to the country chapters, the book also includes three case- 
study chapters. Our contributors have looked at Afghanistan, Myanmar, 
and Somalia as examples of countries where rising powers such as India, 
Indonesia, China, and Turkey have actively engaged in peacebuilding ini-
tiatives. We opted to use a “structured, focused” method for our case 
studies; through asking a common set of questions across the cases 
(George and Bennett 2005), this book provides a framework that enables 
comparison across the three case studies. This marks a shift from the con-
temporary single case study and ad hoc case study approach that domi-
nates current research on peacebuilding.
Although there is no single “Western” or dominant template for peace-
building, one may glean common characteristics of dominant multilateral 
institutions and bilateral donors. The EU approach is a good example of 
the traditional or established approach to peacebuilding as practiced by 
the donor countries that are members of the OECD. Through the OECD 
these countries have a codified approach to development assistance and 
peacebuilding, through agreed approaches such as the “The Principles for 
Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations”.2 In 
general, the approach of the UN Secretariat and of these European institu-
tions can be characterized as top-down, institution-focused rather than 
process-focused, state-centric, and on a relatively short time horizon (Call 
and Collin 2015; Stamnes 2016). The policies and practices of many 
OECD bilateral donors also adhere to these traits, as well as conditionality 
on good governance. Powerful countries have thus far shaped how the 
concept and practice of peacebuilding are understood in the UN. Yet as 
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the influence of the rising powers increases, the UN’s understanding of 
and approach to peacebuilding offers a test or window into our competing 
hypotheses of whether rising powers will reshape the dominant multilat-
eral and bilateral approaches, or whether they will, in turn, be shaped by 
the dominant approaches and discourse and come to resemble more con-
ventional approaches.
hOw DO we cOnceptuAlize peAceBuilDing?
For the purposes of this book, we have opted to use a very broad under-
standing of peacebuilding. If not, we would have undermined our attempt 
to understand how the rising powers view peacebuilding by imposing a 
definition and approach to peacebuilding influenced by the traditional 
understanding and approach to peacebuilding. We have thus opted to use 
a broad understanding of peacebuilding to mean any deliberate program- 
like effort that has a conflict-resolution theory of change that is meant to 
influence preventing a lapse into violent conflict or to sustain peace.
We have considered using the UN definition(s) and approach to peace-
building, as it represents a globally agreed concept, but we have found 
that there is a considerable gap between what many Member States view 
as the role of an international body like the UN when it comes to peace-
building, and how they choose to deal with such issues domestically. For 
instance, whilst the USA engages in debates on peacebuilding at the UN, 
the concept is not prominently used domestically in the policies or 
approaches of the US government.
We have thus opted against using the UN definition for fear of con-
taminating our study of peacebuilding in the rising powers by imposing an 
external concept. Instead we have tasked our contributors to take a “bot-
tom- up” approach and to seek out national concepts and understandings 
that approximate this broad theory of change approach to peacebuilding. 
Even this broad approach to peacebuilding has proven challenging at 
times. In our concluding analysis, we discuss these definitional and con-
ceptual challenges in greater detail.
the chApters thAt FOllOw
The first section of the volume presents national approaches to peace-
building in their own contexts. The authors seek to describe, on their own 
terms, the national approaches to peacebuilding. Each researcher sought 
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to specify what various national officials and other constituencies mean by 
the term “peacebuilding” and to identify what other terms are deployed in 
official documents and discourse that refer to bundle of activities that 
might in traditional circles be labeled “peacebuilding.” In these analyses of 
national approaches, the authors sought to describe each approach as it 
has emerged and how it is bureaucratically circumscribed, in the terms of 
each country context. Each of these chapters was authored by researchers 
living in the country studied. These authors all conducted interviews with 
pertinent diplomatic and development officials, mainly in the capitals, but 
also in some cases in the missions to the UN in New York. Some of the 
authors of these analyses of national approaches also drew on field research 
in the countries where these operations are taking place.
This section begins with Abdenur and Call’s analysis of Brazil, which 
has been among the more vocal and visible on peacebuilding policy in the 
UN and in fora of the Global South such as the India-Brazil-South Africa 
Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the Community of Portuguese-Language 
Countries. It then moves to Alexandra’s analysis of Indonesia, one of the 
newer actors in regional peacebuilding active especially in mediation facili-
tation in Southeast Asia. The next chapter by P. K. Singh details the long 
record of India in peacebuilding policy and activities from its earliest days 
as an independent country, explaining its strong emphasis on nationally 
owned, state-led development. Sazak and Woods’ chapter on Turkey’s 
role in peacebuilding reflects an expanded role in humanitarian diplomacy 
and its identity as a Muslim nation seeking to play a more active role in the 
Middle East. Finally, South African leadership seeking to support peace 
processes and post-conflict efforts in the continent, including peace opera-
tions, is the subject of Nyuykonge and Siphamandla’s final chapter, among 
other national approaches to peacebuilding.
The second section of the book presents three case studies that illus-
trate the role of rising powers in specific countries in transition. Few peo-
ple recognize India’s role as the fifth largest donor in Afghanistan in the 
twenty-first century, and Sinha’s chapter contrasts that role with the 
approach of traditional donors in that conflict-ridden country. The per-
sonal interest of then Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan in Somalia’s strife 
helped Turkey take a prominent role in that country. Its humanitarian, 
mediation, and institution-building support helped define Turkey’s 
approach to peacebuilding, as analyzed by Sazak and Woods in this case 
study. Finally, Indonesia, China, and other rising powers have been impor-
tant supporters of Myanmar’s transition to democracy and in efforts to 
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address the diverse communal armed conflicts. The chapter by Alexandra 
and Lanteigne examines those peacebuilding efforts.
A concluding chapter analyzes these empirics, cataloging several com-
mon characteristics of what might be considered common to the diverse 
group of rising powers examined in this study. Some of the characteristics 
are stronger in some countries than others. Furthermore, we identify some 
of the important differences among rising powers’ peacebuilding activi-
ties. These are important as they show how trends may evolve in different 
ways and reflect the various motives that underlie the relatively new 
engagement of rising powers as protagonists in peacebuilding efforts in 
partner countries. The conclusion also analyzes the influence rising pow-
ers’ approaches have had on traditional institutions and their peacebuild-
ing policies and practices.
Finally, we suggest some implications for theorizing about the broader 
political and strategic role of emerging or middle powers. As the number 
of armed conflicts rises and the numbers of their victims reach historic 
highs not seen since World War II, “peacebuilding” is an increasingly 
important arena for addressing global violence and its human conse-
quences. It is also an important window on North-South relations in 
evolving global governance, including the identities of these countries on 
the world stage. As such, we anticipate that this analysis will contribute not 
just to policy debates about peacebuilding, but to theoretical discussions 
of global governance.
 nOtes
 1. The editors, Charles T. Call and Cedric de Coning, have served in their 
personal capacities on the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Group for the 
UN Peacebuilding Fund. De Coning’s term was from 2012 to 2015, while 
Call served two terms from 2012 to 2017.
 2. In 2009 the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD 
established a subsidiary body called the International Network on Conflict 
and Fragility (INCAF). Through INCAF, DAC members participated in the 
development of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States in partner-
ship with the g7+, which is a voluntary association of 20 countries that are 
or have been affected by conflict, as well as civil society. This collaboration 
was done under the aegis of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding 
and Statebuilding. See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/
conflictfragilityandresilience/iefs.htm, accessed on July 1, 2016.
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Since the early 2000s, Brazil has been a high-profile advocate of non-
Western approaches to development cooperation, peace operations, and 
other initiatives related to peacebuilding. This avid support is associ-
ated primarily with the administration of President Lula Inácio da Silva 
(2003–2010). During this period, Brazil sought greater prominence on 
the international stage on several fronts. Brazil pressed for transformations 
in the multilateral system, including helping to create and then exercise 
leadership in fora such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) coalition and the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) 
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Dialogue Forum. It also worked to gain greater influence within the mul-
tilateral system, boosting its historic bid for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council and contesting United Nations (UN) securitization. 
Under Lula, Brazil almost tripled its development cooperation to $1.6 
billion reais (USD$923 million at the time). Some 66.3% of this total 
was channeled through multilateral cooperation, and the remainder with 
bilateral efforts focusing on Latin America and Africa (IPEA 2011). This 
represented a significant surge and diversification in Brazil’s role in devel-
opment, including in many conflict-affected countries.
More broadly, during this period Brazil became more active in a variety 
of initiatives that can be considered to fall under the concept of peace-
building. As part of its South-South development cooperation efforts, 
Brazil vastly expanded its technical cooperation with post-conflict coun-
tries such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and East Timor. It also 
sponsored and executed peace-related development projects to support 
the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), whose military 
command it held continuously for an unprecedented 12 years, starting in 
2004. Both in its home region and beyond this vicinity, Brazil engaged 
in conflict mediation efforts, whether through regional organizations like 
the Union of South American States (UNASUR) or via ad hoc arrange-
ments. At the UN, Brazil was instrumental in the creation of the UN 
Peacebuilding Architecture, and once established it assumed a broader 
leadership role at the Peacebuilding Commission, especially with respect 
to Guinea-Bissau. In UN normative debates, Brazil promoted peace-
building as a complement and sometimes as an alternative to militarized 
approaches to peacekeeping, arguing that investing in political processes 
and socioeconomic development was essential to the promotion of peace.
This chapter describes the scope of, and trends in, Brazil’s peacebuild-
ing activities since the early 2000s, focusing on the eight-year Lula presi-
dency and, to a lesser extent, its aftermath. It analyzes the broader context, 
key principles, and main mechanisms of Brazilian peacebuilding; identifies 
major patterns and trends; and notes some of the most important chal-
lenges and contradictions. In particular, we examine whether there is a 
“Brazilian” approach to peacebuilding and what its elements might be, as 
well as how that approach differs from dominant or Western principles and 
practices. The research is based on interviews conducted in mid-2015 and 
mid-2016 in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and New York, as well as analysis of 
official documents from the UN and the Brazilian government.
We find that, although Brazilian stakeholders rarely use the term 
“peacebuilding” (in Portuguese, “consolidação da paz”) outside UN 
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debates, and while there is no single dedicated government agency guid-
ing this engagement (and rather, a broad gamut of institutions whose 
efforts include peacebuilding activities), Brazilian efforts abroad constitute 
a loose but emergent approach to promoting stability and development in 
partner countries. Brazil has articulated clear principles of a peacebuilding 
approach that differs in policy and on-the-ground practice from those of 
Western donors. Nevertheless, Brazil’s approach also shares some simi-
larities with Western peacebuilding, both normatively and operationally. 
In the post-Lula years, two main elements—the economic downturn 
in Brazil and the political turmoil surrounding Rousseff’s presidential 
impeachment—has reoriented Brazilian foreign policy, raising new ques-
tions about Brazil’s ability to sustain its emerging role in peacebuilding.
FoundatIons oF a BrazIlIan approach 
to peaceBuIldIng
Brazil has no single document, such as a White Paper, outlining a policy 
framework for peacebuilding. The term consolidação da paz, in fact, is sel-
dom used outside multilateral settings such as the UN and IBSA. Outside 
of those platforms, Brazil’s approach to peacebuilding can be inferred from 
official speeches and statements, national security documents, diplomats’ 
understandings, and actions along three fronts: development cooperation, 
international conflict mediation, and humanitarian assistance.
Despite the breadth of these initiatives, certain common principles 
underlie Brazil’s approach to peacebuilding, and these concepts are fre-
quently evoked by Brazilian diplomats and some academics in arguing that 
there is a distinct “Brazilian” approach to promoting peace and stability. 
While Brazilian officials and experts do not exclude the possibility that 
other countries embrace or reflect similar principles, they often defend the 
idea that these principles are based on Brazil’s somewhat unique histori-
cal trajectories and experiences with peace and development, and that, as 
a result, Brazil’s engagement with peacebuilding entails more equitable 
relations of power among stakeholders.
Historical Foundations
Although most initiatives that make up Brazil’s peacebuilding have 
emerged in the past 15 years, the country’s historical trajectory offers a 
source of inspiration for its current approach. Relevant here are (a) Brazil’s 
status as a colony of Portugal that “shrugged off” empire and assumed 
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independence with minimal violence; (b) its legacy as the largest slave 
importing state in the Americas, as well as the last nation in the Western 
world to abolish the practice; and (c) its position as a regional power that 
nurtures ambitions to become a global power yet remains sensitive to how 
its exercise of power in the hemisphere is perceived by its neighbors.
As a result of its own colonial experience, as well as its sheer size (Brazil 
is now the world’s fifth largest country by territory and accounts for 48% 
of South America’s territory), Brazil has repeatedly sought to reassure 
other countries in its vicinity that it would not abuse its vast geography 
to seek regional hegemony. According to the mainstream historiography, 
upon independence, in 1822, within its relations with other states Brazil 
adopted a “culture of pacifism” meant to prevent the newly formed sover-
eign country from being seen as imposing or intruding on its neighbors.1 
The 1934 constitution—which only lasted three years but was extremely 
influential in the drafting of subsequent constitutions—states that Brazil 
will “never engage in a war of conquest” and stipulates that war shall not 
be launched until arbitration is exhausted (Constituicao 1934). Similarly, 
textbooks stress the country’s non-military approaches to foreign 
engagement—leitmotifs that have carried into contemporary discourses 
of foreign policy.2 There were some early territorial wars against neigh-
boring countries, especially over the Cisplatine province (which became, 
with British mediation, independent Uruguay in 1928), and coercive 
diplomacy was used with Bolivia and Argentina during territorial disputes. 
Internally, there were a handful of revolts in the Southern and Northern 
regions (including the Canudos War, a popular-messianic uprising that 
was crushed by the Brazilian Army in 1897). Despite these incidents, the 
country managed to avoid major interstate conflicts and, as a result, the 
country’s pacifist mythology emphasizes that Brazil has never launched a 
war.3
Despite its relatively peaceful trajectory in defining its borders, and 
although the country’s population is historically diverse, Brazil has a far 
less harmonious history when it comes to issues of ethnicity and race. The 
formation of Brazil as a people was the result of violent processes (Ribeiro 
1995). The colonial state exterminated and marginalized indigenous peo-
ple and, even after the formal end of slavery, its “whitening” immigra-
tion policies favored Europeans. Over a century of institutional denial of 
racial and ethnic differences has led to unacknowledged deep inequalities 
and discrimination that are most visible in the country’s contemporary 
high rates of violence (a 2013 UNODC study showed that Brazil had 
25.2 homicides per 1,00,000 people, among the highest in the world) 
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(UNODC 2013). As a result, despite its official discourse of pacifism and 
harmony, Brazil’s internal contradictions sometimes belie the rhetoric 
of peace and stability that officials and others draw upon in legitimizing 
Brazil’s role in peacebuilding. The same can be said of the country’s tur-
bulent history with democracy, with several periods of repressive military 
regime (including from 1964 to 1985) and a political trajectory marred by 
presidential coups and countercoups.
The Post–World War II Period
During the Cold War, and especially when the country was under military 
rule, Brazilian foreign policy largely aligned with that of the USA, even 
as Brazil retained its membership in the G77 and was among the most 
active states fighting for the inception of the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). Although Brazil has never been a member 
of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it has followed many of the group’s 
initiatives as an observer, and there are strong parallels in Brazil’s discourse 
of solidarity and that of the movement. This ambivalence in Brazilian for-
eign policy toward the rest of the developing world—and its resulting 
policy shifts—also characterized Brazil’s stance toward the struggle against 
colonialism in the mid-twentieth century. As Portugal’s empire was col-
lapsing in the early 1970s, Brazil—which previously had mostly stood 
by Portugal’s position against the independence of African states in UN 
debates—began supporting decolonization in Angola, Mozambique, and 
other Lusophone colonies (Pinheiro 2007). Thereafter, Brazil’s foreign 
policy placed an even stronger emphasis on non-intervention and peaceful 
approaches to resolving conflict.
Outside of its immediate vicinity, Brazil engaged in issues of interna-
tional security by becoming an early contributor to UN peacekeeping mis-
sions, starting with the first mission (UNEF I, in Sinai) in 1956. This 
participation launched a long-term commitment to UN peacekeeping, 
although troop contributions have varied over time; to date, Brazil has 
participated in more than 50 peacekeeping operations and related mis-
sions, having contributed over 33,000 military officials, police officers, 
and civilians (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This participation 
reflects Brazilian foreign policy’s longstanding commitment to multilater-
alism, particularly via the UN.
Toward the end of the Cold War, even as Brazil underwent a grad-
ual transition from military to civilian rule, it worked with Argentina to 
overcome a deep historical rivalry that had culminated in both countries 
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attempting to develop nuclear weapons. The two sides successfully resolved 
their tensions by deepening political and economic ties (for instance, via 
Mercosur) and voluntarily dismantling their nuclear weapons programs, 
while maintaining their peaceful elements. The 1991 establishment of 
the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (ABACC), a bilateral safeguards agency, marked an innovative 
way of institutionalizing peaceful conflict resolution between the two 
states and avoiding regional tensions (de Quieroz 2016). The resulting 
warming of ties between the two countries is often cited by Brazilian dip-
lomats as a way of boosting Brazil’s credentials in conflict prevention and 
resolution (Patriota and Timerman 2011).
The Post–Cold War Period
With the end of the Cold War, Brazil relied even more heavily on multi-
lateral platforms to expand its role in international peace and security, not 
only through the UN but also via regional platforms such as Mercosur 
and, more recently, UNASUR, which was created in 2008.4 Especially in 
Africa, Brazil has been active in peacebuilding through the Community 
of Portuguese-Language Countries (CPLP). And, since the 2000s, it 
helped to create new coalitions of rising powers, such as IBSA and the 
BRICS. Working through multilateral institutions not only provides Brazil 
with added legitimacy in peacebuilding, it also helps to extend its reach 
geographically, since other members sometimes engage in peacebuilding 
efforts in countries where Brazil’s bilateral relations are relatively weak.
This predilection for multilateralism has been essential to understanding 
Brazilian efforts to promote democracy and human rights abroad. Brazil 
has historically eschewed direct engagement in promotion of democracy 
and human rights in other countries because this practice is sometimes 
associated with Western powers’ self-interested and selective efforts, which 
have often yielded counterproductive outcomes. However, Brazil engages 
in democracy and human rights promotion when a specific demand arises 
via a multilateral forum, including the Organization of American States 
(OAS), UNASUR, and the CPLP.
Brazil has, on occasion, tried to boost its role in mediation of conflicts in 
South America. In 1995, it worked with the USA, Chile, and Argentina to 
mediate the brief border conflict between Peru and Ecuador, the Cenepa 
War (Biato 1999). The ensuing 1998 peace agreement, the Brasília 
Presidential Act, was definitive in establishing the formal demarcation of 
A.E. ABDENUR AND C.T. CALL
 21
the border, putting an end to one of the longest territorial disputes in 
the Western Hemisphere. Despite these examples, Brazil’s engagement 
in conflict mediation within its own region has remained sporadic and 
selective.
the core prIncIples oF BrazIlIan peaceBuIldIng
The early 2000s witnessed a new, concerted effort by Brazil to engage on 
peacebuilding issues. The figure of Lula was central to this surge. A former 
factory worker and union leader who was imprisoned briefly by the mili-
tary dictatorship, Lula led the socialist Workers Party for 14 years through 
the country’s transition from authoritarianism. Elected based on a coali-
tion representing urban workers, peasants, and the lower middle classes, 
Lula sought to transform Brazil into a more equitable society while using 
foreign policy to boost development and expand the country’s influence 
abroad, including in international security issues.
In foreign policy, Lula’s government frequently drew on domestic 
policy initiatives as inspirations to combat poverty and hunger globally. 
To this end, the Brazilian government promoted a discourse of solidarity 
and horizontality, presenting its South-South development cooperation 
efforts as devoid of the power asymmetries resulting from Europe and the 
USA’s colonial and imperial legacies in much of the developing world. In 
2013, the director of ABC [a Brazilian Cooperation Agency, a division of 
the Ministry for External Relations (MRE)] underscored the principles 
believed to differentiate Brazil’s approach from those of donors and estab-
lished multilateral organizations:
The policy of Brazilian cooperation is based on international solidarity 
[…] we react to the demands (we don’t have previously prepared projects 
to be presented to partners). […]The principle of South-South coopera-
tion that we follow is that of no conditionality, which is the non-linkage 
between technical cooperation and pursuit of economic and commercial 
goals and benefits or concessions in areas of services in exchange for coop-
eration. [Another principle Brazil respects is the] non-interference or non- 
intromission in internal affairs. (de Abreu 2013)
These principles—solidarity, demand-driven cooperation, non- 
conditionality, and non-interference—are invoked by Brazilian diplo-
mats as the hallmarks of a distinct “Brazilian way.” In addition, the Lula 
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administration emphasized national ownership of development coop-
eration projects abroad as part of the country’s respect for sovereignty. 
However, some have criticized Brazil’s solidarity as strictly targeting other 
governments (regardless of type of regime) and of equating “national” 
ownership with “government” decision-making, as opposed to more par-
ticipatory processes that would include non-governmental and opposition 
voices in partner states (Abdenur and Marcondes 2016). Other traits of 
what might be termed a “Brazilian way” include Brazilians’ proclivity for 
closeness to people in  local communities abroad (a point that is often 
stressed with respect to Brazilian peacekeepers), emphasis on economic 
programs and job generation in post-conflict countries, and reliance on 
development cooperation rather than on aid.
Some of these principles resonated with, and were in turn reinforced by, 
Lula’s initiatives in global coalition-building, especially with other rising 
powers. The creation of coalitions like IBSA, which brings together three 
diverse democracies, and the BRIC (which in 2011 expanded to include 
South Africa and became known as BRICS), reflected both a desire to 
transform the international system into a more multilateral configuration 
and an aspiration to open up more space for Brazil’s own possibilities 
abroad. The BRICS adopted a highly contestatory discourse vis-à-vis cer-
tain components and norms of the established global governance archi-
tecture, and began to deepen cooperation and coordinate some positions, 
especially on issues related to economic cooperation and development 
financing. The coalition acquired a greater degree of institutionalization 
by launching new institutions, such as the BRICS New Development Bank 
(NDB) (BRICS 2014). The NDB is meant not only to help fill the gar-
gantuan demand for infrastructure financing in the developing world, but 
also to place further pressure on established institutions like the Bretton 
Woods organizations to undertake serious reform in their decision-making 
processes. The new institution is relevant to peacebuilding because, at a 
normative level, the bank reinserts infrastructure investment at the heart 
of development debates, including within conflict-affected areas.
Despite its visibility, the BRICS and IBSA are not the only informal 
coalitions on Brazil’s rising power agenda. The G20, initially launched in 
1999, became more important to Brazilian foreign policy in the 2000s as 
a high table for global governance and economic policy. On a far lesser 
scale, Brazil also helped to establish and expand bi-regional summits such 
as the Summit of South American-Arab Countries and the Africa-South 
America Summit. Brazil’s role in these various informal coalitions of states, 
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which helped to expand its influence across the Global South, was decisive 
and influential for its peacebuilding initiatives in part because they granted 
Brazil greater legitimacy in engaging in a wider variety of contexts.
Within the UN System, this contestatory tone translated into demands 
for organizational reforms, including changes to the Security Council 
that would guarantee Brazil a permanent, veto-wielding seat on the UN 
Security Council. In this respect, Brazil has sought alignments beyond 
rising powers. For instance, starting in the mid-2000s, the country joined 
Germany, Japan, and India in the G-4, whose members seek a more demo-
cratic Council that would reflect contemporary interstate relations rather 
than the aftermath of World War II (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
Although these countries helped prompt the formation of a High-Level 
Panel on UN Reform in 2004, its recommendations for broadening the 
Council’s membership were not acted upon. As a Brazilian diplomat in 
Brasília put it, “This failure to reform added to the palpable sense of frus-
tration among [us], thus strengthening the resolve to launch alternative 
routes outside the UN architecture, especially through the loose coalitions 
of rising powers.”5
Nevertheless, at the UN Brazil engaged more directly in key nor-
mative debates about security and development. At the UN Security 
Council, where Brazil occupied a non-permanent seat in 2004–2005 and 
in 2010–2011 (making it, along with Japan, the member state that has 
occupied such a position the most times in UN history), (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) Brazil argued that the UN has neglected its original focus 
on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction in favor of heavy- 
handed military interventionism, whether led by North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) or otherwise. As one Brazilian diplomat states,
In general terms the UN has focused too much on the pillar of peace 
and security versus development. Decisions have been toward militarized 
solutions…. In our view, peacekeeping and peacebuilding shouldn’t be 
sequenced, but should be dealt with together, in tandem. When dealing 
with a post-conflict situation, one must deal with the causes of the conflict—
institutional, political, social and environmental. (Patriota 2011)
These sentiments reflect the foreign policy principles encoded in the 
1988 federal constitution, such as non-intervention, self-determination, 
international cooperation, and the peaceful settlement of conflicts— 
principles that had long guided Brazil’s positions at the UN. Back in the 
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early 1990s, for instance, Brazil proposed that the UN Secretariat produce 
an “Agenda for Development” to complement the influential “Agenda 
for Peace” published by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (Vigevani and 
Cepaluni 2012). However, under Lula Brazil placed greater emphasis 
on the transformative agenda. When chairing the Security Council in 
2011, Brazil chose to focus a debate on “security and development.” 
Brazil emphasized the interconnectedness of these aims as reflected in the 
presidential statement (PRST) that the Security Council adopted: “The 
Security Council underlines that security and development are closely 
interlinked and mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable 
peace” (President of UN Security Council 2011). The statement also rec-
ognized and called for strengthening the links between peacekeeping and 
early peacebuilding.
One Brazilian diplomat reflected on Brazil’s efforts:
I see that [PRST] statement as the culmination and heyday of a process of 
thinking about peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Brazil. From 2002 to 
2011, we were learning how to be norm-setters in the international com-
munity. Haiti was formative in conceptual development but also in the 
coalition- building element. We learned how to twist arms to have our con-
cepts included in the Council’s resolutions.6
Similarly, Brazil’s 2012 attempt to temper the principle of Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) by proposing the concept of Responsibility while 
Protecting (RwP)—despite never gained significant traction—demon-
strates Brazil’s occasional willingness to make high-profile proposals for 
alternatives to Western approaches. It also shows that Brazil’s primary 
platform for engaging with international security and peacebuilding, at 
least at a normative level, remains the UN. We now turn to how these 




When Brazil assumed the leadership of the military component of 
MINUSTAH, in 2004, the move represented a significant step up in its 
commitments to UN peacekeeping. That engagement became even more 
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complex after the 2010 earthquake created a humanitarian crisis super-
imposed on an already highly unstable setting. Even before the disaster, 
Brazil was the single largest troop contributor country to MINUSTAH, 
as well as a part of the core group of countries in Port-au-Prince and in 
the “Group of Friends of Haiti” in New York. Brazil saw the Haiti mission 
as a chance to initiate an alternative approach to UN peacekeeping—in 
essence, a more peacebuilding-oriented approach. As one Brazilian diplo-
mat said, “This was key in Haiti: how do we make it different? Our assess-
ment was that the US effort in the 1990s was a failure because it invested 
too much in the military and not enough in development and capacities.”7
Brazil pressed for authorization to use UN peacekeeping funds, gener-
ally restricted to funding peacekeepers and their operational needs, on 
development and peacebuilding-oriented programs in Haiti. As another 
diplomat reported, “In the Security Council and in the fifth [budget] 
committee, we pushed for quick-impact projects [QIPs] and community 
violence programs for Haiti.” The UN allocated approximately USD$5 
million annually to these QIPs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In one 
example that combined elements of development and peacebuilding, the 
“Light and Security” initiative, coordinated by Brazilian troops, installed 
solar lampposts in the most vulnerable parts of the capital, making those 
areas safer at night (UN Brazil 2013).
The Brazilian Corps of Engineers also helped to perforate wells, build 
bridges and dams, and carried out slope stabilization in landslide-prone 
areas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). One Brazilian diplomat reported 
that, in Haiti, “Our military engineers pushed the boundaries. The UN 
Secretariat wouldn’t let us repair roads too far from the battalion base 
[i.e., not required for MINUSTAH operational needs], so we brought in 
our own asphalt manufacturing capability and used Embassy funds to pay 
for road repairs elsewhere.”8 In many of these initiatives, Brazilian troops 
built upon the development-oriented activities that the Brazilian Armed 
Forces carry out domestically, for instance in remote areas of the Amazon 
and border regions.
In a somewhat usual arrangement, in Haiti the Brazilian government 
also created a partnership with Viva Rio, a Rio-based NGO that had spe-
cialized in community peacebuilding and disarmament in urban Brazil, 
to carry out humanitarian and development initiatives in areas of Haiti 
that had been strongly affected by the earthquake and ensuing crisis. 
For instance, Viva Rio coordinated a reconciliation program in which it 
helped mediate between the Haitian national police and leaderships from 
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 different parts of Bel Air, Cité Soleil and Delmas. Viva Rio also received 
MINUSTAH financing to carry out sports (including capoeira) and 
culture (such as Carnaval celebrations) in strengthening this mediation 
initiative (Viva Rio 2015). At the same time, the Brazilian government 
provided bilateral technical cooperation in social policy areas like pub-
lic health, agriculture, energy, and capacity-building. Through these dif-
ferent arrangements, Brazil worked to complement the military role in 
MINUSTAH with initiatives that would promote social well-being and 
stability in the long term.
Brazilian diplomats and analysts identify specific differences in the 
country’s approach to peacekeeping that have led some to refer to the 
“Brazilian way.” First among these is the warm conviviality of Brazilian 
culture, including the open and friendly manner of its soldiers in dealing 
with the Haitian population. Many Brazilian solders come from the poor 
favelas and communities that share traits with the most difficult communi-
ties in Haiti, and many are similarly dark-skinned, despite Brazil’s com-
plicated race relations. Related to this cultural affinity was Brazil’s early 
decision to deploy its forces with greater contact and proximity to the 
populations, especially in shantytown communities like Bellaire and Cité 
Soleil considered to have been taken over by politicized criminal gangs 
opposed to the government. One analyst described a decision that, when 
Brazil’s troops entered Bellaire in 2006, they would remove their sun-
glasses, look into the eyes of the people, and—in contrast to the Jordanian 
units—get out of their armored personnel carriers (APCs) and walk in the 
streets and converse with the population.9 In addition, Brazilian forces 
announced their entry into the community a few days prior, letting the 
criminal gang leaders leave and granting Brazilian troops non-confron-
tational entry and continued presence in these communities. Brazil fol-
lowed up these operations with social programs. Numerous analysts have 
evaluated and documented the more positive reaction of the inhabitants of 
these communities to the Brazilian units over earlier troops.
Brazil’s approach in Haiti, including in Bellaire, was neither uniform 
nor unproblematic. Despite the discourse on Brazilian conviviality and 
ease in integrating with locals, its participation in MINUSTAH has not 
been without critics. Some note that there is a feedback loop between 
Brazilian security forces’ heavy-handed presence in (or incursions into) 
the favelas in Rio and the peacekeeper’s approach to urban gangs in Haiti 
(Muller 2016). Certain Brazilian observers have criticized the insufficient 
coordination among stakeholders in Haiti, including Brazil (Hirst 2010). 
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Others have also noted that, as a result of its Haiti’s engagement, Brazil’s 
approach to peacebuilding often relies on a heavy military component and 
an uneasy or incomplete relationship with both Brazilian and local civil 
society actors. The same can be said of Brazil’s humanitarian efforts, in 
which Brazilian civil society and its official engagement with local non- 
government actors is minimal, if at all present.
Aside from Haiti and East Timor, most conflict-affected countries that 
Brazil has engaged with lie in Africa (Santos and Cravo 2014). During 
the 2000s, in particular, Brazilian peacebuilding initiatives expanded on 
the continent as part of Lula’s broader drive to increase Brazil’s presence 
in, and relevance to, Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan countries. Lula 
engaged in a highly visible presidential diplomacy, making 33 country- 
visits to partner states in the continent. He opened 19 embassies in the 
continent. His speeches tended to underscore the idea of solidarity and 
kinship, stressing that Brazil had a moral debt to Africa due to the heavy 
influence of African slavery on Brazilian society.
Development Cooperation
In its efforts to expand Brazilian cooperation with partner nations, the 
Lula government significantly broadened technical expert cooperation, 
especially in Africa and Latin America, with a focus on social policy areas 
such as tropical agriculture, public education and public health. During the 
eight years of his two-mandate presidency, Lula visited 27 African coun-
tries, opening and reopening embassies around the continent (Peixoto 
2010). Brazil’s expanded development and peacebuilding efforts reflected 
not just ideological commitments to South-South solidarity, but also a 
pragmatic recognition that Brazil’s ambitions to transform global power 
would require the political support of many countries of the global South.
Brazil branded itself a policy innovator in policy areas like public 
health, education, and tropical agriculture, framing its own development 
experiences as more similar to those of partner countries than those of 
traditional donors. Most of this technical cooperation is coordinated by 
the Brazilian cooperation agency (ABC), a division of the Ministry for 
External Relations (MRE). The ABC’s annual budget grew from 18.7 
million reais in 2006 to 52.26 million in 2010, the last year of Lula’s sec-
ond mandate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In 2009 alone, half the budget 
was spent in African countries, while 23% was spent in South America, 
12% in Central America and the Caribbean, and 15% in Asia—illustrating 
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that Brazil’s technical cooperation portfolio was not driven entirely by 
regional considerations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The ABC coordinates works with the implementing institutions (mostly 
other ministries or associated institutions, such as Fiocruz, the public health 
institution attached to the Ministry of Health, and Embrapa, the public 
agriculture research and development company affiliated with the Ministry 
of Agriculture. Less frequently, ABC partners with non- governmental 
institutions like SENAI (National Service for Industrial Learning) to carry 
out vocational and professional education programs abroad, but local civil 
society entities are rarely directly involved in Brazil’s technical cooperation 
initiatives. Although Brazil still lacks a legal framework for regulating its 
international development cooperation (or humanitarian assistance, exam-
ined below), its project portfolio diversified considerably during Lula’s 
two mandates, both geographically and thematically. It also came to incor-
porate more trilateral cooperation arrangements, whether with donor 
states [for instance, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)] 
or with multilateral platforms like the European Union or IBSA (Brazilian 
agency for cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The majority of cooperation projects involve sending Brazil-based 
experts from those institutions on short missions abroad to share knowl-
edge and experiences with their counterparts in partner states, typically 
drawing inspiration from initiatives inspired by Brazil’s domestic experi-
ences. This approach means that Brazilian technical cooperation lacks the 
thick middle layer of “development experts” that populate other coun-
tries’ donor agencies and international organizations, as Brazil’s providers 
hold expertise in their given technical field much more than in the trans-
mission of those skills in foreign contexts. While this approach generates 
few knowledge-generating mechanisms and less institutional memory, it 
also reduces bureaucracy and some expenses, for instance the maintenance 
of offices and personnel abroad.
At the same time, during the Lula years Brazil expanded its humani-
tarian role abroad. Within the Ministry of External Relations, a separate 
division was created in 2004, the General Coordination of Humanitarian 
Cooperation and Fight against Hunger (CGFOME). The division was 
tasked with coordinating Brazil’s humanitarian assistance, much of which 
focused on agricultural and nutritional issues via financial and grain dona-
tions to UN agencies and programs, as well as specific initiatives undertaken 
in partnership with other government divisions, such as the Ministries of 
Health, Defense, and Agriculture. From 2006 to 2015, Brazil channeled 
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humanitarian assistance to 96 countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and 
the Middle East (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).
There were some exceptions to this pattern of periodic missions, both 
in Mozambique and therefore part of broader efforts to foment stability in 
this post-conflict state: The first was a factory meant to produce medicine 
locally, especially anti-retrovirals for HIV/AIDS. The second was a tri-
angular cooperation project, undertaken in collaboration with the JICA, 
to transform large swaths of Mozambique into a corridor for export- 
oriented production of commodities (Suyama and Pomeroy 2015). Both 
these projects ran into problems of scale and financing and, in the case of 
ProSavana, met resistance by local as well as Brazilian civil society actors. 
These examples have made some Brazilian diplomats and specialists form 
the implementing agencies reluctant to take on ambitious, costly projects 
abroad.
The most strategic initiatives in these settings have become labeled as 
“structuring projects” (projetos estruturantes), and they are meant to build 
individual and institutional capacity to catalyze sector-wide reform inspired 
by Brazilian policy models. For instance, Fiocruz has been engaged in the 
creation and expansion of national public health schools that draw inspira-
tion not only on Brazil’s own public health schools, but also on the SUS, 
its public health system, which is based on Brazil’s constitutional right to 
universal access to free health care. Through these structuring projects, 
Brazil seems to offer state-led alternatives to models promoted by Western 
donors and major international organizations. However, in some instances 
they are implemented with little attention to local civil society, which con-
trasts to the very origins of those systems back in Brazil. For instance, 
the SUS itself resulted as much from grassroots activism during Brazil’s 
redemocratization in the 1980s as from government efforts. As a result, 
when such models are used as inspiration for post-conflict settings like 
Mozambique and Angola, they may run into difficulties resulting from the 
“political disembeddedness” of the cooperation projects, which do not 
take into account the role of local civil society (Abdenur and Marcondes 
2016).
Brazil’s peacebuilding has also included economic cooperation, includ-
ing via trade and investments (particularly infrastructure), which are 
viewed as necessary for triggering growth in partner states and essential 
for post-conflict reconstruction. For instance, although starting from a 
relatively low base in absolute numbers, there were efforts under Lula to 
both intensify and diversify Brazil’s commercial exchanges with African 
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states. These flows were mostly comprised of Brazil exporting manufac-
tures and semi-processed goods and importing from Africa commodities. 
In addition, there was an expansion of Brazilian investments in Africa, 
especially by large companies—either state-affiliated ones like the oil com-
pany Petrobras or the airplane manufacturer Embraer, or private ones 
like Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, and other Brazil-based multinationals 
specializing in infrastructure construction. The mining purchased major 
concessions and planned large investments around Africa. Some of these 
companies’ investments were partially financed by the Brazilian National 
Development Bank (BNDES), which created special credit lines for export 
incentives and even opened a regional office in Johannesburg to help 
coordinate these ties (BNDES 2013).
Within Africa, Brazil has engaged most deeply, although sporadically, 
in Guinea-Bissau. Many of the strengths, and contradictions, of Brazilian 
peacebuilding are evident in this case. At the UN, Brazil has long acted 
on behalf of Guinea-Bissau, trying to call attention from the international 
community to the country’s problems, which concern not just recurring 
political instability but also chronic underdevelopment. Even as Brazil was 
a very active participant in the creation of the UN peacebuilding archi-
tecture, including the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), it continued to 
work via the UN and the CPLP to garner resources and political dedi-
cation to trying to solve Guinea-Bissau’s instability and poverty. Once 
the PBC was established, Brazil assumed the leadership of the Country- 
Specific Configuration for Guinea-Bissau, through which it has tried to 
mobilize political solutions, especially by helping to coordinate the role 
of regional states and ECOWAS in preventing further coups-d’état in 
Guinea-Bissau (Abdenur and Marcondes Neto 2014). After the April 
2012 coup, Ambassador Antonio Patriota undertook fact-finding mis-
sions to the country, strengthened communications about Guinea-Bissau 
between the PBC and the UNSC (where Guinea-Bissau competes for 
attention with more severe crises), and was highly proactive in working 
with ECOWAS to prevent spillovers from the crisis (UN Secretary General 
Report on Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau 2015).
Brazil has also tried to implement bilateral cooperation efforts in 
Guinea-Bissau, ranging from the construction of a security forces training 
center to technical cooperation in areas like education and agriculture, 
particularly with a view to helping diversify the country’s economy away 
from its narrow reliance on the cashew nut cash crop (Brazilian Agency for 
Cooperation 2012). Finally, Brazil has invested heavily in trying to boost 
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Guinea-Bissau’s electoral system and human rights institutions, but the 
recurrence of coups in Bissau attests to the limitations of Brazil’s approach 
and, more broadly, of the efforts by the broader international community.
International Conflict Mediation
Brazil also tried to expand its role in international mediation, which his-
torically had been largely limited to South America, for instance in the suc-
cessful efforts to mediate a brief border conflict (the Cenepa War) between 
Ecuador and Peru in 1995. In the 2000s, Brazil became more willing 
to engage in international conflict mediation outside its own region. For 
instance, in 2007, Brazil was the only Latin American country to be invited 
to the Middle East peace conference in Annapolis, on the Palestine-Israel 
peace process. Yet the most visible and controversial such attempt involved 
a collaboration with Turkey and the USA to temper growing tensions 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. These efforts culminated in a 2010 
agreement signed by Iran, Brazil and Turkey, whereby Iran would send 
low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for enriched fuel for Iran’s 
nuclear research reactor (CFR 2010). The deal was not implemented for 
a variety of reasons, including the withdrawal of US support, and the out-
come made Brazilian diplomats a bit more reluctant to engage in such 
high-level mediation attempts. However, the experience did not stop 
Brazil (under Dilma Rousseff) from working through IBSA in an attempt 
to mediate the intensifying conflict in Syria; in August 2011, the three 
countries sent ministerial delegations to Damascus and were met there by 
President Bashir al-Assad, who promised (in vain) that his regime would 
act to stop the escalation of violence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011).
Points of Tension
However, Brazil’s peacebuilding is also marked by some points of ten-
sion between its discourse and practice. For instance, to some analysts, 
Brazil’s longstanding commitment to non-intervention seemed to come 
into contradiction with its participation in MINUSTAH, a Chapter VII 
mission (although the Brazilian government argued that only one chap-
ter of Resolution 1542, which created the Multinational Interim Force, 
was based on Chapter VII, rather than the whole resolution; Fishel and 
Sáenz 2007). Another point over which Brazilian peacebuilding has 
been criticized is that of insufficient transparency and accountability 
 A “BRAZILIAN WAY”? BRAZIL’S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING 
32 
of  initiatives. Although IPEA, the government think tank, has been in 
charge of collecting data on different aspects of Brazil’s South-South 
cooperation, the government institutions that are invited to open up 
their data do so voluntarily (IPEA 2011).
More broadly, the MRE in particular has been reluctant to adopt mon-
itoring and evaluation practices because these are considered by some 
Brazilian cooperation specialists to have a heavily Western bent, especially 
when associated with the practices of donor countries and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, recog-
nizing the need for more systematic planning that establishes benchmarks 
for both process and outcome-based evaluations, ABC in 2016 began 
considering the possibility of developing “homegrown” M&E practices. 
It is worth noting that the public institutions from which Brazil’s South-
South cooperation experts are drawn, such as Fiocruz and Embrapa, have 
robust mechanisms for M&E that are applied to projects domestically, and 
that these toolboxes have not been implemented abroad partly due to the 
low institutionalization of Brazilian peacebuilding, but also due to politi-
cal resistance.10 At any rate, part of objective of this technical cooperation 
is political—the maintenance of good diplomatic relations, an element 
that is not readily captured by traditional M&E processes.
Also on the flip side, Brazilian arms companies like Taurus also benefit-
ted from expanding African markets (and indirectly, from African con-
flicts and instability) to boost their sales of arms and military equipment, 
including some, such as cluster bombs, that had been banned under UN 
regimes. In 2013, Brazilian exports transferred some USD$10 million in 
small arms and accessories alone to other countries (Small Arms Survey 
2014). As with other major arms-exporting countries, these transfers 
sometimes undermine Brazil’s peacebuilding credentials abroad.
the retractIon In BrazIl’s peaceBuIldIng
Despite their close political relationship during Lula’s presidency, the 
transition from Lula to his former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, saw a 
noticeable shift in foreign policy. Rousseff seemed to take little interest 
in issues of foreign policy, aside from commercial and investment rela-
tions, and her presidential diplomacy reflected this relative lack of atten-
tion (in her five and a half years of presidency, she only visited three 
African states, for instance—South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique). 
There were also strained relations between the presidency and the MRE, 
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with abrupt switches of foreign ministers on two occasions. Although 
Brazilian diplomats (who are overwhelmingly career professionals) pro-
vided some continuity to political and cooperation efforts, for instance 
Brazil’s commitment to the BRICS, there was a considerable retraction 
in high- visibility engagement, both in South-South Cooperation and in 
relations with the North. As one Brazilian diplomat remarked in 2015 
about the country’s role at the UN, “We learned how to be agenda mak-
ers. Now maybe we are rolling back that role.”11 Brazil’s global role was 
also complicated by damaged US-Brazilian relations after Wikileaks docu-
ments showed widespread cyberespionage by the US government against 
Brazilian companies and political leaders, including the president herself.
This foreign policy shift and its economic context—a combination 
of falling prices in key commodities and ineffective policies—have had 
concrete repercussions for Brazil’s peacebuilding efforts. By 2014, the 
Brazilian government faced serious economic challenges, as GDP growth 
dropped from a peak of 7.5  in 2010 to below 1% in 2014. As a reces-
sion ensued, wide budget cuts were made, including to the MRE. These 
cuts affected not only Brazil’s South-South development cooperation at 
ABC, but also the day-to-day operation of its embassies and other diplo-
matic representations abroad. According to one source, the budget of the 
CGFOME dropped precipitously from 2010 to 2014.
When the Brazilian Congress first voted to impeach President Rousseff, 
in spring 2016, Vice President Michel Temer became an interim president 
and appointed José Serra, a São Paulo politician and former presidential 
candidate from the opposition party PSDB, as a foreign minister. In his 
inaugural speech, Serra indicated that the Temer government would stress 
different priorities than the two preceding Workers Party-led governments, 
notably by deemphasizing the role of South-South cooperation and seek-
ing to deepen ties to the USA and Western Europe. Temer’s government 
indicated that it wished to tone down the anti-Western rhetoric of both 
Lula and Rousseff and to deepen ties to the OECD and to northern coun-
tries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Discussions began within Brazil 
about phasing out the country’s role in MINUSTAH, although some 
have noted that such a retraction would deeply impact Brazil’s visibility in 
international peacekeeping unless troop contributions to other UN mis-
sions were made. However, the discussions have not yet yielded a concrete 
plan. At the same time, some restructuring within the MRE has gener-
ated new sources of uncertainty. In August 2016, after the presidential 
impeachment had been completed, the government announced that the 
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CGFOME had been permanently closed. Although its humanitarian assis-
tance initiatives were reallocated to ABC and the Social Policy division, 
this restructuring signaled the Temer government’s non-prioritization of 
Brazil’s role in humanitarian action (Valente 2016).
Although it is too soon to say what the mid- to long-term effects of 
the new government’s reorientation will be, deep uncertainty surrounds 
Brazil’s future role in peacebuilding, especially outside of the UN. Brazil’s 
engagement with peacebuilding follows an arc—a steep surge followed by 
a seemingly, equally steep decline in its engagement abroad. This variation 
raises broader questions about how vulnerable the rising power’s newfound 
roles in peacebuilding are to political winds and economic downturns. The 
low degree of institutionalization and questionable commitment of the 
state to these recent initiatives make their sustainability unclear.
conclusIon
In its peacebuilding engagement, which peaked in the 2000s, Brazil pursued 
both bilateral and multilateral avenues. However, in comparison with other 
large rising powers like China, Russia, Indonesia, India, and Turkey, much 
of Brazil’s engagement has taken place through multilateral institutions— 
not only the UN, but also informal coalitions such as the G20, BRICS, and 
IBSA. This option reflects the central role that multilateralism has played 
in Brazilian diplomacy, including the belief that collective, UN-sanctioned 
initiatives tend to be the most legitimate course of action.
Despite the discourse of demand-driven initiatives, Brazil’s peacebuilding 
is motivated by a combination of interests and identity. While the country’s 
history, including its constitutional landmarks, have established a set of prin-
ciples that serve as more or less stable guidelines for its foreign policy, they are 
not always applied in a uniform or consistent manner. Under Lula, Brazil’s 
aspiration to accelerate the transition of the international system toward a 
more multipolar configuration no doubt influenced some of its peacebuild-
ing engagements. A related objective—a permanent seat at the UNSC—was 
also among the drivers behind Brazil’s expanding engagement with peace-
building. In turn, these aspirations raised the expectations that other actors 
in the international community have about Brazil’s role in peace and security, 
both quantitatively (for instance, in terms of financial or troop contributions) 
but also qualitatively, through innovative approaches to promoting peace.
Brazil has consistently argued in favor of a less militarized approach to 
international security issues, and most of its peacebuilding efforts rely more 
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heavily on mediation, investment in socioeconomic development (not only 
through social policy and job generation, but also via infrastructure devel-
opment), and coordination between national and regional actors.
One persistent question, however, concerns the sustainability of 
these initiatives. Will there be a resurgence in Brazilian peacebuilding? 
Within the UN, it is likely that Brazil’s political commitment to the PBA, 
which has been deeply entrenched both in Brasilia and at the mission in 
New York, will continue. Outside of the UN, the possibility of another 
surge in Brazilian peacebuilding is constrained not only by the dual politi-
cal and economic crisis, but also by the “spread too thin” character of 
Brazil’s engagement during the 2000s. This overextension is particularly 
evident in the country’s South-South development cooperation portfolio, 
with many projects indefinitely suspended in 2016 due to budget cuts. 
Combined with low institutionalization, as reflected in the lack of a dedi-
cated legal framework and career path specializing in development coop-
eration within the MRE, the funding gap leads to lapses in institutional 
learning and feedback mechanisms that would enable improvements, such 
as in project planning and accountability.
Although Brazil’s expanded peacekeeping role has been highly visible, 
thanks to its participation in MINUSTAH and MONUSCO, the way that 
Brazil links peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives differs from the 
approaches of the other rising powers. For instance, whereas India sees 
development and peacebuilding as deeply intertwined, and whereas Turkey 
links peacebuilding with humanitarian and peacemaking efforts, for Brazil 
there is a clearer (but by no means absolute) distinction between peacekeep-
ing and peacebuilding. Brazil does embrace the distinction between those 
two spheres made in UN circles, but these two dimensions are more closely 
linked in Brazilian practice than in Western efforts. This is because Brazil 
views peacebuilding as a key corrective to conventional approaches to peace-
keeping, especially the heavy focus on security and military-dominated ini-
tiatives. By linking civilian peacebuilding alongside peacekeeping operations, 
as was done in Haiti through the partnership with Viva Rio, Brazil hopes 
to ensure that peacekeeping missions not only meet the everyday security 
needs of the local population, but also helps to ensure its economic and 
social well-being. Brazil’s main contribution, therefore, is not to enhance 
the Western approach to peacebuilding, but rather to use peacebuilding in 
order to help rebalance Western approaches in a less securitized direction. 
However, in order to push for deeper transformation, Brazil needs to make 
its own peacebuilding more sustainable, coherent, and accountable.
 A “BRAZILIAN WAY”? BRAZIL’S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING 
36 
 notes
 1. Interview with Prof. Tania Manzur, July 2015, Brasilia.
 2. Interview with Prof. Tania Manzur, July 2015, Brasilia.
 3. Brazil entered World Wars I and II only after its ships were attacked.
 4. As of September 2016, UNASUR comprises 12 South American coun-
tries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Suriname, and Venezuela.
 5. Interview with Brazilian diplomat in Brasília, November 2015.
 6. CT Call personal interview with Brazilian diplomat who had worked at the 
mission to the United Nations and requested anonymity, August 2015, 
Brasilia.
 7. CT Call personal interview with Brazilian diplomat who had worked at the 
mission to the United Nations and requested anonymity, August 2015, 
Brasilia.
 8. CT Call personal interview with Brazilian diplomat who requested ano-
nymity, August 2015, Brasilia.
 9. CT Call personal interview with Leopoldo Paz, August 2015, Brasilia.
 10. Interview with Fiocruz specialist, Rio de Janeiro, October 2016.
 11. CT Call personal interview with Brazilian diplomat who requested ano-
nymity, August 2015, Brasilia.
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CHAPTER 3




Compared to peacekeeping, the term peacebuilding receives relatively less 
attention among Indonesian policymakers and society. Indonesia’s active 
contribution to United Nations peacekeeping since 1957, not too long 
after its independence, has often been showcased as one of the coun-
try’s greatest achievements in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
However, this should not lead to the conclusion that Indonesia is not 
playing any role within the peacebuilding arena. This is partly because 
peacebuilding has been understood in a much broader sense than peace-
keeping. In the Indonesian context, peacebuilding, rather than viewed 
as direct efforts to prevent another lapse into conflict in post-conflict 
societies, is understood as different kinds of activities that can contrib-
ute to conflict prevention and conflict management. Indonesia focuses its 
peacebuilding efforts on sharing its experiences and knowledge in democ-
racy as a key to sustaining peace, playing a role as mediator/facilitator/
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observer, and conducting humanitarian actions that can help initiate the 
peace process.
While Indonesia has been involved in mediation activities for decades, 
this peacebuilding role developed more robustly during the ten years of 
President Yudhoyono’s administration from 2004 to 2014. The transition 
from the authoritarian regime of the New Order era to a democratic gov-
ernment led to greater stability, marked by the ability of the government 
to initiate peace processes that led to the settlement of various internal 
conflicts, and also the implementation of the first direct presidential elec-
tion in the country. Despite some problems, the transition went smoothly 
and the country avoided violent revolution, which was predicted by many 
observers. These experiences of democratic transition, which included 
installing the civilian government, returning the military to the barracks, 
and settling internal conflicts, have been considered valuable lessons which 
can be shared with other countries that are currently struggling with simi-
lar challenges.
This willingness to share experiences and lessons learned has been seen 
as part of Indonesia’s soft power to be projected in order to achieve its 
vision of becoming a middle power. As Indonesia gradually transforms 
itself from an aid recipient into an emerging donor or development partner, 
peacebuilding has become one of the key areas in which the government 
assists other countries that are struggling to rebuild their core political and 
economic infrastructures in order to achieve sustainable peace.
This policy brief explores how peacebuilding is understood in Indonesia, 
including any novel insights that can be drawn from its understanding 
of the concept; the principles/philosophies that underlie peacebuilding, 
the motivating factors, and the existing debate about peacebuilding; and 
finally descriptions of peacebuilding activities and how the results of those 
activities implemented abroad have been measured. Rather than exploring 
Indonesia’s unilateral role per se, the elaborations also include Indonesia’s 
role in the context of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
since the country has often worked through the framework of the regional 
organization, and Indonesia is often perceived by others as the ‘natural 
leader’ of ASEAN.
The policy brief begins with a brief explanation of the historical evolu-
tion of Indonesia’s peacebuilding efforts. For the purpose of this study, 
it traces back only to the so-called peacebuilding activities in the New 
Order era up to the post-reformation era under President Yudhoyono’s 
(2004–2014) administration. This historical evolution is important 
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to show a sense of continuity in the values and principles applied to 
Indonesia’s foreign policy, including in peacebuilding activities abroad. 
However, as is often the case, pragmatism sometimes takes precedence 
over a values-based approach to foreign policy.
The Indonesian approach to peacebuilding is distinct in at least two 
ways. First, it emphasizes persuasion to encourage host countries to think 
of ways to create peace in their respective countries, particularly through 
intensive dialogues with local stakeholders. Rather than taking place solely 
at the formal level, such dialogues have often been conducted on an 
informal basis to engage non-state actors, such as think-tanks and non- 
governmental organizations. Second, Indonesia emphasizes the concept 
of ‘sharing’ experiences. Rather than acting as an expert conveying its suc-
cess stories, Indonesia tends to apply a two-way approach in which it not 
only shares its own experiences, but also learns from the host country and 
works to understand the local context while seeking the local ‘modalities’ 
to be utilized in order to start the peacebuilding process. Indonesia does 
not advocate a ‘one-size-fits-all’ peacebuilding policy since each country 
has its own unique challenges and context. Respect for these conditions is 
considered key to successful peacebuilding.
HIstorIcal EvolutIon of IndonEsIa’s rolE 
In PEacEbuIldIng: nEw ordEr 
to Post-rEformatIon Era
Rather than understanding peacebuilding strictly as a set of activities con-
ducted in the aftermath of conflict, Indonesia interprets the concept more 
broadly. In the New Order era (1966–1998) under President Soeharto, 
such activities were mainly focused on conflict management, which 
entailed mediation or facilitation roles. In the post-reformation era under 
President Yudhoyono, Indonesia has also shared its experiences and les-
sons learned in democratization and dealing with internal conflicts.
Any discussion of Indonesia’s peacebuilding roles must be placed within 
the context of the country’s overall foreign policy.
During the first decade of his term starting in 1966, President Soeharto 
abandoned Soekarno’s flamboyant style and high-profile foreign policy, 
instead focusing on economic development. Foreign policy initiatives 
were directed to invite foreign investment, mainly from Western countries 
and international financial institutions to finance its  development  plan. 
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Rather than playing an assertive role like in the Old Order era under President 
Soekarno, from the late-1960s through the mid-1980s, Indonesia took a 
lower profile, focusing on economic growth and development, which was 
seen as the path toward a more assertive role internationally in the long 
term. In his remarks in August 1969, Soeharto elucidated this logic: ‘Why 
is the voice of Indonesia no longer heard abroad? The matter is that we 
shall only be able to play an effective role if we ourselves are possessed of a 
great national vitality’ (Leifer 1983). It was not until the 1980s, after the 
‘Asian economic miracle’ and a period of sustained growth, that Indonesia 
started to play a more active role, initially within Southeast Asia.
Two cases are often quoted as examples of successful peace efforts by 
Indonesia. The first is the end of the long Cambodian armed conflict. 
Working within the framework of ASEAN, Indonesia hosted the Jakarta 
Informal Meeting I in Bogor in July 1988 and the Jakarta Informal 
Meeting II in Jakarta in October 1989, which culminated in the histori-
cal Paris Peace Agreement in late October 1991. As depicted by former 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Indonesia, interlocutor for ASEAN, these two 
meetings sought to facilitate dialogue, first among the four Cambodian 
factions and second among those factions and Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and other concerned countries (Alatas 2001, 270). ASEAN, including 
Indonesia, worked hard to keep international attention on the Cambodian 
conflict and to end Vietnam’s occupation in Cambodia. Ultimately chang-
ing international circumstances at the end of the Cold War led Vietnam to 
withdraw its forces in April 1989 (Narine 1998, 207).
The second case is Indonesia’s involvement in facilitating the peace 
process between the Government of Philippines and the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) for two decades. According to Wiryono 
Sastrohandoyo, a seasoned Indonesian diplomat who once acted as a 
mediator of conflicts in Mindanao, soon after the rebellion broke out 
in late 1972, President Soeharto suggested that President Marcos settle 
the conflict through the mechanism of ASEAN. However, seeking to 
secure oil from the Middle East, Marcos decided to bring the case to 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) instead. The process 
under OIC resulted in the signing of Tripoli Agreement in December 
1976, but the agreement could not be implemented. Further discussions 
considering the establishment of an autonomous Muslim region in the 
southern Philippines were halted as hostilities among the parties resumed. 
The peace agreement was hampered even more as the Marcos administra-
tion insisted on implementing it without the participation of the MNLF.
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Only at its Ministerial Meeting in 1991 did the OIC) decide to expand 
the committee to include member countries from Asia. This develop-
ment was also supported by the new Philippine government of President 
Corazon Aquino. At that time, the OIC) Secretariat asked Indonesia to 
help facilitate the peace process. In 1993, Indonesia was elected Chair of 
the OIC) Ministerial Committee of Six, of which fellow Asian country 
Bangladesh was also a member. In April 1993, Indonesia hosted a second 
round of informal exploratory talks in Cipanas, West Java, which resulted 
in a ‘Statement of Understanding’ that called for formal peace talks that 
would discuss the modalities to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement. 
The first round of formal peace talks was held in October–November 
1993, which resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement 
and the 1993 Interim Ceasefire Agreement. After a series of meetings 
at the technical level, informal consultations and formal peace talks, 
the peace agreement was then signed between the Government of the 
Philippines and the MNLF in Manila in September 1996. Ambassador 
Sastrohandoyo, discussing Indonesia’s crucial role in forging the agree-
ment, said:
This is a case of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-building in 
which the United Nations (UN) was not involved at all. Instead it was an 
international organization with a religious orientation, the OIC), which was 
mediating. Its efforts could make no headway, however, until two countries 
from the Asian region, one of them a next-door neighbour of the conflicted 
country, became involved. (Sastrohandoyo 2008, 19)
In the post-reformation era, the Yudhoyono government was again able 
to assume a more assertive role in the region after half a decade of internal 
domestic consolidation. Indonesia experienced serious political, security, 
and economic crises during the period of 1999–2003, in the aftermath of 
Soeharto’s New Order regime. The impact of these crises was so severe 
that the economic growth declined and its political and military influenced 
waned in the immediate post-Soeharto years. Some analysts saw Indonesia 
as a ‘wounded phoenix’, unable to rise and pursue a robust foreign policy 
due to internal crises and lacking the strong leadership shown by Soeharto 
during New Order era (Weatherbee 2005).
It is interesting to observe how the post-reformation government under 
Yudhoyono tried to cope with its lack of ‘hard’ or material capabilities. The 
administration started to invest in projecting Indonesia’s soft power, which 
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mainly derives from the country’s political transition  experience from semi-
authoritarianism to a democratic civilian-led government. By expanding 
this soft power, Indonesia has sought to nurture what the President called 
‘intellectual leadership’, particularly in ASEAN. According to Yudhoyono, 
the country sought to be a ‘peacemaker, confidence- builder, problem-
solver, and bridge-builder’ (Yudhoyono 2005, 387). Fully aware of its 
identity as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, 
Indonesia portrayed itself as a genuine example where ‘democracy, Islam 
and modernity can go hand-in-hand’.
However, in the early years, Yudhoyono’s first term, the country was 
challenged by the tsunami disaster that hit Aceh in late December 2004, 
causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and destroying almost all the 
infrastructure in the province. The government gradually returned to its 
foreign policy activism again after two years, which is marked by the atten-
dance of President Yudhoyono in the Non-Aligned Movement Summit 
in Havana in September 2006. At the summit, he declared Indonesia’s 
aspiration to bridge the developed and developing worlds. One year later, 
Indonesia was able to secure several positions in the international arena, 
including a stint as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council 
(2007–2009), and membership in the UN’s Economic and Social Council 
(2007–2009) and Human Rights Council (2007). The year 2006 also 
marked a significant increase in Indonesia’s peacekeeping contribution, 
when it contributed a total of 1058 personnel to five UN missions, includ-
ing 850 troops for UNIFIL. By 2010, Indonesia was listed as one of top 
20 largest troop contributing countries to UN peacekeeping, and was 
ranked sixteenth in 2014.
In this context and in the area of peacebuilding, Indonesia expanded 
its role as a ‘champion’ of democracy in the region, as well as facilitator 
and peace observer. At the regional level, during the process to create 
the ASEAN Charter, Indonesia’s late Foreign Minister Ali Alatas insisted 
that the principles of rule of law, good governance, democracy promo-
tion, and protection of human rights to be included as the new principles 
of ASEAN.1 Later on, Indonesia took a leading role in the formulation 
process of the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint, which 
mandated the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body—later 
named the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
and the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation—a new institution 
established in 2011, which was specifically tasked to conduct research in 
peace and conflict resolution.
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At the bilateral level, Indonesia also offered to facilitate peace processes 
in other countries in the region. In 2008, the government explored poten-
tial involvement in facilitating the peace process in Southern Thailand, 
but the Thai government eventually rejected this. Then, starting in July 
2012, Indonesia also participated in the International Monitoring Team 
(IMT) to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement between 
the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF). Indonesia earned the trust of the Philippine government to par-
ticipate in IMT until 2015. At the global level, in its effort to project 
democratic values as the foundation to create peace, Indonesia initiated 
the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) in 2008. The forum, which invites 
Asia-Pacific leaders, aims to promote and foster regional and international 
cooperation in the field of peace and democracy through dialogue, allow-
ing leaders to share their experiences and best practices. The Institute of 
Peace and Democracy (IPD), which was specifically created to organize 
the BDF, has been successful in convening an annual meeting. The eighth 
meeting of the BDF took place in 2015.
Before entering into more detailed elaborations in the next few sections, 
one can see through the historical evolution of Indonesia’s peacebuilding 
activities some continuities and changes. Many of the values and principles 
that shape Indonesia’s peacebuilding have remained the same. However, 
some changes have also been observed, particularly in the way adherence 
to the non-interference principle has been interpreted and applied in con-
ducting peacebuilding activities.
From the analysis on Indonesia’s worldview and foreign policy by Paige 
Johnson Tan, two major aspects show continuity. The first is the way 
Indonesia perceives its role in the region as well as in the world. Second, it 
is the country’s underlying attitudes toward major powers and the world 
system as a whole. These two aspects reflect the doctrine, present since 
Suharto, that Indonesia’s foreign policy be ‘active and independent’ (Tan 
2007, 157).
The first aspect indicates the ‘active’ element in Indonesia’s foreign 
policy. As a large country in the region, Indonesia believes it should play a 
significant role in establishing a ‘world order’ based on ‘perpetual peace’, 
as enshrined since 1945 in the preamble to the constitution. In the New 
Order era, after the country’s economy grew significantly in late 1980s, 
the Soeharto government stated its intention to re-establish its active and 
assertive role in the world (Tan 2007, 159–160). Indonesia re-asserted 
this aspiration after domestic political and economic conditions improved 
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in the post-reformation era, as lingering internal conflicts were settled. 
As mentioned by President Yudhoyono in the mid-2005, ‘…After all, we 
have today an Indonesia that is capable and eager to actively engage the 
international community in the common task of building a better world’ 
(Yudhoyono 2005, 397).
The second aspect is Indonesia’s ‘independent’ policy. After the bit-
ter experiences of colonialism, Indonesia shared with other post-colonial 
countries the sentiment that the global system is still operated by and 
for the interests of the powerful countries. Therefore, in the Indonesian 
leaders’ view, it is very important to be neutral as a nation-state, navigat-
ing between superpowers during the Cold War, and even lead the region 
along a neutral path. What typifies Indonesian thinking, however, is the 
idea that neutrality should lead each country to ‘national resilience’, which 
will then create ‘regional resilience’. It means that each country and the 
region should come up with their own solutions to their own problems, 
limiting the interference of external powers in order to maintain stability. 
The first Foreign Minister of the Soeharto administration, Adam Malik, 
elaborated on this concept in 1971:
…However dominant the influence of these big powers may be, I think 
there is and there should be scope for an indigenous Southeast Asian com-
ponent in the new emerging power balance of the region. In fact, I am 
convinced that unless the big powers acknowledge and the Southeast Asian 
nations themselves assume a greater and more direct responsibility in the 
maintenance of security in the area, no lasting stability can ever be achieved. 
(Wulan and Bandoro 2007, 28)
The idea was reaffirmed during the post-reformation administration. 
When talking about the ASEAN Community, President Yudhoyono 
stated that ‘we in ASEAN are taking full responsibility for our own 
security’(Yudhoyono 2005, 395). Indonesia’s peacebuilding activities 
therefore value respect for the host country’s sovereignty and focus on 
gaining confidence and trust from local stakeholders, who have the resil-
ience to build sustainable peace.
While peacebuilding during the New Order era focused on playing a 
facilitator role, the Yudhoyono administration took a different route by 
sharing values that can contribute to creating sustainable peace, namely 
respect for democracy and human rights. The post-reformation govern-
ment has stepped up its peacebuilding in the region, such as in Myanmar, 
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where Indonesia assisted in implementing security sector reform to create 
military professionalism and separate the military from politics.
Several factors explain these different approaches. First, during the New 
Order era, Indonesia was governed by a military authoritarian regime, 
so even discussion about democracy and separation of the military from 
politics was unthinkable. Second, playing a facilitation role requires ‘hard 
power’, that is, economic and military strength in order to be able to influ-
ence conflicting parties to stop fighting and come to the negotiation table. 
Post-Soeharto governments are still struggling to rebuild that economic 
and military strength. As an alternative, Indonesia has developed and pro-
jected its soft power—values and wisdom gained from experiences during 
the political transition period.
concEPts and tErms
In Indonesia, especially among policymakers, the term ‘peacebuilding’ 
has been translated into Bahasa Indonesian as ‘bina perdamaian’ (which 
literally means peacebuilding). However, most of the existing literature 
on peacebuilding in Indonesia has elaborated on peacebuilding activities 
inside the country, since Indonesia has been—and is still in some areas—
dealing with separatist and communal conflicts. No study has yet been 
conducted analyzing Indonesia’s involvement in peacebuilding in other 
countries. This is not surprising, since interest in the topic is relatively 
novel. Therefore, the understanding of this type of ‘external’ peacebuild-
ing is rather limited.
Peacebuilding in the Indonesian context, rather than viewed rigidly as 
a set of activities conducted after peace has been secured through peace-
keeping missions, is applied more broadly as a variety of activities related 
to peace. Indonesia’s external peacebuilding efforts can be identified in 
at least three areas: (1) promotion of democracy and human rights; (2) 
mediation/facilitation role; (3) humanitarian action, including disaster 
relief.
At the policy level, these external peacebuilding activities have been 
included in the democracy and conflict resolution program, one of the 
seven program priorities mentioned in the Draft Design for Indonesia’s 
South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) .2 The SSTC viewed peace-
building as one of Indonesia’s comparative advantages, together with 
good governance.3 From here, it is clear that peacebuilding is viewed as 
a capacity to be shared with other countries, and therefore has been put 
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within the framework of Indonesia’s development assistance, together 
with other capacities in economic and socio-cultural fields.
Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights
As mentioned earlier, Indonesia’s experiences with peaceful democratic 
transition, despite some sectarian and communal conflicts as well as 
ethnic- based riots, are considered valuable modalities that can be shared 
with others that are facing similar challenges. There were fears that 
Indonesia, during this period of political turbulence, would be ‘balkan-
ized’ into smaller regions along ethnic-religious lines. The ability to sur-
vive and maintain its unity and become a relatively ‘healthy’ state, in terms 
of its political and economic achievements, is something to value and learn 
about.
Indonesia’s successful democratic transition is even more unique, given 
its status as the largest Muslim state. The fact that Indonesia has not 
become an Islamic state after the political reformation process, maintain-
ing its status as a secular country, has been portrayed as evidence that 
Islam can go hand-in-hand with democracy. As mentioned by President 
Yudhoyono in 2005,
…We are home to the world’s largest Muslim population. We are the world’s 
third largest democracy. We are also a country where democracy, Islam, and 
modernity go hand-in-hand….  (Yudhoyono 2005, 390)
It is interesting to note that sharing its experience with democracy has 
been underlined as one of the seven program priorities in Indonesia’s 
SSTC.4 The intention to build Indonesia’s democracy promotion capacity 
grew following the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia and later Egypt. 
Using the one- and second-track approaches, the Indonesian government, 
through the IPD, organized a workshop, in Jakarta in April 2012, that 
brought together delegates from Egypt, Tunisia, and Indonesia to discuss 
several issues, such as Islam, the state, and politics; political and constitu-
tional reforms; election laws and management; the role of political parties 
and civil society; the army’s role in democratic society; and the participa-
tion of women in the political process (Eliraz 2014).
Indonesia’s ability to share its experience with democratic transi-
tion to assist other burgeoning Muslim majority democracies has been 
highlighted by other international observers.5 Australian diplomat Greg 
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Moriarty, for example, argued that the Indonesian democratic transition 
served as a good example for the ‘Arab Spring’ countries that Islam and 
democracy can be compatible (Alford 2011).
Recently, Indonesia has also shown interest in promoting democracy 
to its fellow ASEAN member Myanmar. When it was under authoritarian 
rule, the country received harsh criticism from the international commu-
nity due to serious human rights violations, including political repression 
by the military junta, making it ASEAN’s ‘Achilles heel’. Indonesia, since 
Myanmar’s political opening, has looked to create pathways to promote 
democracy into the country. It started with the first formal visit of President 
Yudhoyono to Myanmar in 2006. It continued with the Second Forum 
of the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC)  between 
Indonesia and Myanmar in 2011, which took place in Yangon, in which 
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa met with his Myanmarese counter-
part, U Wunna Maung Lwin, and with Aung San Suu Kyi—the symbol of 
Myanmar’s democratic struggle. On this occasion, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister expressed the country’s intention to work with Myanmar’s gov-
ernment to support capacity building in the fields of good governance, 
democracy, and human rights (Maulida and Adamrah 2011).
Mediation/Facilitation Role
Indonesia’s role as a mediator, facilitator, and observer is nothing new. 
As mentioned earlier, during the Cold War era, Indonesia was praised for 
its active role in the Cambodian peace process, organizing the Jakarta 
Informal Meeting I and Jakarta Informal Meeting II.
More recently, in the early 1990s, Indonesia was actively involved in 
brokering peace in the Southern Philippines. Indonesia has been par-
ticularly engaged in the peace process between the Government of the 
Philippines (GPH) and the MNLF) at the request of the Organization 
of Islamic Conference (OIC) forum, while Malaysia is more involved 
as a third-party facilitator between the GPH and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). As mentioned earlier, Indonesia’s facilitat-
ing role culminated in the First Round of Formal Peace Talks held in 
Jakarta in October–November 1993, which resulted in the signing of a 
Memorandum of Agreement and the 1993 Interim Ceasefire Agreement. 
Indonesian officers then also joined as members of the OIC) Observer 
Team that coordinated the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. 
Jakarta was chosen as the host of several follow-up meetings to establish 
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a transitional structure and mechanism for the provincial government in 
the autonomous region, besides New  York and Jeddah. Then, a peace 
agreement was reached between the GPH and the MNLF in September 
1996 (Sastrohandoyo 2008, 15–30). While it is understood that peace is 
a process, Indonesia has continued its role as part of the IMT since 2012. 
Until 2014, at least four teams were sent to monitor peace in this area.
Indonesian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also 
played crucial facilitation roles. Muhammadiyah, an international non- 
governmental organization (INGO) based in Indonesia, has participated 
in the International Contact Group, a hybrid mediation support initiative 
asked to provide support to the parties.6
Indonesia also attempted to act as a mediator in Southern Thailand 
between the Thai government and the Muslim groups residing in 
the southern part of the country. The Indonesian government, led by 
Vice President Jusuf Kalla (who now also serves as the Indonesian Vice 
President for the second time), managed to host a peace talk in Bogor in 
2008 attended by Thai officials and representatives of insurgent groups. 
The effort did not produce an agreement and was later rejected by the 
Thai government since it insisted that the talks should be kept strictly 
domestic (The Jakarta Post 2010).
Humanitarian Action
While humanitarian action, including disaster relief, is normally separated 
from peacebuilding efforts, in the context of Indonesia, humanitarian 
assistance has been utilized to pave the way to conduct peacebuilding. 
This distinct feature has been created as a strategy to ensure that state 
sovereignty is respected, since humanitarian action is often considered less 
threatening than peacebuilding activities that can be perceived as chal-
lenging a government’s capacity to deal with post-conflict situations. 
Furthermore, humanitarian assistance can be crucial to gaining trust from 
the host countries, since such efforts are often viewed as a gesture of good 
will. Humanitarian assistance can also be utilized to share experiences with 
disaster and crisis management.
Cyclone Nargis provides a good example of the usefulness of humanitar-
ian assistance. In this context, Indonesia played a leading role in approach-
ing the military junta in Myanmar and challenging it to open access to 
outside humanitarian aid to help the victims. Indonesia drew upon the 
experience of handling the impact of the tsunami disaster that hit Aceh in 
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December 2004, in which the peace negotiations between the Indonesian 
government and the Aceh separatist movement resumed immediately 
after the tragedy took place. The Indonesian government saw an oppor-
tunity for the regime in Myanmar to open up to the outside world, which 
became another path to spread democratic and human rights values in the 
country through long-term and sustained engagement with international 
community. As elucidated by Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda in the 
wake of Cyclone Nargis disaster,
Based on our experience with tsunami, we want to make sure there’s more 
after the relief phase. Reconstruction, rehabilitation and even prevention. We 
want to nurture that sense of wanting to open up on Myanmar’s side to have 
a long-term engagement with the international community. (Hotland 2008)
Indonesia has also been actively involved in finding ways to help 
Myanmar’s Rohingya minorities. Starting with the flow of Rohingya 
people stranded in Indonesia’s territories, mostly in the northern tip of 
Sumatera island in 2012, the Indonesian government has been domesti-
cally pressured to help the group, which faces repression and discrimina-
tion in Myanmar. The local people, such as the Acehnese, have helped the 
Rohingya to get food, medication, and shelter after traveling through the 
Indian Ocean for months.
In September 2012, the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) through its 
Chairman Jusuf Kalla, who was actively involved in the Aceh peace pro-
cess while he served as Vice President, visited Myanmar and shared some 
best practices and suggestions based on the Indonesian experience in 
dealing with peace in Aceh, in a forum to discuss peaceful solutions to 
the civil conflict in Myanmar (Taufiqurrahman 2012b). He also signed 
an agreement with the Myanmar Red Cross to provide financial and 
technical assistance for short- and long-term programs that address the 
refugee crisis in the Rakhine state. Kalla stated that PMI would like to 
stay in the Rakhine state for the post-conflict reconstruction program 
(Taufiqurrahman 2012a). While PMI has received permission to conduct 
its activities in the country, unfortunately other humanitarian agencies, 
such as Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland (MSF-H), have been denied 
access since February 2014 to continue humanitarian activities in the 
country (Fan and Krebs 2014, 9–10). Despite these obstacles, the fact that 
PMI still has access should be seen as an opportunity for Indonesia to play 
a significant role in the country, especially to help resolve ethnic tensions.
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Looking at Indonesia’s capacities, based on its experiences dealing with 
its own communal conflicts, since the late 2012 President Thein Sein has 
asked Indonesia to assist the Myanmar government in resolving the ongo-
ing ethnic tensions that are taking place in the Rakhine state, where most 
Rohingya people have been displaced (Santosa 2012).
Recently, in late December 2016, the Indonesian government has once 
again taken the initiative to send humanitarian aid to the Rakhine state to 
ease the suffering of the people, especially the Rohingyas. The tension has 
risen in the area as the government responded through the military mea-
sure to search for the perpetrators after the attack against the police in the 
Mungdaw and Rathedaung townships in early October 2016. This action 
has been followed by the Indonesian government proposal to the OIC 
during the Extraordinary Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur on 
January 19, 2017, which basically calls for it to conduct four things: (1) 
to offer humanitarian aid and security advice for avoiding further clashes; 
(2) to work closely with the Myanmar government; (3) to cooperate with 
regional organizations, such as ASEAN; and (4) for the OIC member 
countries to assist the country through economic development, with the 
possibility to get assistance from the Islamic Development Bank (Antara 
News 2017).
orIgIns and undErlyIng PrIncIPlEs/PHIlosoPHy
Based on the elaborations above, we can see that peacebuilding in the 
Indonesian context has been viewed rather differently from traditional 
actors. Peacebuilding, while it certainly entails activities to rebuild core 
government functions to prevent lapses into conflict, also includes sup-
porting activities to build trust in order to allow more ‘direct’ peacebuild-
ing efforts to take place. This is crucial since peacebuilding has been seen 
as external intervention by outside actors into a country’s domestic affairs, 
which is sometimes considered a challenge to the host government’s 
sovereignty.
Such distinct approaches also entail a set of unique principles. There are 
at least two principles to highlight.
The first principle is the importance of carefully considering the ‘com-
fort’ level of the host country in accepting the offer to help with a peace-
building process, while at the same time seeking an entry point. This is 
critical to gaining the trust of the partner country and eventually deter-
mines the level of success achieved in this peacebuilding effort. The host 
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government should reach the stage where it feels the need for and is com-
fortable enough to open up itself to receiving other countries’ assistance 
in the peacebuilding process.
How to achieve that comfort level? First, it is done through persua-
sive action. For example, representatives from the Indonesian government 
approached Middle East countries such as Egypt and Tunisia in the midst 
of the Arab Spring uprisings to share Indonesia’s democratic transition 
experiences.7
Second, Indonesia provides humanitarian assistance, such as the 
response to the devastative Cyclone Nargis caused in Myanmar. When the 
Myanmarese government was condemned for its refusal to give access to 
international humanitarian agencies to enter the country during Cyclone 
Nargis and even ‘threatened’ to receive a UN Security Council response 
under the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP) principle, as proposed by 
the French government, Indonesia immediately rejected such a proposal. 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa argued that by invoking 
the RtoP principle, ‘it would jeopardize and undermine aid work, not 
only for Myanmar, but also future humanitarian situations’, since RtoP is 
only applied in situations related to the four serious crimes, that is geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Hotland 
2008). Indonesia has played an influential role to consolidate support 
from all ASEAN member countries for Myanmar’s chairmanship bid in 
ASEAN for 2014. Indonesia viewed that ASEAN membership would 
motivate the Myanmarese government to further democratize and adopt 
more stringent human rights values (Adamrah 2011).
Consent from the host country is a must. While Indonesia often took the 
initiative in engaging with other countries, it always emphasized consulta-
tion with and consent from the host country. For example, when Indonesia 
offered assistance in monitoring the mid-term elections in Myanmar in 
2012, it patiently waited for the signal from the Myanmarese government 
as to whether it needed an election monitoring team (Kompas, January 
2012). Also, in the case of Southern Thailand, the Indonesian Foreign 
Minister stated that any request for assistance from the Thai government 
would be welcomed, but Indonesia would not interfere preemptively (The 
Jakarta Post 2010). Consent fosters a sincere engagement with the host 
government in the peacebuilding process. This reflects Indonesia’s desire 
for the host government to feel confident that the offer of peacebuilding 
assistance will not challenge its sovereign control over its internal affairs. 
With this so-called constructive engagement, it is expected that Indonesia, 
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in its efforts to conduct peacebuilding in other countries, will not burn 
bridges, but rather maintain its relations and be able to exercise influence 
and persuasion with other governments.
The second principle is ‘sharing’. This concept of ‘sharing’ has been 
mentioned in almost every effort to help other countries in this peace-
building context. Based on several interviews, this concept of ‘shar-
ing’ has been defined in at least two ways. First, it is to emphasize that 
Indonesia has no intention to dictate or impose certain lessons or values 
to the host countries. According to the Executive Director of the Institute 
for Peace and Democracy, I Ketut Erawan, this approach has been taken 
because Indonesia believes that each country has local modalities/capaci-
ties to start its peacebuilding process. Furthermore, there are cases, such 
as in Myanmar, where the local stakeholders, including the government, 
asked Indonesia to share its experience in managing its ethnic relations. 
Related to Indonesia’s initiative to support Myanmar in its democratic 
transition, as highlighted by the former Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia has been willing to be a ‘study case’ for any 
country to learn. Moreover, Minister Natalegawa stated that, ‘With the 
approach that we are doing, they do not feel that they are being dictated 
because what we try is to share our experiences and lessons that we gained 
before…’ (Kompas, February 2012). Second, the things that are shared 
are based on Indonesia’s own experiences with democratic consolidation, 
among other challenges. Indonesia has also been open to share its mis-
takes and setbacks with the partner countries. By doing so, Indonesia has 
been able to secure trust and has more credibility, since it is not dictating 
the path forward for host countries. Thus, Indonesia also believes that 
there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ recipe to build peace, since each country has 
its own distinct characteristics and challenges. Indonesia shares not only 
success stories, but also its past mistakes and failures. Therefore, each host 
country can choose what should be adapted to its own context.
Such principles are meant to accommodate respect for state sovereignty 
and non-interference in others’ domestic affairs. Again, it is believed that 
the success of peacebuilding efforts depends on the ability of the actors 
to work at a pace that is in line with the standards of the host country, a 
pace that does not threaten the control of the host government over its 
own domestic sphere. This may be a long process, and is often criticized as 
ineffective by traditional peacebuilding actors, mainly Western countries, 




This leads to the question of whether the application of such principles 
actually positions external peacebuilding actors as weak vis-à-vis the host 
government. One senior Indonesian diplomat said that we should not 
forget the element of ‘firmness’ in any persuasive approach undertaken. 
This has been shown in the case when the former Foreign Minister Hassan 
Wirajuda approached the military junta in Myanmar to allow humanitarian 
aid. Wirajuda was able to put pressure on the junta by asking the Foreign 
Minister of Myanmar what ASEAN membership meant for Myanmar and 
what Myanmar’s membership meant to ASEAN in terms of ASEAN’s 
internal coherence and international profile (Widyaningsih and Roberts 
2014, 108). By explaining the consequences of not allowing ASEAN to 
play a role in responding to the disaster, the ‘persuasive’ effort resulted 
in the opening up of the country for the flow of humanitarian assistance.
Motivations
It is a daunting task to explore the drivers behind Indonesia’s peacebuilding 
activities abroad. In interviews conducted with various government officials, 
most of them immediately referred to one of the country’s national objectives 
stated in the Preamble of the Constitution, which is ‘to participate toward 
the establishment of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and 
social justice’. Such statements, mostly made by senior diplomats, imply that 
there is still a strong tendency to argue that it is inappropriate to talk about 
direct benefits as if the government seeks ‘rewards’ for the good deeds that 
it does for others. However, discussions with some younger diplomats reveal 
a growing alternative view that now is the time for the government to start 
thinking about what real or tangible benefits to pursue if the country wishes 
to maintain its active role, particularly in the peacebuilding and peacekeep-
ing fields. They argued that while such idealism is to a certain extent still 
valid, it is also important to think about how Indonesia’s contributions can 
also serve the country’s national interests in a more tangible way.
CSIS’s earlier study on the SSTC described these complexities. The 
study, in which Indonesia’s peacebuilding activities were included as one 
of country’s niche capacities to share, concludes that SSTC activities so 
far have not had clear objectives. There are three categories of ‘benefits’ 
that can be applied to Indonesia’s peacebuilding context. First,  intangible 
benefits such as showing Indonesia’s good will and solidarity toward 
other developing countries are emphasized. Second, while helping oth-
ers, Indonesia can also benefit by learning from the experiences that the 
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beneficiary/host countries go through. Third, while there might be some 
tangible political and economic benefits, it is always necessary to avoid 
imposing Indonesia’s interests and agenda and to be as subtle as possible 
when dealing with this issue. This is crucial to maintain Indonesia’s repu-
tation among developing countries (CSIS 2014).8
In the peacebuilding context, the second ‘benefit’ above has been 
affirmed. Through its interactions with the partner countries, Indonesia 
has learned many useful lessons to help develop its democracy. One exam-
ple, in Indonesia’s engagement with Tunisia to help the country set up 
its election system, policymakers learned that Tunisia’s election system 
ensures equal opportunity for women candidates to be elected by putting 
the names of men and women candidates alternately in the ballot papers 
for national and local elections.9
Another motivation is the aspiration to play a role as a middle power, 
which has to a certain extent influenced the initiative to embark on peace-
building activities abroad. It is particularly based on the perception of 
Indonesia’s identity as the biggest country in Southeast Asia in terms of size 
and population, and also as a proponent of the first Asia-Africa Conference 
in 1955, the largest association of developing countries. Additionally, the 
country perceives itself as having a distinct capacity that may not be inher-
ited by others. Former President Yudhoyono, in the beginning of his first 
term, described the country as home to the world’s largest Muslim popu-
lation as well as the third largest democracy. Indonesia aspires to be a 
model, according to him, for how democracy, Islam, and modernity go 
hand-in-hand. Having this special quality, Indonesia envisions itself play-
ing an active role as a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, or 
bridge-builder that connects different countries and civilizations.
CSIS’s study on Indonesia’s SSTC activities10 makes a similar argu-
ment that the government tends to be subtle when discussing the tan-
gible economic and political benefits of peacebuilding. According to the 
interviewees, this tone is struck to avoid the perception that Indonesia’s 
vested interests and agenda are imposed on the recipient countries. This 
is important to ensuring that Indonesia’s presence is accepted among host 
countries, so that it is perceived as an impartial/neutral actor and can con-
tinue its role as peace-maker or bridge-builder. Therefore, an important 
motivating factor for Indonesia’s peacebuilding activities is to enhance its 
global presence and build its reputation as a responsible member of the 
international community that contributes significantly to the maintenance 
of international peace and security. There are three words, according to 
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the study on Indonesia’s SSTC, to describe its motivation: good will, soli-
darity, and presence (CSIS 2014, 84–85).
Finally, there are debates on the extent religious considerations influ-
ence the government’s decisions about which countries Indonesia engages 
in. There has been clear and sustained pressure from Indonesia’s Muslim 
majority public to persuade the government to assist Muslim communities 
that are facing discrimination and persecution in their home countries, 
both within the region (Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and 
currently Rohingya minorities in Myanmar) and further afield, such as in 
the Palestinian territories and Syria.11 However, as mentioned by one of 
Indonesia’s leading international relations experts, this current focus on 
Islam as part of the country’s national identity is relatively new, beginning 
in the post-Soeharto era, which commenced in 1999 while emphasizing 
that solidarity among developing countries often prevails over solidarity 
among Muslim countries (Anwar 2010, 47).
Rather than simply invoking its Islamic identity, the country has a dis-
tinct aspiration to show how Islam can go hand-in-hand with democracy. 
This is due to what Indonesia perceives as its unique status as the world’s 
largest Muslim population and the third largest democracy. Indonesia sees 
a niche in its engagement: emphasizing its Muslim identity to gain con-
fidence from the host countries while promoting democracy as a key to 
sustaining peace.
Debates on Aspects of Peacebuilding
Since peacebuilding abroad is relatively new for Indonesia, there has been 
little debate on the subject to date. Nevertheless, from interviews con-
ducted with government officials and peacebuilding activists in Indonesia, 
one important issue can be highlighted.
The most common debate centers on whether the country should 
actually play a role in helping other countries deal with their internal cri-
ses. While there has been a strong call from within Indonesia to play an 
active role to promote democracy abroad to exert its soft power, many 
officials possess self-awareness that the country is not in the best strategic 
position to play a significant role abroad due to internal political prob-
lems. Its democracy is still very much ‘a work in progress’ and faces many 
 challenges (see Sukma 2012, 90 and Karim 2013). Some take the view 
that Indonesia’s domestic challenges make it difficult to support democ-
racy abroad.
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actIvItIEs/Programs and ImPact
Despite Indonesia’s activism in peacebuilding, data on these activities are 
scattered and not well-documented in a single and centralized location. 
Nevertheless, some information can be gathered through the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and related institutions like the IPD.
In peacebuilding efforts related to the first area of democracy pro-
motion and human rights, the government mostly conducts workshops, 
seminars, and trainings for the stakeholders in host countries. Two work-
shops appear in the online reports of the MFA’s Directorate of Technical 
Cooperation (KST) within the period 2006–2013:
 1. International Training Workshop on ‘Democratization and Good 
Governance’ held in Jakarta from October 28 to 31, 2008, orga-
nized by the Directorate of KST. The beneficiaries were participants 
from Timor Leste (four), Palestine (four); Cambodia (two); Lao 
PDR (two); Papua New Guinea (one), Viet Nam (two), and 
Indonesia (one).
 2. International Workshop on Democracy Sharing Experiences 
Between Indonesia and Arab Countries held in Jakarta, Pekanbaru, 
and Bandung from September 13 to 20, 2013. The beneficiaries 
were from Jordan (five), Sudan (five), Somalia (one), Egypt (three), 
and Yemen (three).
Another source of Indonesia’s peacebuilding activities is the Blue 
Book on Indonesia-Myanmar Capacity Building Partnership 2013–2015. 
That source reveals these activities within the peacebuilding framework 
(Table 3.1).
For such activities, government institutions, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Law and Human Rights and Ministry of 
Defense, and other government-related institutions, such as the National 
Human Rights Commission, have been involved as the main actors. 
Among those activities, the Indonesian government has been very active 
in organizing the annual Bali Democracy Forum since December 2008. 
This Forum invites state leaders to discuss the development of democracy 
in the Asia-Pacific region. It is seeks to ‘promote and foster regional and 
international cooperation in the field of peace and democracy through 
dialogue-based on sharing experiences and best practices that adhere to 
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Table 3.1 Proposed peace-related Indonesian programs/activities in Myanmar 
(2013–2015)
Year Period Programs/activities Organizer
2013 October Training on promoting national 
reconciliation for social welfare
•  MoFA (Directorate KST)
December Dialogue between Indonesian and 
Myanmar parliaments
 •  IPD
•  MoFA (Directorate of 
East Asia and Pacific)
June Workshop and training on 
chairmanship in ASEAN
• IPD
•  MoFA (Directorate of 
East Asia and Pacific)
2014 March Workshop on enhancing 
Supremacy of Law in the 
framework of protection of human 
rights
•  MoFA (Directorate KST, 
Directorate of East Asia 
and Pacific, and 
Directorate of Legal 
Affairs)
•  Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights
July Discussion on strengthening 
election monitoring system
• Election Commission
•  Local (Jakarta) Election 
Monitoring Body
•  MoFA (Directorate KST 
and Directorate of East 
Asia and Pacific)
October Workshop on national action plan 
on human rights
•  MoFA (Directorate KST, 
Directorate of East Asia 
and Pacific)
•  Indonesian Embassy in 
Yangon
2015 July Training program on peace- 
building in the process of 
sustainable development in 
Myanmar
•  MoFA (Directorate KST 
and Directorate of East 
Asia and Pacific
•  Ministry of Defense 
(MoD)
•  Indonesian Embassy in 
Yangon
November Workshop on enhancing capacities 
in democracy and human rights
•  MoFA (Directorate KST, 
Directorate of East Asia 
and Pacific, and 
Directorate of Legal 
Affairs)
•  Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights
Source: Blue Book on Indonesia–Myanmar capacity building partnership 2013–2015 (Indonesian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013)
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the principle of equality, mutual respect and understanding, with the 
participating countries sharing its ownership’.12 The IPD was formed by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of Udayana University, 
based in Bali, to serve as the implementing agency for the Bali Democracy 
Forum.13
The mediation/facilitation/monitoring roles usually involved certain 
high-ranking active or ex-government officials or other prominent figures. 
The monitoring/observer role usually involved civil servants and military 
personnel, which was the composition of the Indonesian delegation that 
participated in the IMT in the Southern Philippines.
Finally, in the humanitarian actions area, the activities have been diverse, 
ranging from providing health facilities, building schools, natural disaster 
relief efforts to help the victims, to providing temporary shelters for the 
displaced Rohingya minorities.
Budget
Most of Indonesia’s peacebuilding activities are funded through the 
national budget, but some activities receive funding or grants from exter-
nal partners. Unfortunately, it is still difficult to determine the specific 
allocations from the national budget for Indonesia’s SSTC, let alone 
activities related to capacity building in democracy and conflict resolution 
per se. While there may be some information available about the targeted 
countries and types of assistance, there is no specific information available 
about budget allocation for each program.
The activities to promote dialogues on democracy organized by IPD 
cost around US$67,000 (IDR 800 million) per activity, which includes 
preliminary visits to conduct a needs assessment, consultations and net-
working with local stakeholders, and workshops and trainings.14 Since 
IPD is independent of the government, it seeks funding support from 
external partners, such as AusAID, USAID, and different foreign embas-
sies in Indonesia, while cost-sharing has been utilized for some activities in 
collaboration with several ministries.15
Table 3.2 shows some pieces of information that can be traced from 





Just as it is difficult to put together a comprehensive and systematic 
accounting of Indonesia’s peacebuilding activities, it is also hard to mea-
sure the impact of those activities on sustaining peace. As in the case of 
Indonesia’s overall SSTC framework, the ultimate problem is that there 
have been no evaluation or monitoring mechanisms to date. There has 
been an absence of evaluations of completed projects, which could prove 
useful to assess which activities work and which do not (CSIS 2014, 55).
Thus far, the main indicator of success is positive feedback from the rel-
evant stakeholders or follow-up requests from the host countries for fur-
ther engagement, such as in Indonesia’s engagement with Egypt in sharing 
its democratic experiences.16 Another example is the acknowledgement 
given by the highest leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
), Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, in support of Indonesia’s continuing role with 
the IMT in ensuring the success of the peace process in the Southern 
Philippines (Ladiasan 2014). In addition, Myanmar President Thein Sein 
Table 3.2 Indonesia’s peacebuilding assistance in selected countries (2010–2014)
Target country Year Form Amount
Palestine 2014 Aid USD 5,00,000 
(IDR 1 billion)
2014 Aid USD 1 million
2014 Capacity building USD 1.5 million
2012 Aid USD 1,00,000
2012 Fund to develop cardiac center in Gaza USD 2.1 million 
(IDR 20 billion)
2010 Aid USD 20,000




2014 Funding to build four schools USD 1 million
2013 Emergency relief and funding to 
redevelop housings
USD 1 million
South Thailand 2013 50 scholarships for college students to 
study at Islamic Universities in 
Indonesia
n/a
Syria 2014 Aid USD 5,00,000
Source: Author’s compilation from different media sources
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asked Indonesia to assist his country in resolving ethnic  tensions, par-
ticularly those involving the Rohingya people. Moreover, the Myanmar 
government also indicated its hope and support for Indonesian private 
sector investment in the Rakhine state—the area where most Rohingya 
people live—in order to create more jobs to ease the social and economic 
problems there (Santosa 2012).
In the case of ASEAN, the achievements, interestingly, have been 
measured in terms of the ability of some ASEAN countries to ‘unite’. 
The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to conduct peacebuilding tasks, 
mainly to monitor the decommissioning of GAM (the separatist Free 
Aceh Movement group) weapons, redeployment of the Indonesian 
security forces, reintegration of ex-combatants into the society, as well 
as the legislative process have been deemed at least a partial success due 
to the participation of some ASEAN member states (Brunei, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), including Indonesia, which 
made the mission impartial, without denying the significant support 
given by some European Union member states during the early phase 
of AMM. There was even a proposal to make AMM a model for future 
cooperation in crisis management between regional actors (Feith 2007, 
1–7).
This can also be seen in the establishment of the IMT—in which 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei participated—to monitor the implemen-
tation of the peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines 
and MILF. In fact, the consent from the host country, as shown by the 
Indonesian and the Philippines governments, for ASEAN or some ASEAN 
member states, in collaboration with external partners to conduct peace-
building activities, is by itself already an indicator of achievement.
conclusIons and way forward
The account above demonstrates that Indonesia views its peacebuilding 
role as part of its overall assistance and cooperation with other countries, 
particularly fellow developing countries. While some peacebuilding efforts 
entailed humanitarian actions, including aiding the people in host coun-
tries with some economic assistance, the government tends to separate 
peacebuilding efforts from ‘routine’ development assistance that supports 
economic and socio-cultural ends. In its peacebuilding efforts, Indonesia 
focuses more on sharing capacities in the political field, particularly by 
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sharing its democratic and human rights values and playing a mediation 
or facilitation role.
Rather than having a rigid template to be brought to the host coun-
tries, Indonesia tends to approach them with a ‘blank sheet’. Indonesian 
diplomats and analysts interviewed for this study suggest that Indonesia 
often takes a longer time to explore the needs of respected countries while 
opening up genuine communications with different local stakeholders 
both from government and non-governmental actors. Indonesia believes 
that each country has its own strengths. Indonesia’s role is to support each 
country as it crafts its own peacebuilding process, rather than pushing it 
from the outside. This approach contributes to the establishment of a 
sense of national ownership, which is critical to ensure the success of any 
peacebuilding effort. Furthermore, a persuasive approach is necessary in 
peace efforts in order not to challenge the government’s sovereignty. The 
demand for learning from Indonesia’s experiences should come from the 
host countries, rather than being imposed by the Indonesian government.
Indonesia emphasizes a mutual learning process when conducting 
peacebuilding activities. Rather than the partner countries simply learn-
ing from Indonesia’s experiences, it is always a two-way exercise in which 
Indonesia also learns from the other side. Since Indonesia, in its encoun-
ter with partner countries, is willing to divulge that it is also still strug-
gling with many internal problems that threaten sustainable peace, partner 
countries are persuaded of the value of Indonesia’s role, especially to be 
open in exploring and discussing their problems. This first step is crucial 
to the process of finding solutions.
However, Indonesia’s peacebuilding role faces many challenges. The 
first challenge comes from within the government: a lack of coordina-
tion among different government institutions. Within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, for example, several directorates handle peacebuilding in 
Myanmar. Based on geography, Myanmar is handled under the responsi-
bility of the Directorate of ASEAN Political Affairs and Security, as well as 
the Directorate for East Asia and Pacific. Peacebuilding is also categorized 
as part of Indonesia’s public diplomacy, and some activities are coordi-
nated by the Directorate of Technical Cooperation under the Directorate- 
General of Public Diplomacy. Other activities involve other ministries or 
agencies such as the police or military institutions.
The second challenge is the lack of detailed and centralized databases 
containing records on peacebuilding programs and activities. Related to 
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this is the dearth of standardized monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to 
measure achievements as well as mistakes in order to make  improvements. 
So far each institution generally keeps its own notes on evaluations, if any. 
However, the public rarely has access to such notes and reports.
Third, while there is much research to be done, Indonesia’s niche 
capacities and distinct approach in conducting its peacebuilding in the 
region, as well as in the global arena, represent a distinct contribution. Its 
approach reflects broader approaches of rising powers that ultimately fill 
gaps left by the efforts of traditional Western actors.
Rather than competing, the different approaches taken by traditional 
actors and rising powers complement one another. Traditional actors have 
provided useful guidelines that define peacebuilding and list the essential 
activities and principles that must be applied in order to sustain peace 
in the long run. Nevertheless, the distinct approaches introduced by ris-
ing powers are also important, since these actors’ recent experiences with 
peacebuilding within their own borders provide a certain legitimacy. These 
approaches emphasize the need to respect the host country’s sovereignty, 
as well as the importance of gaining confidence and trust from the very 
beginning of the peacebuilding process and working at a pace that is com-
fortable for local stakeholders.
However, rising actors still face challenges, mainly in securing funding 
to sustain their global and regional peacebuilding activities. Traditional 
actors can play a role in collaborating with the rising powers to conduct 
peacebuilding activities. Through the framework of triangular coopera-
tion, traditional peacebuilding actors can provide funding for the pro-
grams initiated and designed by the rising actors. Traditional actors can 
also help rising powers frame their experiences more effectively. UNDP, 
for example, has a depth of knowledge in peacebuilding projects as well 
as how to monitor the implementation of those projects in a professional 
manner. Such knowledge is important to transform rising powers into 
more advanced actors in peacebuilding. However, it is important that they 
bring their own distinctive experiences and wisdom to their peacebuilding 
efforts.
Finally, consolidation of Indonesia’s own material capabilities is impor-
tant to sustain the expansion of its peacebuilding activities, particularly if 
Indonesia wishes to continue its role as peace facilitator/mediator. Using 
soft power is indeed important and useful, but not enough. By doing so, 





 1. ASEAN Charter, article 2.
 2. In the Draft Grand Design for Indonesia’s South-South Triangular 
Cooperation, there are seven program priorities mentioned. The other six 
programs are capacity building in the field of trading and export; infra-
structure and road construction program; family planning and reproduc-
tive health program; scholarship for developing countries; capacity building 
in macro-economy, public finance, and micro- economy; and capacity-
building in the field of community empowerment. It should be noted that 
the Grand Design is in the form of final draft that is still awaiting the gov-
ernment’s promulgation.
 3. Similar to the Grand Design, this Blue Print also awaits the government’s 
promulgation. The other comparative advantages are poverty reduction; 
agriculture and food security; infrastructure; disaster and climate change 
risk management: human resource development; development of science; 
socio-cultural development; macro-economy, economic management, and 
public finance; and microfinance; trading, service, and investment. 
Peacebuilding is listed as number 6 in the list.
 4. According to the final draft of the Grand Design of Indonesia’s SSTC, 
there are seven program priorities: (1) capacity-building in democracy and 
conflict resolution; (2) capacity-building in the field of trading and export; 
(3) infrastructure and road construction program; (4) family planning and 
reproductive health program; (5) scholarship for developing countries; (6) 
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CHAPTER 4




As the largest democracy to have emerged out of the bonds of colonialism, 
India has played an important role in providing valuable aid and assistance 
to newly independent and developing countries around the world since 
its independence. In order to fulfil its international obligation of help-
ing countries make the difficult transition to self-reliance and develop-
ment, India has contributed to building strong and peaceful countries 
and regions across the globe by sharing with them the benefits of its own 
experience as well as global best practices, along with providing valuable 
aid and assistance.
To put India’s development assistance programme in its correct per-
spective, it is absolutely necessary to understand the factors shaping Indian 
discourse over the years. India played an important role on the global 
stage even before it became an independent nation on 15 August 1947. 
The Indian Armed Forces provided the largest volunteer armies to partici-
pate both in the First and Second World Wars, where there were hundreds 
of thousands of casualties and faced demobilisation immediately after the 
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wars. During the First World War, the Indian Army was one of the first to 
face the horrors of Chemical Warfare. India was also a founding signatory 
of the League of Nations as well as the United Nations (UN). During 
1943 India was faced with a famine in Bengal, where reportedly two to 
three million people died, yet the export of food grains from India to sup-
port the global war effort continued uninterruptedly.
While independence broke the shackles of British colonialism, it also 
partitioned the country and saw the greatest displacement of population 
that the world had ever known. It led to rioting and communal violence 
that left thousands dead. Before the nation could get to grips with this, 
the Pakistan Army supported by irregular forces invaded the Indian State 
of Jammu and Kashmir. Being a founding member of the UN and believ-
ing in its principles, India took the issue to the UN hoping for justice, 
but what followed was an eye-opener for India, as also a lesson on what 
to expect from great powers and international institutions. Insurgency, 
supported by foreign countries, also reared its head in the early to mid- 
1950s, and India’s experience in successfully handling these insurgencies, 
where it used the security forces along with the civilian administration 
in addressing social-politico-economic development, shaped its outlook 
towards development assistance.
India also faced a major refugee problem in 1971, when over ten million 
people from East Pakistan flooded into India. This and other events led to 
a short Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, resulting in the creation of 
Bangladesh. India not only pulled back its troops from Bangladesh within 
about three months after the hostilities, but also relocated over 92,000 
Pakistani prisoners of war from Bangladesh to India, thereby ensuring 
their safety in consonance with the Geneva Conventions. India’s contri-
bution to the UN peacekeeping operations is well known. These factors, 
amongst others, need to be kept in mind while analysing India’s contribu-
tion to development partnership, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
the PeacekeePIng ParadIgm
India’s contribution towards building the infrastructure for peace and 
stability in developing countries precedes and, to a large extent, antici-
pates, the concept of “peacebuilding” as enunciated by the UN. India’s 
aid and assistance programmes have not only helped countries tide over 
the onset or aftermath of major crises, but have often come in early to 
forestall potential crises from destabilising a country or a region. Close 
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 partnerships in the development process have naturally led to strong 
contacts, and the benefits of the association have exceeded beyond the 
“assistance” paradigm. It is this attitude of mutual respect and goodwill 
between the development assistance partners that has proven more suc-
cessful for India than just the quantity or amount of aid delivered per se.
However, to compare India’s development aid and assistance practices 
with the UN’s principles of “peacebuilding,” it would be important to 
study the two concepts at the outset.
the un PersPectIve
The emergence of the theory and practice of “peacebuilding” has been 
one of the most innovative developments in peace and conflict research 
over the past generation. It is believed that just as peacekeeping was the 
UN’s most important contribution to peace and security in the first 50 
years of its existence, peacebuilding could become its most important 
innovation in the future (Ryan 2013).
The concept of peacebuilding in the UN was introduced in 1992 by UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the report “An Agenda for 
Peace,” wherein he defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and sup-
port structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order 
to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations Information Centre for 
India and Bhutan 2006). Although the report had only a few paragraphs 
devoted to the concept, it acted as a catalyst for further research and evo-
lution of the concept.
A more detailed understanding of the term was given by the UN 
Secretary General’s Policy Committee in 2007, which described peace-
building as “a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or 
relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels of 
conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and 
development” (United Nations Information Centre for India and Bhutan 
2006). The Secretary General’s Report of 2009 identified five recurring 
priority areas for international assistance. The first was the support to basic 
safety and security; the second referred to political processes; the third 
referred to the provision of basic services; the fourth referred to the res-
toration of core government functions; and the fifth identified economic 
revitalisation as a priority area.
Although the idea of “peacebuilding” has been well received, it has 
faced many challenges over the years. Thus, the Policy Committee’s 
 PEACEBUILDING THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP: AN INDIAN... 
72 
 aforementioned statement in 2007 also enunciated the way in which 
peacebuilding strategies need to be developed and implemented. It states, 
“Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific 
needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should 
comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of 
activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”
It is noteworthy that the importance of local ownership, as is evident 
in the statement above, has remained a key component to the idea of 
peacebuilding, but it has been difficult to observe in practice. Cedric de 
Coning has highlighted this shortcoming in peacebuilding efforts by stat-
ing that “the notion of local ownership has become a buzzword. It is one 
of those words that has to be in any document about end states and exit 
strategies, yet no one really expects it to be meaningfully pursued” (de 
Coning 2013).
He points out that “external peace-builders see themselves as acting in 
a kind of unacknowledged guardian role, in which they act according to 
what they think are in the best interest of the society. Very few recognise 
or acknowledge the role the international community plays in undermin-
ing local ownership” (de Coning 2013).
Again, the political nature of peacebuilding is often ignored. This issue 
was squarely addressed by the UN Secretary General in his address to the 
first session of the Peacebuilding Commission on 23 June 2006, when he 
stated:
“We must also remember that peacebuilding is inherently political. At times 
the international community has approached peacebuilding as a largely 
technical exercise, involving knowledge and resources. The international 
community must not only understand local power dynamics, but also rec-
ognize that it is itself a political actor entering a political environment”. In 
this regard, the statement of Mr Jan Eliasson, the UN Deputy Secretary 
General, during the debate on post-conflict peacebuilding, wherein he said 
that “peacebuilding is most effective when political, security and develop-
ment actors support a common, comprehensive and clear strategy for con-
solidating peace,”1 merits consideration.
an IndIan PersPectIve
India has a distinguished legacy of international peacekeeping and peace-
building dating back to the 1950s when as a newly independent and 
democratic country, it reached out and helped other newly independent 
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countries emerge from the scourge of colonialism by partnering in the 
establishment of state institutions and developmental activities. In essence, 
the foundation of later South–South Cooperation (SSC) can rightly be 
attributed to these partnerships, which cemented national identities with 
those of a later day larger South–South movement.
Right from the beginning the economic and technical assistance that 
India extended to other developing countries was voluntary and not an 
obligation, like the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Further 
unlike the ODA, India characterised its assistance as development part-
nership and not a donor–recipient relationship. India’s basic approach to 
development assistance was that it was demand-driven, given without con-
ditionalities, administered in a decentralised manner and would not con-
strain the sovereignty of its partners. Simply put, India’s philosophy was 
that despite being a poor, developing country just out from the shackles of 
colonialism, it had an international responsibility and obligation to share 
its modest resources and capabilities with other developing countries.
India has clearly articulated its position on issues pertaining to peace-
building during various debates at the UN. It has given particular emphasis 
to local ownership, inclusiveness and relevance rather than being imposed 
from above. In his statement at the UN Security Council Open debate on 
post- conflict peacebuilding on 12 July 2012, Mr Vinay Kumar, Charge 
d’Affaires, Permanent Mission of India to the UN (PMI), said, “We, 
therefore, think that the core institutions of governance are the key to 
sustainable peace. They must be rooted locally rather than being imposed 
from above. Their local relevance and inclusiveness will make all the dif-
ference in the governance process. It is, therefore, important for the PBC 
(Peacebuilding Commission) to align its objectives with national priorities 
and ensure that all plans and programs are implemented under national 
leadership and through national institutions so that gains are sustainable 
even if slow” (Kumar 2012).
In its statement on the Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its 
7th Session and the Report of the Secretary General on the Peacebuilding 
Fund on 26 March 2014, India stated that: “Peacebuilding is important. 
It is necessary to rebuild institutions and infrastructure in nations torn 
by civil war if we want to solidify peace and avoid a relapse into conflict. 
A certain amount of external guidance is implicit in peacebuilding, but it 
should not be at the cost of local ownership and agenda…. The external 
footprint should be light to avoid any outcomes of neo-colonialism or 
humanitarian intervention” (Mukerji 2014).
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In his statement, at the Informal Interactive Dialogue of the General 
Assembly on 8 September 2014, Mr Abhishek Singh, First Secretary, PMI, 
stated, “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce 
the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national 
capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the founda-
tions for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies 
must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned 
based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, 
sequenced and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achiev-
ing the above objectives. The emphasis should be building national capaci-
ties and national ownership” (Mukerji 2014).
It is therefore heartening to note that today India has provided devel-
opment assistance to over 160 countries since its independence, encom-
passing multiple sectors, while at the same time adhering to its declared 
philosophy.
PhIlosoPhy and evolutIon of IndIan develoPment
Partnership Architecture
Right at the outset it needs to be understood that the “Indian Development 
Partnership Architecture” is a work in progress and there is no single doc-
ument or White Paper that spells out the “architecture.” The building 
blocks of this “architecture” have to be culled out from the then pre-
vailing national/international scenario, policy statements, participation in 
bilateral and multilateral development organisations and so on. India’s 
development partnership architecture could therefore be looked as an 
experimental model that has undergone a series of institutional innova-
tions at different points in time.
India’s foreign policy philosophy since independence in 1947 under its 
first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru has often been seen as one laced 
in an element of idealism. However, in the early years of its independence, 
India realised that countries in the global south that were emerging from 
colonialism would be affected by fragility, poverty, lack of infrastructure 
and possibly conflict or violence and would need development partner-
ship right from the moment they gained independence. Although the term 
“South–South Cooperation” was not coined then, the seeds of its need and 
values can be traced to this phenomenon of helping countries in the South 
build a peaceful environment through development aid and partnership.
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The foreign policy philosophy of India was based on the ideal of peace-
ful co-existence, wherein the economic development of all countries would 
be an obligation of the whole international community. India’s develop-
ment partnership was thus a commitment to internationalism, wherein all 
countries emerging from the scourge of colonialism and the after-effects 
of the Second World War would contribute to the evolution of a new and 
just global order. In 1947 when India became independent, it neither had 
any experience in the field of international aid/partnership, nor was there 
any substantive architecture for this available that would suit its ideas of 
development needs and partnership. Therefore, India’s development part-
nership programme is an evolutionary process that takes into account its 
own developmental experiences and its own vision of social and economic 
development.
India’s development partnership programme commenced in 1949 and 
precedes the concept of peacebuilding as we know it today. Right from the 
outset, India’s basic philosophy towards development assistance was that 
any aid/assistance would be demand-driven, given without conditionalities, 
be administered in a decentralised manner and would not constrain the sov-
ereignty of its partners in any way. An important point to note is that India 
has not made the same distinction between development assistance and 
peacebuilding activities that the traditional actors seem to make. Another 
point worth mentioning is that although never very clearly spelt out, India 
shares her experiences of democracy, pluralism and tolerance with the host 
countries, without interfering in their internal politics and social dynamics.
Some of the important milestones in the evolution of India’s 
Development Partnership programmes that commenced in 1949 itself 
were the establishment of the Cultural Fellowship in the Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA) and the follow-up by a special concessional loan to 
Burma (Myanmar) in 1949 itself to help meet its balance of payment crisis. 
The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in 
Asia and the Pacific was conceived in January 1950 and launched on 1 July 
1951 as a cooperative venture by seven Commonwealth nations,  including 
India, thereby showing that India was willing to partner multilateral 
organisations in addition to its bilateral developmental relationships.
In 1954, an overseas Indian Aid Mission (IAM) was launched at 
Kathmandu, Nepal, for coordinating and monitoring implementation 
of various Indian projects in Nepal. In 1964, the first agreement was 
signed with Nepal for periodic review of development projects. Seeing its 
success, a joint commission for project reviews was established in 
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Afghanistan in 1969. This commission, which was set up in other countries 
too, was tasked to also identify resources and capabilities for undertaking 
projects of mutual interest and also exploring possibilities for expanding 
trade. The IAM was renamed as the Indian Cooperation Mission (ICM) 
in 1966, signifying that the Indian partnership was not just about aid 
but was a cooperative partnership, and in 1980 the ICM was merged 
under the new Economic Cooperation Wing of the Indian Embassy in 
Kathmandu. In November 2003, India and Nepal signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) for initiating the Small Development Projects 
(SDP) in Nepal. The SDP was based on local needs through commu-
nity participation with development directly reaching the beneficiaries in 
a short period of time. The project costs were less than US$ 0.7 million. 
The implementation of the SDP was overseen by a Project Monitoring 
Committee, which ensured that there was no cost and time overruns. 
These projects are so successful in Nepal that India is now implementing 
SDP in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Myanmar.
Many ministries are involved in the Indian Development Partnership 
Programs. For instance, Ministry of Rural Development is the nodal min-
istry of two international organisations connected with rural development. 
These are as follows:
• The Afro-Asian Rural Development Organisation (AARDO). This is 
an inter-governmental, autonomous organisation founded in 1962 
with a view to promote coordinated efforts, exchange of experiences 
and cooperative action for furthering the objectives of development 
of rural areas. It has 30 African and Asian nations, including India, 
as its members. Earlier, AARDO was known as the Afro-Asian Rural 
Reconstruction Organisation. The AARDO has its permanent head-
quarters at New Delhi.
• Centre for Integrated Rural Development of Asia and the Pacific 
(CIRDAP). India is a member of the inter-governmental CIRDAP, 
which was established in July 1979 at the initiative of the countries 
of the Asia-Pacific Region and the FAO of the UN with support 
from several other UN bodies. It has 15 member countries, includ-
ing Afghanistan, Bangladesh (host country), India, Myanmar and 
Vietnam. It came into being to meet the needs of various developing 
countries of that time. It was mandated to facilitate the provision of 
services that will influence policy formations and programme actions 
towards rural development and poverty alleviation (CIRDAP 2017).
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Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC)—
Realising the importance of capacity building and skills development, 
India launched the ITEC in 1964 under its MEA to share knowledge 
and skills with fellow developing countries. The ITEC programme, 
which is fully government funded, is essentially bilateral in nature and 
is in line with its stated objective of respecting sovereignty and foster-
ing a cooperative approach. It is demand-driven and does not impose 
any conditionalities. It furthers national development priorities of India’s 
partners and has national ownership at its core. Under the ITEC and its 
sister programme, SCAAP (Special Commonwealth African Assistance 
Programme), a total of 161 countries in Asia, Africa, East Europe, Latin 
America, the Caribbean as well as Pacific and Small Island countries are 
invited to share in the Indian developmental experience acquired over 
six decades. For civilian training programmes, a total of 8280 slots were 
allotted to ITEC/SCAAP partner countries during 2013–14, for which 
approximately US$ 23 million was budgeted. Similarly about 1500 vacan-
cies for security training were allotted to ITEC partners for nominating 
their personnel for training in the field of Security and Strategic Studies, 
Defense Management, Marine and Aeronautical Engineering, Logistics 
and Management and so on. Although ITEC was initially conceived as a 
programme at the bilateral level, in recent years, ITEC programmes have 
also been used for cooperation activities conceived in regional and inter- 
regional contexts such as Economic Commission for Africa, Industrial 
Development Unit of Commonwealth Secretariat, UNIDO, Group of 77 
and G-15. It has also been associated with regional and multilateral organ-
isations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
African Union (AU), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical 
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Afro-Asian Rural Development 
Organisation (AARDO), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Pan-African Parliament, Indian Ocean 
Rim—Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and India-Africa 
Forum Summit. ITEC is the flagship programme for India’s capacity- 
building effort, not only because of its magnitude and wide geographi-
cal coverage, but also for innovative forms of technical cooperation. 
Approximately US$ 3 billion has been spent by India on the programme 
since its launch in 1964.
Pan-African e-Network—With the growth of the economy and the 
technology, especially in the IT and health care sector, India embarked on 
an ambitious and visionary project in 2009, known as the “Pan-African 
 PEACEBUILDING THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP: AN INDIAN... 
78 
e-Network,” to provide educational and medical support to 54 participat-
ing African countries, remotely via satellite technology through a grant 
of US$ 125 million. The network is equipped to support e-governance, 
e-commerce, remote mapping and meteorological data sharing. Over a 
dozen super-specialty hospitals in India have been connected to African 
hospitals where tele-consultations and continuing medical education ses-
sions are conducted. Simultaneously about 50 learning centres in Africa 
were connected to five Indian universities, thereby providing education 
facilities to thousands of students.
Alongside the processes mentioned above, the MEA itself continues to 
evolve, learning not just from its own experiences but also from best prac-
tices in the development architecture globally. In 1961 the Economic and 
Coordination Division was established in the MEA to coordinate tech-
nological cooperation, and in 1964 the ITEC programme was launched 
as a part of this Economic Division. With the success of the ITEC pro-
gramme and the consequent increase in workload, the ITEC Division 
was established in the MEA in 1995. In 2004, the India Development 
and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS) was launched to provide lines 
of credit (LOC) by the EXIM Bank, and in 2005 a new division called 
the Development Partnership Division was created in the MEA for bet-
ter delivery of development projects. During the budget speech of 2007, 
the Union Finance Minister had proposed the setting up of the India 
International Development Cooperation Agency for Coordinating all 
projects, lines of credit, technical cooperation, deputation of experts and 
training of foreign nationals in India. However, this agency was never 
set up and instead a new division called the “Development Partnership 
Administration (DPA)” was set up in 2012 for coordinating all aspects of 
India’s Development Assistance.
As regards financial support, while the capacity-building ITEC pro-
gramme was totally Government funded, loans and grants were also 
provided. To increase the amount of funding available for development 
activities, since 2003, LOC covering 63 countries totalling almost US$ 
12 billion have been extended, with Africa receiving almost 60% of this. 
Similarly, the DPA is implementing a number of grant assistance pro-
grammes, which include construction of 50,000 houses for internally 
displaced persons in Sri Lanka, construction of the Salma Dam and 
power sub-station in Doshi and Charikar, and the Parliament building in 
Afghanistan. The EXIM Bank (2012) data on operative LOC for financial 
year 2011–12 provides the following detail (Table 4.1).
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dIversIty and magnItude of develoPment 
PartnershIP
To get a good understanding of the diversity and magnitude of India’s 
development partnership, one needs to just look at the India–Africa and 
India–Afghanistan development programmes.
India–Africa Programmes
India’s links with Africa stretch back centuries, cutting across social, eco-
nomic, political and diplomatic issues. The shared experience of colonial-
ism leading to economic deprivation, fight for independence, partnership 
in the Non-Aligned Movement, the urge to promote SSC all come 
together, and it is difficult to separate one from the other. The fact that 
Indian peacekeepers under the UN flag have been participating in all UN 
missions in Africa also adds to this unique relationship between India and 
Africa. Therefore, examining India–Africa relations in silos may not bring 
out the true picture. Table 4.2 highlights the framework for Africa–India 
cooperation (Kragelund 2010).
Building on the foundations of the partnership laid through the ITEC 
programme amongst others, India launched the Focus Africa Programme 
in 2002 and was followed in 2005 by the Conclave of India-Africa Project 
Partnership, and in the next eight years there had been 22 Indo-African 
business conclaves. Buoyed by the healthy all-round economic and trade 
linkages, India hosted the first India–Africa Forum Summit in 2008 and 
the next summit meeting was held in 2011.
India–Afghanistan Programmes
A striking example of India’s development assistance programmes that are 
in consonance with UN peacebuilding principles and the stated needs, 
requirements and involvement of the recipient country in promoting its 
Table 4.1 EXIM Bank Operative 
Lines of Credit (2011–12, US$ 
million)
1. Asia – 3458
2. Africa – 4313
3. Americas – 191
4. Europe and CIS – 148
5. Total – 8160
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development and capacity building can be gleaned from the large-scale 
multisectoral assistance India has provided for the reconstruction and 
developmental programmes in Afghanistan. This development partnership 
dates back to the years shortly after Indian independence and continued 
during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, despite 
significant internal economic pressures. India provided Afghanistan with 
millions of US dollars in grants and humanitarian assistance through the 
UN during the 1990s. Since 2002, India has played an active role in the 
Table 4.2 Africa–India framework for cooperation
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reconstruction of Afghanistan, with its programmes following priorities of 
the Afghan government and people.
The “Afghanistan National Development Strategy-Executive Summary 
2008–2013—A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and 
Poverty Reduction” (Afghanistan 2013) lists eight pillars for their national 
development: security; good governance; infrastructure and proper utili-
sation of natural resources; education and culture; health and nutrition; 
agriculture and rural development; social protection; and economic gov-
ernance and private sector development. It is noteworthy that India’s 
development assistance programmes to Afghanistan have substantially 
contributed to almost all of the pillars of national development enlisted 
by the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Thus, India’s recon-
struction and developmental programmes in Afghanistan are tailored to 
the specific needs and ownership of the Afghan government and its peo-
ple, as is enshrined in the values of the UN ideals of peacebuilding.
India has played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabili-
tation of Afghanistan. India’s extensive developmental assistance pro-
gramme, which now stands at around US$ 2 billion, is a strong signal of 
its abiding commitment to peace, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan 
during this critical period of security and governance transition. This 
makes India one of the leading donor nations to Afghanistan, and by far 
the largest in the region.
The government of India has taken on several medium and large infra-
structure projects in its assistance programme in Afghanistan. Some of 
these include construction of a 218  km road from Zaranj to Delaram 
for facilitating movement of goods and services to the Iranian border; 
 construction of a 220KV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to 
Kabul and a 220/110/20 KV sub-station at Chimtala; upgrading of tele-
phone exchanges in 11 provinces; expansion of national TV network by 
providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals 
for greater integration of the country; and three airbus aircraft to Ariana 
Airlines and construction of the new Afghan Parliament building. In the 
area of skill development, the Indian government offers training to Afghan 
officials/nationals in diverse fields through 500 ITEC slots allocated annu-
ally to Afghanistan; special ITEC courses for Afghan government officials; 
614 ICAR scholarships under the India–Afghanistan Fellowship Program 
during 2012–13 to 2020–21; training via tele-education at the Afghan 
National Agriculture Sciences and Technology University, Kandahar, 
and at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health, Kabul; and ICCR 
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scholarships to 1000 Afghans every year to pursue under graduate courses 
in various Indian universities in major cities across India.
Major on-going Indian projects in Afghanistan include Salma Dam, 
Doshi and Charikar power substations; restoration of the Store Palace; 
and wheat assistance to Afghanistan to the tune of 1.1 million MT, out of 
which 7,11,882 tonnes of wheat has already been supplied. India has also 
decided to donate 1000 more buses to Afghanistan along with improving 
related infrastructure.
A significant addition to India’s development portfolio in Afghanistan 
is the Small Development Projects (SDP) scheme for developing infra-
structure in the fields of agriculture, rural development, education, health 
and so on. Announced during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit 
to Afghanistan in 2005 initially with an amount of US$ 20 million, the 
scheme was further enhanced with additional provision of US$ 100 mil-
lion in November 2012.
India is contributing to the security sector by providing equipment 
and training to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police. To 
help promote rule of law, India has trained Afghan judges and lawyers 
at the Indian Law Institute. As part of support to democracy, India has 
trained staff members of the National Assembly Secretariat at the Bureau 
of Parliamentary Study and Training on various aspects of parliamentary 
functions. Training was also imparted to journalists and news agency 
officials.
Development Partnership Administration (DPA)
From relatively modest beginnings, India has become an important player 
in the area of international development cooperation. Over the past few 
years, India’s development assistance has started to cover a large number 
of countries, and, consequently, the projects being implemented by the 
MEA have increased substantially. Recognising this, the DPA was created 
in the MEA in January 2012 to effectively handle India’s aid projects 
through the stages of concept, launch, execution and completion.
India’s development partnership is based on the needs identified by 
the partner countries, and the effort of the MEA is geared toward accom-
modating as many of the requests received from partner countries as is 
technically and financially possible. DPA has started to create in-house, 
specialised technical, legal and financial skills in order to fast-track all 
stages of project implementation. DPA has three divisions. Currently, 
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DPA I deals with project appraisal and LOC; DPA II deals with capacity- 
building schemes, disaster relief and the Indian Technical and Economic 
Cooperation Program; and DPA III deals with project implementation. 
As the DAP in the MEA is gearing towards meeting its mandate, it is 
expected that effective and efficient handling of all aid projects from the 
stages of concept, launch, execution and completion would result in effi-
cient implementation of projects, in close cooperation and facilitation of 
the partner countries.
While the lead agency in India’s development partnership strategy will 
continue to be the MEA, it needs to be reiterated that other ministries 
in the government will continue to have an important role. MEA will 
therefore continue to advise the Ministry of Finance regarding assistance 
packages and priorities; coordinate with the Ministry of Commerce in 
relation to LOC; coordinate with the Ministry of Water Resources for 
hydroelectric projects; and coordinate with the Ministry of Defense for 
overseas projects to be undertaken by the Border Roads Organisation or 
for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by the armed forces. The 
DPA while not formulating development assistance policy will deal with its 
implementation by focusing on greater synergy and coordination, stream-
lining the delivery mechanism and improving the effectiveness of the total 
development assistance/aid provided.
emergIng Powers and the dynamIcs of south–south 
cooPeratIon (ssc)
During the last two decades, there has been a major shift in geopolitics 
with the emergence of new economic and military powers on the global 
stage. Many of these countries have the capacity to take on the role of 
peacebuilding because like the big industrialised nations of the past they 
have the finances, capacities and expertise to provide effective support in 
peacebuilding missions around the world. Underscoring the importance 
of emerging powers in maintaining and promoting peace at the global 
level, Benjamin de Carvalho and Cedric de Coning have noted:
what distinguishes emerging powers from merely regional ones is that they 
are often responded to by others on the basis of system-level calculations 
about the present and near future distribution of power. Consequently, 
emerging powers can be said to be emerging from their regions onto the 
global scene, and they possess a certain set of attributes, or serious potential, 
 PEACEBUILDING THROUGH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIP: AN INDIAN... 
84 
to bid for great power status—i.e. taking on even greater responsibility for 
co-managing the global order in the short to medium term. (de Carvalho 
and de Coning 2013, 2)
They further state that:
the rising powers are committed to the reform of the global order, and that 
they are pursuing a multilateral rule-based global architecture that can pro-
vide the legal and political framework necessary to ensure a more equitable, 
enforceable and stable global order, in which it would be impossible for any 
one country, or bloc of countries to dominate the system. (Ibid, 6)
These new emerging powers, particularly countries like India, China and 
South Africa, are becoming very important players in the development 
cooperation arena too. The emergence of these countries as development 
partners is very visible in Africa, where they have significantly expanded 
their presence through foreign direct investment, trade and knowledge 
transfer. Their achievements in addressing their own development chal-
lenges through innovative approaches make them more attractive as devel-
opment partners, and have eroded the North’s exclusive hold on matters 
of international development.
debate over role of south–south  
cooPeratIon (ssc)
Conceptually, SSC refers to the sharing of knowledge and resources 
between developing countries with the aim of identifying the most effec-
tive steps towards the eradication of their developmental challenges. It is 
strongly based on the notion of development through equitable access 
to trade, investment and technology and takes place at bilateral as well as 
inter/intra- regional levels. The emerging powers are offering the devel-
oping countries a choice, thereby introducing some form of competitive 
challenge in the existing development aid system and possibly this causes 
some tension in the North–South debate. This notwithstanding, it must 
be reiterated that SSC must be seen as a complement to and not a replace-
ment of North–South Cooperation (NSC).
In the framework of SSC, there is no distinction between the partner 
countries. All the countries engaged have something to offer and take from 
each other. The key values of the SSC are respect for national sovereignty, 
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national ownership and independence, equality, non-conditionality, non- 
interference in domestic affairs and mutual benefit. However, there are 
conceptual differences between the NSC and SSC, which are highlighted 
in Table 4.3 (Chaturvedi 2014).






Nature and purpose of 
support
ODA. Stated to be altruistic 
in nature
Mutual benefits and growth
Philosophical 
perspective
Framework approach Ingredient approach
Participants At least one participant has 
very high per capita income
Both partners may have very low 
per-capita income
Level of development Large differences in stages of 
economic development 
between donors and 
recipients
Both partners almost at the same 
stage of economic development
Role of participants Donors and recipient of 
ODA
Relationship of equality, both 
may contribute to the process
Conditionality “Top-down” with policy 
conditionality and no 
predictability
Request-driven and generally 
free from conditionality of any 
kind, so largely within timelines
Flexibility Multilayered time- 
consuming bureaucratic 
structures, hence added 
transaction cost
Highly decentralised and 
relatively fast with a few 
implications for transaction cost
Priority sectors Grant assistance and budget 
support for social sectors
Economic and technical 
cooperation largely confined to 
projects in infrastructure and 
productive sector investment
Adherence to global 
governance framework 
like Paris Declaration
Donors use guidelines of 
Paris Declaration, which 
they evolve as an instrument 
for effectiveness
Providers are out of the purview 
of any global arrangement such 
as Paris Declaration, in which 
they are not involved. Hinges on 
mutual trust of partner countries
Data, monitoring and 
evaluation
Peer-reviewed by DAC- 
OECD. Data are compiled 
and periodically released by 
the national governments 
and DAC-OECD
No monitoring mechanisms 
beyond occasional reports of 
data and anecdotal details
Role of NGOs Extensive Limited
Role of Private Sector Limited Extensive
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The above notwithstanding, the fact is that as of now the South–
South countries somewhat lack the requisite structural and organisational 
capacity to effectively pursue their aims. This contrasts sharply with the 
developed North that has well- funded institutions and mechanisms that 
coordinate their interests. Perhaps to overcome these challenges we see 
trilateral groupings such as the India–Brazil–South Africa dialogue forum 
or the multilateral groupings such as BRICS, spanning many continents 
(Ugwuja et al. 2014).
The growing role played by India and other developing countries in 
the area of development assistance seems to be causing anxiety in the 
West as they are apprehensive of losing influence in a field that they domi-
nated. India has reservations about the Busan process, which is viewed 
as an attempt to standardise the delivery of assistance/aid on the norms 
and principles of the West. India is also generally cautious of some of the 
premises underlying the post MDG development agenda. India would 
not like to see that it becomes a means for the West to pass on a greater 
burden to developing countries. It needs reiteration that whereas North–
South aid is a historical responsibility, SSC is a voluntary undertaking. The 
 development assistance provided by the emerging developing countries 
should be viewed as different from the North–South commitments. It is 
neither a substitute for North–South aid nor should it be used as an excuse 
for developed countries to reduce their aid programmes.
challenges and oPPortunItIes
India’s Development Partnership, while contributing to peacebuild-
ing, is very different from economic intervention in support of counter- 
insurgency or counter-terrorism operations, such as those waged by ISAF 
in Afghanistan. It needs to be understood that economic assistance/part-
nership in the same country at the same period of time may have two 
totally differing aims as well as outcomes. India’s development partnership 
assistance in Afghanistan since 2002 and that of other donors who also 
were supporting military operations there would therefore be quite differ-
ent in conception and implementation, although they may both support 
peacebuilding. Thus, the peacebuilding situation addressed by India and 
others could have different but possibly complementary outcomes, which 
need to be understood. Further, foreign powers that intervene in  local 
conflicts often seek to end the fighting and “restore stability” possibly 
within the duration of the intervention or immediately after it. So their 
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economic activities for “restoring stability” are likely to be quite different 
from economic activities that are part of India’s development partnership, 
which is a long-term strategic partnership. These pose challenges but can 
be overcome by greater transparency, coordination and synergy between 
the host country and aid providers.
The challenge posed to the safety of foreign citizens working in devel-
opment partnership programmes as also of the investment made by the 
government and private entities in conflict-affected countries is a matter 
of serious concern. Providing security to men, material and investment is a 
serious challenge, which has to be factored in. India has provided security 
for its diplomatic mission and projects in Afghanistan in close cooperation 
with the government of Afghanistan.
A question that is sometimes asked is about development intervention 
aggravating conflict situation in the host country. While there has been no 
reported case of Indian development partnership programmes aggravating 
the conflict situation, this issue needs to be constantly kept in mind. This 
could best be done by following India’s fundamental principles of aid/
assistance being inclusive and demand-driven with local ownership, given 
without conditionalities and would not constrain the sovereignty of the 
host country in any way.
India is neither part of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) nor does it report its development assistance to DAC. However, 
India has taken part in the OECD-led international dialogue on develop-
ment. While this dialogue contributed to mutual understanding regarding 
aid and development cooperation, India did convey its concerns on some 
of the premises underlying the OECD led dialogue. Although it is early 
to say, but the possibility of an alternative to the OECD definition of aid 
could emerge. India and other rising powers could consider doing so by 
putting out a draft vision of development aid, which would encompass the 
key features of SSC, including trade, investment, technology transfer and 
so on.
The challenges of bringing in greater transparency, creating a level 
field for public and private sectors, and promoting a greater role for non- 
governmental organisations and academia have often been discussed over 
the years as has been the fact that one could learn from the best practices 
of the international community and also share the lessons/experiences 
of India. The DPA is addressing these issues and one hopes to see move-
ment on these fronts. The DPA could also consider bringing out a “White 
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Paper” on India’s Development Partnership programmes. Many internal 
and external challenges that India faces come up during closed-door dis-
cussions. Some of these pertains to project conceptualisation; appraisal, 
monitoring, political sensitivities and vested interests in the partner coun-
tries and so on. The DPA is aware and has started to tackle these chal-
lenges, and we should see new guidelines, greater transparency and public 
outreach in the near future.2
International development aid given by any country would be linked 
to their national interests and foreign policy strategy. Although not stated 
in so many words, can India’s development assistance/partnership pro-
grammes be any different? While there is no doubt that India’s develop-
ment partnership activities must conform to its guiding principles, it must 
also be closely linked to its commercial, strategic and foreign policy inter-
ests. This is a challenge which the MEA has negotiated very successfully in 
the past and must continue to do so in the future too.
conclusIon
The defining characteristic of India’s development assistance programmes 
has been to share its experience in poverty alleviation and economic devel-
opment. India’s policymakers strongly believe that given the aid and 
assistance through effective development partnership, unstable and under-
developed countries can emerge as healthy and strong constituents of the 
international community. This can establish the prerequisites of progress 
and harmony that can then propel the engines of growth and development 
and yield ever appreciating returns. India’s own emergence from its colo-
nial past into a vibrant democratic and global economic power has made 
it both a role model and major player in the realm of peacebuilding and 
development partnership.
As stated in this chapter, India’s contribution towards building the 
infrastructure for peace and stability in developing countries not only pre-
cedes the concept of peacebuilding as enunciated by the UN, but also con-
forms to the way in which “peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and 
tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national 
ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritised, sequenced, and 
relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”
India has not made any major distinction between development assis-
tance and peacebuilding activities as many Western actors seem to do. One 
Indian official characterised these discussions as “academic hair-splitting,” 
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a view that many others seem to share. The UN Secretary General’s Policy 
Committee in 2007 itself described peacebuilding as “a range of measures 
targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strength-
ening national capacities at all levels of conflict management, and to lay 
the foundation for sustainable peace and development.” Further, India’s 
basic philosophy towards development assistance has been that any aid/
assistance would be demand-driven, locally owned, given without condi-
tionalities and void of any constraints on the sovereignty of its partners. 
These principles have stood India in good stead and need to be preserved.
Although deliberate, well-conceived and integral to India’s foreign 
policy since independence, the development assistance programmes were 
pursued more as an important convention rather than as part of clearly 
articulated and declared policy as perhaps India was incrementally evolv-
ing this dimension to its foreign relations, based on its careful study of var-
ious international initiatives, in the field of international development aid. 
India’s assistance to its neighbours in 1948 followed by the Colombo Plan 
of 1950 and later the ITEC programme and now the DPA underscore the 
country’s proactive albeit incremental steps in this regard. However, there 
is no denying that India has not been able to leverage its development 
aid as it has never been promulgated in a coherent manner and so it has 
not been researched on the basis of contemporary standards. Still, there 
has been a growing realisation of this aspect, which has led to the forma-
tion of the DPA in the MEA. It is a step in the right direction, although 
one does not see a completely centralised form of development assistance 
being pursued in the near future.
The chapter also shows that India’s development assistance programmes 
have been global in reach, covering every continent of the world. India’s 
development assistance in Africa and Afghanistan, amongst others, not 
only indicates the wide spectrum of activities of their assistance, but also 
their large time horizon. Most of this assistance is not well known and has 
not been widely disseminated. It is hoped that the chapter would initiate 
the process of bringing out all aspects of India’s development assistance, 
and analysing it comprehensively by researchers and think tanks.
As stated earlier, from a modest beginning in 1948, today India has 
become an important player in the area of global development coopera-
tion. This, coupled with its significant role in UN peacekeeping/peace-
building operations, will only help its stature grow. Hopefully, India and 
the other rising powers will solidify their rightful place in the global secu-
rity and development architectures.
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 notes
 1. Report of the Security Council on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding at its 7359th 
meeting on 14 January 2015, S/PV. 7359.
 2. At a Roundtable held in March 2013 at the Observer Research Foundation, 
New Delhi, Ambassador P.S. Raghavan, who was then heading the DPA, 
had highlighted some of these issues in his keynote address.
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CHAPTER 5




Turkey owes its status as a rising power to the steady political and eco-
nomic development that it enjoyed in the initial years of the twenty-first 
century and to the weakening of the Western, rule-based liberal order. 
This has enabled regional actors with relative economic stability and secu-
rity to assume certain responsibilities that traditionally fell to the Great 
Powers in the Cold War era. Like most BRICS countries and other rising 
powers, Turkey has ridden the tailwinds of this global opening. Turkey 
also shares with some other rising powers the experience of rapid eco-
nomic growth, relative stability, and an ongoing political transition and 
reform. As the world shifts to a more multipolar system, Turkey has been 
using its religious, ethnic, and cultural ties to try to consolidate its soft 
power, both regionally and further afield. During this period, Turkey has 
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raised its profile as a regional actor and an emerging power, especially as 
the Arab Spring produced opportunities, crisis, and warfare on its borders.
These lessons, as well as the country’s status as a European Union can-
didate, a committed NATO ally, and a buffer state for the West, heighten 
Turkey’s role in the facilitation of peace in the region and reinforce its 
image as a bridge between geographical and cultural divides.
As a Western-oriented, secular state with a majority Muslim popula-
tion, Turkey is increasingly regarded as a pivot in effectively addressing 
both humanitarian and security aspects of the entrenched conflicts in Syria 
and the greater Levant. Turkey hosts approximately 2.8 million Syrian 
refugees (UNHCR, February 2017). At the same time it provides sup-
port for opposition forces in Syria and allowed members of the anti-IS 
(Islamic State) coalition, such as the USA to use its airbases. For much of 
its history, however, Turkey has been plagued by rampant insecurity and 
economic and political instability. It has experienced four military coups 
and a 30-year armed insurgency. As such, Turkey’s recent activities may be 
supported by economic and international shifts in power, but its concep-
tualization and approach to peacebuilding is very much informed by the 
country’s experiences of insecurity.1
the emergence of turkIsh PeacebuIldIng
Security and stability are two central issues that have guided Turkey’s strate-
gic considerations. In the wake of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire, modernization through alignment and membership of Western 
institutions was seen as crucial to preserving the security and stability that 
had been lost in the preceding years. It is also in this context that some of 
the traditional principles of Turkey’s foreign policy have emerged, such as 
non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Turkey’s domestic and for-
eign policies have also been significantly influenced by the founder of the 
Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. A number of his speeches, particularly 
the phrase “Peace at home, peace in the world” have been used to frame 
Turkey’s international engagement, from its first forays into peacekeeping 
in the 1990s to recent peacebuilding activities. Former Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu had also reiterated this principle stating that Turkey 
has tried to build a proactive foreign policy based on peace and stability at 
home (2012). This ideal, however, has come under significant strain since 
the Arab Spring spread to the Levant, and its transformation into a violent 
civil war in Syria and rampant insecurity in Iraq. These issues have directly 
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affected Turkey’s own security and stability. The suicide attacks since the 
June 7, 2015 general elections that have hit major towns in the southeast, 
the Turkish capital Ankara, and the country’s largest city Istanbul, are 
nearly all traced to IS cells that infiltrated the porous borders in the South. 
This has been accompanied by renewed clashes between Turkish security 
forces and the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which are equally 
detrimental to Turkey’s stability and its image as a “peacemaker.” In an 
additional blow to Turkey’s security, it endured a coup attempt on July 15, 
2016, which led to the purging of thousands from the military, education 
institutions, and judicial and state agencies.
For much of Turkey’s history, security, and stability were conceived 
in military terms and in relation to territorial integrity. Turkey’s first and 
only international intervention during the Cold War was its mediation 
between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. This can be seen from a traditional 
security perspective, given the proximity of both countries to Turkey’s 
eastern flank. Following the loosening of the Cold War strictures, the 
Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) was 
established in 1992 with the objective of expanding Turkish relations with 
the newly independent Turkic States of Central Asia. TIKA was conceived 
as a mechanism of Turkish soft power through cooperation in the eco-
nomic, cultural, and humanitarian fields (Murphy and Sazak 2012). For 
much of this period, however, TIKA was left to languish as an agency due 
to internal instability and a focus on a harder, security-driven concept of 
military engagement. Turkey’s first foray into peacebuilding during this 
time was in the Balkans in the 1990s, contributing troops to multilateral 
peacebuilding and peace enforcement missions with the United Nations 
(UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The shift from such hard security-based peacebuilding to the civilian 
participation and technical assistance that characterizes Turkey’s activities 
in recent years was facilitated by a change in domestic dynamics. Over 
the last decade, the Turkish Armed Forces has been losing its influence 
in foreign policy matters, which are now primarily determined by civilians 
in government. This was accompanied by expanded civilian and police 
participation in peace operations, increased engagement in multilateral 
organizations, and a revival of TIKA activities. Facilitated by a period of 
relative political and economic stability and internal reforms that eased 
restrictions in political, religious, and social spheres, Turkey began to 
expand its official development. Although retaining a strong military was 
a necessity due to the instability of the surrounding region, under the 
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Justice and Development Party (AKP) civic and economic power was pro-
moted as a more sustainable method of foreign engagement (Murphy and 
Woods 2014).
Domestic changes were accompanied by a restructuring of Turkish 
foreign policies priorities and goals under the AKP.  This has served to 
both promote the prestige of a more internationally active Turkey and to 
reinforce the success of the country’s leadership to a domestic audience 
(Achilles et al. 2015). Guided by then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
(key adviser and later foreign minister from 2009–2014), a multilateral 
foreign policy emerged that sought a balance between proactive engage-
ment and crisis management. Turkish leaders have emphasized the need 
for preventive diplomacy that should be intricately linked to any con-
flict management strategies, whether it is peacekeeping or peacebuild-
ing activities. Identifying mediation and dialogue as essential tools in 
this preventative diplomacy, officials have stated that “peace mediation 
and facilitation efforts are the most cost-effective and efficient way of 
preventing and resolving conflicts” (United Nations Security Council 
2011). Reflecting this position, Turkey has headed a number of initia-
tives. In 2005 the Alliance of Civilizations, which promotes interreligious 
and intercultural dialogue, was launched by the Prime Ministers of Spain 
and Turkey. In 2010, Turkey and Finland created a “Group of Friends 
of Mediation” consisting of 41 countries that support efforts by the UN 
and regional organizations in the area of mediation. And in May 2016, 
Turkey hosted the first World Humanitarian Summit, in Istanbul. These 
are diverse and cross-cultural examples that Turkish officials have iden-
tified as reflecting the country’s approach to peacebuilding (Davutoğlu 
2014). Through these initiatives Turkey has sought to promote flexibility, 
trust, and cooperation as the basis of successful mediation. In parallel to 
these efforts, Turkey launched a process on peacebuilding during its time 
on the Security Council from 2009–2010, which included these initiatives 
and brought together the Council for thematic meetings in Istanbul from 
2010 to 2013 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).
Issues around “hard security” are still a strategic priority for Turkey’s 
foreign policy, as seen in the country’s engagement in Syria. But conceptu-
alizations of security have broadened. As Davutoğlu stated, “stability can-
not be built on the basis of force alone,” (Davutoğlu 2012). Referencing 
the decade of reforms inside Turkey, Turkish officials have sought to 
find a balance between freedom and security in order to achieve stabil-
ity (Murphy and Sazak 2012). Over the years, the concept of “security” 
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has become more multidimensional, focusing on human needs through 
good governance and economic stability. This is evident in Turkey’s rhe-
torical embrace of “humanitarian diplomacy,” an ambiguous concept that 
Turkish officials have increasingly used to frame its repositioning in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring. Humanitarian diplomacy as a concept claims 
to reject state-centric realpolitik and external interference in domestic 
affairs. Highlighting the importance of acknowledging “local values” and 
local ownership, it instead emphasizes the need to put human dignity and 
human security at the forefront of policy considerations (Keyman and 
Sazak 2014). There are of course limits to such aspirations, which can be 
seen Turkey’s strategic engagement to the crises in Iraq and Syria.
the tools of turkIsh PeacebuIldIng
There is no concept paper that explicitly describes Turkey’s definition 
of peacebuilding. It can, however, be understood through bilateral and 
regional activities, norms, and discussions, such as those already men-
tioned, that have emerged among the country’s representatives over the 
last decade. Most Turkish officials discuss the term peacebuilding within 
the context of development and reconstruction of a conflict-affected coun-
try. Turkey’s approach to peacebuilding can be characterized as a twofold 
process, encompassing both statebuilding and peacemaking within soci-
ety. Reflecting a structural approach to peacebuilding, Turkish officials 
emphasize the centrality of good governance, strong responsive institu-
tions, and rule of law for building an effective state and, therefore, in their 
view, a stable and peaceful society.2 Activities related to these goals by 
officials include infrastructure projects, technical assistance, and capacity- 
building programs for state institutions and personnel. This kind of struc-
tural peacebuilding must also be accompanied by an inclusive peacemaking 
process at all levels. Turkish officials feel that this is only possible through 
national ownership of goals and culturally sensitive engagement with all 
stakeholders, including civil society, professional associations, and women. 
This is particularly important with regard to political institutions and 
inclusive economic recovery, which Turkish officials say are essential for a 
peaceful society. Activities associated with societal peacebuilding include 
mediation efforts, education programs, religious support, and inclusive 
economic development.
Like other rising powers, economic interests are intricately linked to 
Turkey’s foreign policy and its peacebuilding activities. Such interests 
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have not only led to financial dividends for Turkey in the past but also 
promoted peace in some cases. Notably, the historically tumultuous rela-
tionship between Turkey and its Kurdish neighbors in Iraq has greatly 
improved with ongoing military cooperation between the administrations 
in Ankara and Erbil. The expansion of economic and diplomatic relations 
with Iraqi Kurdistan not only helped to improve relations, but was also 
a lucrative partnership (Hacaoğlu 2014). At the time, exports to Iraq in 
2013 reached $12 billion, with $8 billion going to the Kurdish Regional 
Government, becoming one of Turkey’s largest export markets (Çag ̆aptay 
et al. 2015). There are also some links between Turkey’s economic inter-
ests and its aid practices in general. In Afghanistan, Turkish companies 
ranked fifth in terms of total number of foreign investors, with 140 regis-
tered in the country in 2013 (Çolakoğlu and Yegin 2014). Turkey’s bilat-
eral trade with Somalia was $72 million by 2015. Officials have also been 
frank about their interest in expanding economic relations with Somalia, 
one of the most prominent countries in Turkey’s development activities.3 
While not a specific policy, a pattern has emerged in which the establish-
ment of a diplomatic presence in a new country is often soon followed by 
investment from Turkish companies and new flight links through Turkish 
Airlines.
Turkish diplomats are firm in their conviction that trade is better than 
aid for development.4 Many Turkish officials regard economic develop-
ment, ideally through the diverse participation of the society as an essen-
tial component of peacebuilding, with one diplomat stating “[W]e don’t 
think that peacebuilding could achieve its goals if there is no economic 
recovery and participation of the whole part of the society in the pro-
gram.”5 Officials believe economic investment provides alternative finan-
cial opportunities to criminality and extremist narratives, and supports 
national ownership of development.
Many of the initiatives that Turkish officials consider as peacebuild-
ing activities are funneled through Turkish development aid. In 2014, 
Turkey’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) was $3.6 billion (TIKA 
2016). This represents nearly a 30 percent increase between 2012 and 
2014 alone (see Fig. 5.1).6 Despite Turkey’s participation in a number of 
multilateral initiatives, the vast majority of this aid is provided in bilateral 
assistance. For example, in 2013, only $151 million of $3.3 billion of 
ODA was provided through multilateral contributions (TIKA 2016, 8). 
In 2014, this was $88 million (TIKA 2016, 9). This illustrates Turkey’s 
preference for bilateral engagement.
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Turkey has expanded its activities to some of the world’s most entrenched 
conflicts. From 2011 until 2014, Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan were 
among the top five largest recipients of Turkish ODA (TIKA 2012; 2013; 
2014a, b; 2016). While Turkey does provide support to non-Muslim 
countries such as Ukraine, Macedonia, and Kenya, to name just a few, the 
bulk of the State’s activities appear to be carried out in Muslim majority 
states. Many of these countries would also be on the list of least developed 
or fragile states. Examples of both the structural and social peacebuilding 
approaches of Turkey are evident in its activities in conflict-affected coun-
tries like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Balkan countries such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo.
Much of what can be defined as Turkey’s structural peacebuilding activ-
ities consist of technical capacity programs, infrastructure projects, and the 
provision of basic services that are focused on the recipient state institu-
tions. Technical assistance, or cooperation as it is alternatively called, is 
broadly defined by Turkey as “strengthening capacities and effectiveness 
of individuals, organizations and institutions through transfer of ideas, 
technologies, knowledge and skills” (TIKA 2014b, 25). This can include a 
wide range of activities from the state to the local level such as trainings and 
scholarships to the provisions of equipment and materials. Additionally, a 
strong understanding of constructive development is common to both 
Turkish state agencies and non-state actors has strong historical roots. 
Fig. 5.1  Turkey’s development assistance 2002–2014 ($US millions)
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Since the Ottoman Empire, privately funded philanthropic development 
has focused on the construction of buildings and infrastructure, as well as 
the funding of services such as schools, hospitals, and mosques (Bikmen 
2008). Examples of infrastructure projects include renovating state build-
ings such or building schools and roads are common across all the coun-
tries in which Turkey is engaged.
Many infrastructure and technical cooperation programs appear to 
focus on improving the provision of basic services such as medical and 
judicial standards. For example, Turkey provides a range of trainings 
from judges and prosecutors in Kosovo to medical staff in Somalia (TIKA 
2014a, b). Turkish officials have said that they feel capacity-building pro-
grams directly support statebuilding by legitimizing the state’s authority 
and making services more effective. From this perspective, a legitimate 
and effective state is a form of peacebuilding that offers alternatives to 
non-governmental organizations such as militant or secession groups. 
However, Turkish officials are quick to emphasize that their support must 
be seen as apolitical in nature, stating: “We can only offer them certain 
technical expertise without any strict recipe. It is after all the requirements 
of the host country to determine how they will proceed.”7
Technical assistance and capacity-building programs are also a charac-
teristic of Turkey’s social peacebuilding, given their broad definition and 
aims. Most of capacity-building programs include training and technical 
assistance to support economic empowerment and appear to be focused at 
the local level through municipalities and communities. Technical equip-
ment assistance has been provided, for example, to the Governorship of 
Sar-e Pol in Afghanistan for vocational training programs for women, and 
the Agricultural Development Project in East Bosnia was established to 
support the return of families from the 1992–1995 war (TIKA 2014a, b). 
These are just some of the local projects aimed at economically empow-
ering communities. Technical assistance is also a part of other social 
peacebuilding activities in the education field, such as providing technical 
equipment for high schools and universities.
Education initiatives have been one of the more widely known areas 
associated with Turkey’s peacebuilding activities. This is due in part to 
the publicity around its extensive scholarship programs in Somalia. State 
scholarships have been provided by, among others, Diyanet (the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs) and the Education Ministry to students from Central 
Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Türkiye Bursları). Most 
education programs in the past had been run by third sector organizations 
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such as Hizmet or Gülen-linked schools. In many countries programs 
associated with this group have since been closed. The Turkish state tends 
to run smaller education-orientated programs, such as providing school 
materials and equipment, funding and renovating buildings, and promot-
ing Turkish language and cultural courses. Education initiatives such as 
these are not only a method of expanding Turkish soft power, but are also 
felt to contribute to social peacemaking through intercultural dialogue. 
Both officials and third state actors believe that education is a key peace-
building tool that can counter the narrative of extremism and provide 
opportunities for the future.
Finally, Turkey’s social peacebuilding activities are also characterized 
by an emphasis on mediation and religiously sensitive programs. Officials 
have stated the importance of mediation, not only at an inter-state level 
but also at the local level, through everyday activities and engagement 
with locals. This may range from consulting with communities to discus-
sions with political authorities on bilateral projects. Turkish officials feel 
that mediation and consultation are mechanisms that support their own 
espoused principles of national ownership. These principles can perhaps 
also be seen to guide the concept of cultural and religiously sensitive pro-
grams. These range from sponsoring intercultural activities such as visits to 
Turkey or football tournaments to providing Qurans or circumcision cer-
emonies for boys for example, in countries such as Afghanistan and Niger 
(TIKA 2014a, b; 2016). The building of mosques or events during Islamic 
festivals such as book fairs or Iftar have been staged from Afghanistan 
to Mogadishu and Pakistan. Given the scope of these programs globally, 
religious sensitivity is clearly a central aspect of Turkey’s activities. Such 
programs are not only pragmatic but they also add legitimacy to Turkish 
activities in the eyes of locals. In Afghanistan, reports noted that Turkish 
projects were more acceptable to communities than others because of their 
perceived sensitivity to local Afghan culture (Murphy and Sazak 2012).
ImPact and conclusIons
Over the last decade, Turkey’s approach to peacebuilding has transformed 
from the strategic state-centric security engagement of the 1990s to a 
more multifaceted conceptualization that encompasses both statebuilding 
and social peacemaking. This has been facilitated by a change in civil- 
military power dynamics since 2000 and a broader understanding of secu-
rity that considers the issue of human needs. Peacebuilding activities in 
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recent years range from technical assistance for state services to education 
and religious programs. This has been developed in parallel with new for-
eign policy activities that emphasize both mediation and enhanced eco-
nomic ties as potential peacebuilding strategies that are of mutual benefit 
to both Turkey and recipient states.
In spite of Turkey’s good intentions to promote peace and stability in 
its region and the rest of the world, Ankara’s capacity to execute this vision 
has some shortcomings. An estimated 2.8 million Syrian refugees, the 
resurgence of war with the PKK, IS’ penetration deep into the country’s 
urban centers, the continuing political volatility in the aftermath of the 
July 15 coup attempt and a receding economy constitute serious obsta-
cles to the sustainability of Turkey’s peacebuilding operations. In addi-
tion, for the last several years Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy goals and 
determination to project its soft power have alienated various supporters. 
Counting on African support to win another term on the UN Security 
Council in 2016, Turkey only received the votes of 60 countries out of 
193 (Sassounian 2014).
Turkey’s struggle against the Gülen network over the last few years, 
which is accused of orchestrating the July 15 coup attempt in addition to 
undermining the government of the AKP, has also affected the country’s 
relations with developing countries. Ironically, Gülenist charity organi-
zations had been among the most visible non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGOs) in providing humanitarian assistance to sub-Saharan Africa 
(Sassounian 2014). Viewed in light of Turkey’s false predictions about 
the longevity of the Assad regime in Syria, Ankara’s recognition of the 
depth of the crises that it is trying to help resolve both domestically and 
internationally, and its influence over the respective parties is challenging. 
In other words, the rhetoric-capacity mismatch in Turkish foreign policy 
risks moving Turkey farther away from “zero problems with neighbors” 
toward the dangerous territory of “zero neighbors without problems” 
(Sassounian 2014).
A number of basic organizational challenges have also hindered the 
Turkish state from realizing its potential to increase the quality and range 
of its peacebuilding initiatives. The most persistent of these impediments 
is coordination problems. First identified in a 2012 report a lack of effec-
tive interagency cooperation has been the most visible problem in Turkish 
peacebuilding activities (Sassounian 2014). The most vital ministries and 
government agencies that are involved in peacebuilding operations, such as 
the Foreign Ministry, Health Ministry, Development Ministry, and TIKA, 
were not informed about each other’s activities both at the higher echelons 
O. SAZAK AND A.E. WOODS
 103
of decision making or in the field. Recent research indicates that very little 
progress has been made in this area in recent years at both the state and 
third sector levels (Achilles et al. 2015). One representative of an interna-
tional organization based in Ankara volunteered that most TIKA bureau-
crats in charge of coordination are not even familiar with the basic UN 
procedures and terms.8 The lack of institutional training and knowledge of 
procedures within organizations like TIKA also complicates communica-
tion and coordination between the field offices and Ankara. In such situa-
tions, the quality and effectiveness of the country programs often depends 
on the individual in the field office. If the person assigned to a country 
office is in fact interested in the mission, TIKA operations in that particular 
country often provide more substantive results for the beneficiaries.9
This lack of consistency in coordination and consistent implementa-
tion of principles and goals also affects the development and monitor-
ing of programs. There is a disparity between the prestige and rhetoric 
around Turkey’s engagement and the actual effectiveness of the activi-
ties implemented. While TIKA publically provides data on the number 
of participants or equipment involved in technical assistance programs, 
greater analysis on how these programs are determined or their impact is 
not made available. There have been reports in the past of peacebuilding 
programs such as infrastructure projects or trainings being implemented 
without consultation with local authorities or research on other aid groups 
working in the area (Larson 2015; Deloffre 2015; Gloyd 2015). These 
problems appeared to have occurred in countries that TIKA had become 
newly active in, such as Somalia, Senegal, or Uganda.10 This also indi-
cates an important vacuum in the pre-deployment analyses and monitor-
ing activities for state operations in the field. Such patterns can, however, 
exacerbate overcrowding, duplication, and waste.
These internal capacity issues that the Turkey has grappled with have 
undoubtedly been exacerbated by the post-coup purges that have ravaged 
state institutions, agencies, and civil society organizations. In addition to 
these problems is the equally detrimental challenge of financing interna-
tional operations. The influx of Syrian refugees, for instance, has cost the 
state an estimated $12 billion (BirGün 2016) and led to nearly $2 billion 
worth of resources being rechanneled from foreign operations. This has 
diverted significant Turkish resources from high profile activities in fragile 
countries such as Somalia (Achilles et al. 2015). In addition, the  volatility 
of the Turkish lira against hard currencies, as well as ongoing political 
uncertainty, has taken a toll on the economic stability that is necessary to 
sustain the funds for Turkey’s peacebuilding initiatives.
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CHAPTER 6




Following the demise of apartheid, South Africa has made considerable 
strides in advancing itself as a global player and champion of African inter-
ests within the continent and globally. This has been most manifest in its 
role in peace and security. With its dual membership as a non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006–7 and 
2009–10, its membership in the G20 from 2009 and its role in the United 
Nations Peacebuilding Council, South Africa has positioned itself as a key 
player in the new efforts at international and African peace and security. 
As one of the architects of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) and the recently developed African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crises (ACIRC), designed to rapidly deploy in response to 
threats to peace and security, South Africa has positioned itself as a crucial 
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role player in efforts to manage security threats in Africa. South Africa 
has also contributed resources to peacebuilding endeavors, including the 
recent pledges and donations of
• over US$1 million to support the Central African Republic’s (CAR) 
recovery efforts under the leadership of the Economic Community 
of Central African States (ECCAS) and the African-led International 
Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA);
• about US$10 million to curb violence in Mali;
• over US$8 million toward assisting the then-Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia;
• the first AU peace support operation in Burundi (Lucey and Gida 
2014) and the special United Nations Force Intervention Brigade 
(FIB), endorsed by the AU to support the Democratic Republic 
of Congo’s (DRC) national army (FARDC) in defeating the M23 
rebellion operating in the Eastern region of the DRC.
Additionally, one of the first things the ANC did when it assumed power 
was to write off the debts of Swaziland, Mozambique, and Namibia, each 
valued at about ZAR1 billion (about $60 million) (Besharati 2013). Today, 
South Africa is transforming its aid and development cooperation activities 
from the African Renaissance Fund to the South African Development 
Partnership Agency (SADPA). The SADPA )is projected to operate an 
annual budget of R500 million (approximately US$50 million) (Besharati 
2013). Although the size of its budget and its technical resources are 
much smaller than those of many traditional donors, through the SADPA, 
South Africa strives to achieve impact on the African continent.
South Africa’s peacebuilding approach has been modeled on its own 
post-conflict reconstruction program called the Reconstruction and 
Development Program (RDP). The RDP includes a socioeconomic policy 
framework that was designed to address the immense socioeconomic prob-
lems brought about by the long years of the apartheid regime. Specifically, 
it set its sights on alleviating poverty and addressing the massive shortfalls 
in social services across the country by relying upon a stronger macroeco-
nomic environment. Unlike traditional peacebuilding, this framework was 
need-driven and offered houses, built roads to marginalized communi-
ties, and made health care and other social services affordable to victims 
of apartheid. In addition, the RDP attempted to combine measures to 
boost the economy such as contain fiscal spending, lower taxes, reduce 
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 government debt, and foster trade liberalization with infrastructural 
projects. Consequently, the policy adopted both socialist and neo-liberal 
elements whose implementation across Africa has drawn a number of criti-
cisms, particularly because in its engagements South Africa has not been 
consistent on its assistance and outreach to states in need. This incon-
sistency casts a shade of doubt on the credibility of South Africa as an 
actor not much different from the interest-driven traditional peacebuild-
ing actors from the global north. For instance, some have questioned its 
involvement in regions outside Southern Africa such as its mediation roles 
in Cote d’Ivoire and Burundi (Nibishaka 2011). Even in Southern Africa, 
its motives and interests have been a subject of debate about whether it 
is advancing its power/hegemonic interests under the pretext of regional 
common good (Kagwanja 2009). It has been accused of imposing its own 
model of transition featuring government of national unity and truth 
commissions in situations where this model might not be applicable. It has 
also been criticized for showing inconsistent ambition for Africa’s peace, 
showing energy in some cases and pulling back in others, such as Somalia. 
It has been accused of using its peace diplomacy to open markets for its 
multinationals, which exploit other Africans. The spike of violence against 
African migrants and refugees in South Africa has also shamed the country 
(Fayomi et al. 2015). Of course, South Africa has sought to assure fel-
low Africans that its interests are genuine and motives are grandiose. It 
has adjusted its approaches and sought to consult more now than before. 
It has sought to communicate a bit more clearly and to intervene only 
after careful consultations with other African countries. As a result, over 
time, its interventions have been limited to those that are done under a 
multilateral mandate such as the SADC mandate for Zimbabwe’s peace 
facilitation, the UN-mandated intervention in the DRC, and the AU–
UN mandate in Darfur, among others (Zondi 2012). More recently, it 
is voting patterns in the United Nations Security Council, especially on 
Resolution 1973, which in the guise of imposing a No Flight Zone was 
converting into a mission to overthrow and unseat Gaddafi. By voting for 
the Resolution which other African heads of states criticized South Africa’s 
integrity has been put on the spotlight and a constant reminder that it has 
turned its back from Africa is evidenced by the recurrent xenophobic inci-
dences that have been sporadic across the country since 2008.
The above notwithstanding, some analysts have emphasized the impor-
tance of South Africa’s military capability in supporting Peace Support 
Operations (Heitman 2013). Some have underlined the need for South 
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Africa to lend more support to the African Union’s African Solidarity 
Initiative (ASI) and the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD) initiative in a multilateral platform, which is in sync with the 
AU’s and REC’s positions (Lucey and Gida 2014). They have argued for 
continued role in capacity building, implementation support, economic 
development, and information sharing programs, which can strengthen 
African states’ recovery from crisis (Hendricks and Lucey 2013a, b). Some 
analysts have made the case for South Africa’s involvement in promoting 
civil society engagement and the Livingstone Formula, which states that 
“Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) may provide technical support to the 
AU by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis, which 
feeds information into the decision making processes of the PSC” (Lucey 
and Gida 2014).
Central to all this is the contested understanding of the concept of 
peacebuilding. For policy makers as well as experts in African conflict 
management frameworks, the concept has remained fluid and seems to 
generically encompass prevention, mediation, peace support operations, 
and post-conflict reconstruction, thereby begging for an appreciation of 
what exactly South Africa’s interventions have constituted in countries 
where they have invested human and financial capital. Using the examples 
of Burundi and the DRC, this sub-section does not just identify the nature 
of South African interventions with the view of appraising the distinction 
between such interventions and those previously undertaken or concur-
rently undertaken by traditional peacebuilding actors. This distinction is 
further critical in relation to various platforms and instruments used by 
South Africa to implement their peacebuilding engagements, and is pre-
sented in two main sections with the first focusing on what peacebuilding 
is conceived to be in South African policy circles and the motivation for 
intervention and the second identifying the tangibles of peacebuilding.
MotIvatIon for InterventIons
Admittedly, peacebuilding is a broad concept that cuts across a number 
of zones, including matters of economy, development, law, humanitarian-
ism, and security. Understanding the nature of support that South Africa 
provides to struggling, fragile, or post-conflict states is key in determining 
the country’s definition of peacebuilding. Part of the problem is that the 
country’s involvement in post-conflict development and reconstruction is 
under-reported and scarcely discussed (Hendricks and Lucey 2013a, b). 
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South Africa’s efforts suggest an unwritten peacebuilding and reconstruc-
tion framework with emphasis on building national infrastructure and the 
provision of affordable essential services like health care, housing, eco-
nomic and social grants, and communications infrastructure. The prac-
tice is that interventions are in many cases driven by demand, such as 
where South Africa is requested by multilateral organizations such the AU 
and SADC, certain cases such as in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Lesotho 
(Motsamai 2014). Yet, the difficulty in ending the crisis early has often 
led to accusations that South Africa was acting malevolently or unilaterally 
(Polzer 2008).
There have been occasions where, motivated by the doctrine of pre-
ventive diplomacy as expounded by the late UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Boutros Ghali, South Africa has acted proactively to intervene in 
developing conflict such as in Lesotho in the late 1990s. On such occa-
sion, there were accusations of unilateralism on its part though the inter-
vention was mandated by the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). Given the travails of a South African economy that has continued 
to grow without generating significant employment creation and given the 
impact of the global financial crisis on it, South Africa has found mandated 
interventions crucial for it to help stabilize regions on which it depends for 
investment without generating political problems for itself. South Africa is 
home to the largest pool of asylum seekers and refugees from the rest of 
Africa, imposing upon it the burden to respond the reasons for this migra-
tion while being sensitive to migrants’ needs.
Another important fact in this approach to peace diplomacy is South 
Africa’s anti-imperialist outlook on international affairs, being watchful for 
signs that western powers use difficulties in African countries to engineer 
regime changes and impose puppet governments. This is the policy stance 
that leads to South Africa intervening even at great costs to eliminate the 
conditions that lead to such eventualities. Recent comments by former 
President Thabo Mbeki in an open letter on Zimbabwe policy suggest that 
South Africa was fearful that the UK and the USA would intervene mili-
tarily in Zimbabwe to remove Mugabe and his government and install a 
government of their choice, taking advantage of the deep governance crisis 
accelerated by the ZANU-PF one-party state agenda and violations of the 
rights of citizens that opposed it. Similarly, its 2011 intervention through 
the AU committee in Libya, trying to mediate between parties and hop-
ing for a political solution in conflict between the Qaddafi government 
and rebels, was motivated by the AU policy to prevent  unconstitutional 
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changes of government and a wish to see Africa take the lead in solutions 
to African problems. Indeed, NATO-led forces brought down the Qaddafi 
government and in the process Qaddafi was killed. The result was a power 
vacuum that left a train of anarchy in that country, and that has destabilized 
large parts of the Sahel region. South Africa voted in favor of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the NATO- led intervention 
in Libya, is still hotly debated in South Africa’s foreign policy circles.
However, in the last decade, the demand for South African assistance 
in Africa’s troubled hotspots has increased exponentially. These demands 
have found themselves competing with domestic pressures and citizenry 
demands for jobs, improved wages, and most recently “free education” 
across the board. According to Hendricks and Lucey (2013a, b), in cer-
tain cases, despite these domestic pressures, there is an “expectation … 
[within the continent] … that South Africa will not just be another donor, 
but a partner with a vested interest in the development of the continent.” 
Maqungo goes further to say that, although demands come from every-
where, South Africa’s peacebuilding activities have been directly focused 
on the African continent safe for when supporting a project within a 
larger multilateral arrangement such as within the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission, BRICS or IBSA.1 When supported a peacebuilding project 
as part of a conglomeration of states, South Africa cannot lay claim to a 
different approach but the prevailing national sense is that, South African 
support “is not massive” but it is a demonstration of solidarity.
According to Kwezi Mngqibisa, post-apartheid South African interven-
tions are justified by the feeling of a moral obligation to support Africa, 
as Africa did for her during the century long apartheid dispensation.2 And 
so to the African states seeking assistance from South Africa, there is the 
expectation that unlike development aid from traditional peacebuilding 
actors that piles on their national debt, South Africa’s aid is different and 
designed to trigger economic growth. In emphasizing the distinction, 
Maqungo contends that while traditional peacebuilding actors such as the 
UN have specific mandates to prevent conflicts, South Africa’s interven-
tions are driven by interests that she exemplifies as geographical, security, 
humanitarian, and furtherance of personal and political party relationships 
by wielders of power and drivers of state policy at a particular time. To 
Maqungo, geographical interests are seen in cases such as Zimbabwe and 
Lesotho, where because of the geographical proximity, if South Africa does 
not intervene early enough to avert a crisis, it would be directly affected 
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by the spillover of such crisis. Pertaining to humanitarianism as a motiva-
tion for South African interventions, Maqungo cited interventions such 
as Mandela’s mediation in Burundi and said, South Africa had no direct 
interest or stakes in the Burundi process, but because the death of Nyerere 
left a vacuum that prompted the continent to solicit the moral authority 
of Mandela to intervene, the country got drawn into it (at great cost). But 
interestingly, personal friendships such as that between President Bozize 
(Central African Republic’s present) and Thabo Mbeki (SA) also drive 
deployments, such as the security sector reform mission to Central Africa 
before the overthrow of Bozize. Maqungo also suggested that experience 
sharing such as between liberation movements like South Africa’s African 
National Congress (ANC) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) can motivate interventions.
the essence of south afrIcan PeacebuIldIng suPPort
It should be stated from the onset that unlike some development partners 
who sharply differentiate between mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuild-
ing, and humanitarian assistance, South Africa’s broad spectrum approach 
is fluid and utilizes the concept of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development (PCRD) to refer to funding for humanitarian and develop-
ment assistance; and with cases such as Somalia, such funding can be used 
for capacity building trainings, policy development, inter-government 
exchange of ideas and electoral support, which all gear toward building a 
strong and resilient state.
More broadly, in terms of peacebuilding support, South Africa has pro-
vided states with substantial assistance in the areas of good governance, 
dialogue and reconciliation, security sector reform, human resource and 
infrastructure development, policy implementation, economic develop-
ment and trade, information sharing and exchange visits among South 
African dignitaries, as well as humanitarian assistance. Key examples that 
can be cited are training and restructuring advice provided by South 
Africa to the DRC national army (FARDC) and police, police in South 
Sudan, military in the Central African Republic and the Disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process in Cote d’Ivoire. In such 
capacities, South African expertise and resources have been essential in the 
development of key policy reforms, institutionalization of  accountability 
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frameworks, and support for electoral processes in recipient countries. 
Furthermore, South Africa has fostered dialogue and reconciliation in 
many instances through financing negotiations, facilitating mediations, 
and channeling international buy-in of the process.
Moreover, human resource and infrastructure development assistance 
committed by Pretoria has ensured training, capacity-building workshops, 
professional exchange visits for key sectors of government and civil society 
organizations, as well as the building of new roads, hospitals, airports, 
schools, and water and irrigation schemes in conflict-affected countries. 
In addition, South Africa’s commitment and know-how have also been 
essential for the implementation of nationally identified priorities such as 
DDR, fund raising and sponsorship programs to procure key state capaci-
ties such as public safety, data administration, and asset management in 
beneficiary countries. In the same vein, South Africa’s support and export 
of technical knowledge in the areas of economic development and trade 
have helped many nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) to increase their national incomes by increasing the utility of 
national endowments such as mines and water reserves.
A good illustration is South Africa’s technical assistance and skills 
training for Congolese to build a hydroelectric plant in the Bas Congo 
Corridor and facilitation of the business communication through reg-
ular flights and the setting up of leading South African businesses. 
Concomitantly, South Africa has provided information sharing and 
exchange visits, combined with humanitarian assistance, manifest vital 
support for CSOs immersed in democratization, gender mainstreaming, 
peacebuilding, dialogue, security sector reform, and transitional justice. 
By the same token, the South African non-governmental organization 
Gift of the Givers (GOTG) is the largest African humanitarian NGO and 
the South African government often donates funds to the GOTG as it 
has a proven track record of delivering humanitarian assistance in Africa 
and beyond, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan.3 During the 2011 
famine crisis that hit Somalia, an estimated 11 chartered “flights carrying 
175 tons of supplies and … another 132 containers carrying 2640 tons of 
aid on several ships … [t]ogether with the medical support [to] … four 
hospitals” were sent from South Africa into Somalia (GOTG 2012). It 
is estimated that this cost approximately ZAR80 million (approximately 
US$10 million) over a one-year period.4 This provided food security to 
about 126,000 people among whom 7000 were and several hundred 
physically challenged families (GOTG 2012).
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The above examples from the DRC, South Sudan, Burundi, and 
Somalia offer tangible evidence of South Africa’s peacebuilding support. 
When one talks about peacebuilding and South Africa, the above come to 
mind first.
the categorIes of InterventIons
Following from the above, South Africa’s approaches to peacebuilding are 
strongly informed not just by its own recent history, but a strong national 
interest that benefits from peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable 
conflicts. This, according to its policy documents, compels South Africa 
to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who 
are struggling to resolve similar conflicts (Department of Foreign Affairs 
1999). Specifically, the 1999 White Paper on South African participation 
in international peace missions contemplates that civilian assistance, armed 
forces, and police officers are essential tools for peace, and their work in 
promoting the respect for human rights, good governance, and institution 
building is critical to reconstructing sustainable peace as opposed to the 
use of force which was previously characteristic of military interventions 
(Department of Foreign Affairs 1999). South Africa therefore commit-
ted through this document to work with the UN, the AU, SADC, and 
other multilateral agencies such as BRICs and IBSA to make appropriate 
contribution to international peace missions. South Africa’s potential con-
tributions include the services of a diverse group of civilians with expertise 
and experience in areas that may be fundamental to the success of a peace 
mission (conflict resolution, election monitoring, medical care, demining, 
telecommunications, etc.). Consequently, whether in South Sudan, the 
DRC, Burundi, or Somalia, the principles that have defined South Africa’s 
intervention and peace support have been the same and have adopted a 
more nuanced terminology of peace missions as opposed to the tradi-
tional peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandates. The difference is that, 
from inception, a government decision to support a fragile country or one 
in conflict is seen as a peace mission, and all support such as below seeks 
to transform the ailing configuration of conflict and restore durable peace 
by putting in place resilient institutions and infrastructure (see Tables 6.1 
and 6.2).
The tables above demonstrate the width of South African support to 
South Sudan and to the DRC and in a sense provide a snapshot of how 
peacebuilding support is channeled and funded. How different then are 
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Table 6.1 South African peacebuilding support in South Sudan (Hendricks and 
Lucey 2013a, b, 3)
Governance Development of the Child Act (University of Cape Town)
Observing the referendum (35-member team consisting of 
members of the parliament, government officials, and analysis 
unit (PRAU))
Capacity building Training of diplomats by the Department of Foreign Relations 
and Cooperation’s (DIRCO), Policy Research and Analysis 
Unit (PRAU)
Regional Capacity Building Project for Civil Service by the 
Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy 
(PALAMA)
Capacity building of top- and middle-level government 
managers by the University of South Africa (UNISA) and the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU)
Training of South Sudan Police Service (SSPS) by the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) on operational training and 
senior management, crime prevention, sexual harassment, 
community policing, cybercrime, and crowd management
Training of key security personnel and institution building by 
the South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
Exchange between the universities of Juba and Fort Hare 
(Higher Education Department) and the University of the 
Western Cape (Law department)
Implementation support Mediation between Sudan and South Sudan (Mbeki as Chair 
of AUHIP)
Support with electoral materials for election in 2010
As part of UN Police (UNPOL) under the UN Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS)
Securing airspace during independence day celebrations 
(SANDF)
Demining (Mechem—Subsidiary of Denel)
Refurbishing government buildings (KV3)
Economic Development 
& Trade
Arms (Denel), beer (SAB Miller), and mining exploration 
(New Kush Exploration), agribusiness (Joint Aid 
Management), cellular network (MTN), cement (Afrisam), 
and banking (Stanbic)
MoU with Council of Geoscience to map minerals
Other NGOs engaged in conflict resolution and capacity building, 
namely IJR, ACCORD, ISS, SAWID, IGD, AISA, and the SA 
Council of Churches. There are also South Africans working in 
other organizations in South Sudan in their individual 
capacities
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Table 6.2 South African peacebuilding support in the DRC (Hendricks and 
Lucey 2013a, b, 4)
Governance Assistance with the development of a master plan for the reform of 
the armed forces
Needs assessment for the army, navy, air force and military health 
(proposed)
SA Police Services (SAPS) development of a five-year plan (not fully 
implemented)
Interpol (SA representative stationed at National Congolese Police 
(PNC) to assist with planning)
Development of an organic law for decentralization of government 
and public administration, and vision and strategy document for the 
public service
Anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework
Establishment of the diplomatic academy
Supporting the legislative drafting and development of a legal and 
constitutional framework
Trade policy formulation; quality control; competition policy; 
intellectual property; and micro-finance
Deployment of election observers
Human resource 
development
Training of army (three battalions; rapid detection force; new 
recruits)
Training of PNC to police elections; VIP protection training; 
professionalization of PNC; office administration training/human 
resource and project management for police; arms control 
proliferation training
Training of civil society for engagement in community policing 
forums and SSR
Training of prosecutors, investigators, auditors, civil society & 
business to develop and implement integrity initiatives
Training of immigration officials
Training of senior DRC public servants and public management
Training of diplomats; foreign language training
Training on conflict resolution and negotiation, SA foreign policy, 
management and leadership and mission administration; training on 
anti-corruption
Training of DRC magistrates
Building capacity for infrastructure development (i.e. job inspection, 
licensing of civil construction agents, setting up of information, 
financing, infrastructure development)
Administrative assistance for CENI
Training of DRC revenue authorities
(continued)
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South African peacebuilding  support interventions from those of Western 
and established actors? One obvious difference is that South Africa’s sup-
port is quite small in size and quantity compared to Western established 




Rehabilitation of the Mura base; rehabilitation of the Maluku police 
training center; renovation of ENA (school of public 
administration); refurbishment of foreign ministry building to set up 
diplomatic academy
Bas Congo corridor (deep-water port at Banana, rehabilitation of 
Matadi Port, rehabilitation of the railway line, Matadi to Kinshasa); 
Zambia Copper Belt spatial initiative
ACSA undertook financial needs assessment (airport construction)
Implementation 
support
DDR; identification and registration of FARDC personnel; 
destroyed illegal and redundant weapons and ammunition
Security patrols
Transportation of ballot papers for elections; air support for 
elections; deployment of SAPS members for elections; donation of 
4×4 vehicles, communication equipment and desks, tents, and 
computers
Institutional development of national ministries, provincial 
legislature, and municipal local councils
Census of public service personnel; pilot project—asset register for 
immovable assets in relation to infrastructure sector
Feasibility study for Bas Congo Corridor and Zambia Copper Belt; 
technical expertise by Telkom to Congolese telecoms network; 
Eskom feasibility study for electrification of Kimbanseke area; 
financial needs assessment of state-owned enterprises
Preparation of funding applications; organizing investor conferences 




Support for the development of trade and industry in DRC
Mining of bauxite, aluminum smelter, hydro-electricity (as part of 
the Bas Congo Corridor)
SAA flights, retail sector (Shoprite), telecommunications (MTN, 
Vodacom), Western Power Corridor Project; Standard Bank
Information 
sharing
Workshops by, e.g. IDASA (democratization and establishment of 
sustainable policing in the DRC); SAWID (gender mainstreaming); 
ACCORD (workshops in peacebuilding); IGD (dialogue on PCRD 
and elections); ISS (gender mainstreaming in the security sector); 
IJR (information sharing on transitional justice)
Information sharing between provincial and local councils in SA and 
DRC
Humanitarian Gift of the Givers—humanitarian assistance
C. NYUYKONGE AND S. ZONDI
 119
field and still having to address critical development challenges domes-
tically. For this reason, over time, Pretoria has provided development 
assistance through a variety of different institutions and not been directly 
involved as in the first decade of its post-apartheid democracy.
South Africa’s efforts listed above demonstrate the breadth of assistance 
including conflict prevention, mediation, peace support and post-conflict 
reconstruction as vehicles for peacebuilding, which makes South Africa’s 
approach to this assistance comprehensive. The modalities for delivery 
of this assistance are clearly distinct from Western and established actors 
in this field, namely South Africa’s engagements are through the African 
Renaissance Fund as well as a host of national departments individually, 
whereas with established actors the assistance is coordinated by a single 
agency. Some of the South Africa actions were funded by Western donors, 
through so-called triangular North–South–South Cooperation arrange-
ments. For instance Norway funded the training of South Sudanese police 
by the SAPS and the Netherlands funded the building of brassage centers 
for the FARDC by the SANDF. Similarly, the South African NGO actions 
listed in the tables above were also largely funded by Western donors. 
Another area of difference is that South Africa, like other emerging and 
Southern actors, does not feel obliged to push the ideology of human 
rights and democracy in their assistance. As a result its pre-conditions 
have little to do with conforming to certain political cultures preferred by 
South Africa, as contrasts with established donors.
lessons learned
There is no gainsaying that in its international engagements South Africa 
has taken a clear South orientation, endeavoring to be the “voice of 
Africa” in aid negotiations. It has been vocal about global-aid effective-
ness. Although development support has remained a tiny quotient of its 
support to countries such as Burundi, the DRC, and South Sudan, the 
competition for this aid has increased and exposed a much decentralized 
and internally competing South African public system. This is largely 
because in the 20-year-old democratic dispensation, the ANC has tried 
to transform the image of South Africa in Africa as a driver of growth, 
human capacity, and freedom on the continent while also trying to right 
the wrongs of apartheid.
At the same time, recent efforts have raised questions about South 
Africa’s commitment to deliver on its ambitious peace support agenda. 
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Somalia offers one example. In February 2012, during the International 
Contact Group of Somalia conference in the UK, South Africa com-
mitted R100 million (US$7.5 million) toward assisting the Transitional 
Federal Government achieve its priorities objectives before the end of its 
term in September 2015. South Africa has insisted that the assistance be 
informed by government to government relations. Somali administrations 
have been adamant that the assistance should be directed toward build-
ing national government structures that would later engage in relations 
with their South African counterparts. Regardless of different expecta-
tions, considerable progress was made with Somalia with the opening an 
embassy in Pretoria and the recognition of Somali consular instruments by 
South African immigration authorities.
Despite this progress, little movement has been recorded thus far in 
South African efforts to get accredited in Mogadishu. Differences have 
also hampered spending the pledged assistance. The South African gov-
ernment supported the ACCORD-managed South Africa–Somalia 
Assistance (SASA) Project, also known as the “Somalia Initiative.” The 
Somalia Initiative, working with the peacebuilding priorities identified by 
Somali local and national stakeholders, aimed to reverse the potency of a 
relapse. The government, however, argued that it, rather than a broader 
group of stakeholders, should direct the expenditures since the allocation 
for SASA is part of pledged funding.
Such ambiguity has been at the core of contestations as to whether 
South Africa is really doing anything in Somalia, whether there is even 
the will by Pretoria to live up to the foreign policy pledges and pace pre-
viously set in Burundi, the DRC, and South Sudan. As a result, the per-
ceptions about South Africa are varied. And justifiably so, because South 
Africa’s track record as demonstrated in the case of the DRC and South 
Sudan has been visibly large and impressive—thus begging the ques-
tion why a change in the case of Somalia. Is it resource scarcity? Is it an 
absence of geo-strategic importance? These notwithstanding, when asked 
to identify specific activities that South Africa has supported, an inter-
viewee stated that “South Africa gives seminars and gives some money 
but it is not enough.”5 Another view was that “South Africa’s support has 
been through the Gift of the Givers and partnerships with educational 
 institutions.”6 But the recurrent sense of more was expected from South 
Africa seemed like the country had set its commitment to the continent 
higher than it could respond to. In spite of this, there is a strong African 
desire to strengthen ties with South Africa and to develop a mutually ben-
eficial relationship.
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Another cause for concern about South Africa’s continued peace efforts 
on the continent was its decision to draw down its troops from Sudan in 
April 2016. Whereas this decision was part of a broader austerity measure to 
respond to domestic economic challenges, it also exposed an often under-
valued precondition for peacebuilding: the indispensability of resources. 
The existence of political will and policies are not enough to drive peace 
support operations. There is a fundamental need for resource availability, 
a stable domestic economy and a politically stable and mature democracy 
which sees value in humanitarianism and global peace endeavors for peace 
support to flow. It may seem that South Africa, itself 20 years into a process 
of post-conflict recovery and democratization, overcommitted itself and 
started experiencing fault-lines that in other states have triggered relapse.
Before now, South Africa’s support to other states has been sourced 
from its African Renaissance Fund (ARF). The dispensing of development 
assistance through the ARF almost created the unintended contemplation 
that South Africa had graduated from a developing country and joined the 
ranks of developed countries. But recent economic challenges, widening 
inequality, and soaring unemployment were stark reminders of the need 
for South Africa to reconfigure its intervention framework. Against this 
backdrop, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) 
was conceived to address the shortcomings in the management and imple-
mentation of development projects experienced with the ARF. SADPA 
would use development cooperation as a tool to advance South Africa’s 
foreign policy goals, while the newly created South African Council of 
International Relations (SACOIR) decide on foreign policy priorities as 
indicated by the National Development Plan. The SACOIR and SADPA 
are therefore two new organs designed to balance national interest and 
foreign policy. While the SACOIR underscores and promotes practical 
opportunities for cooperation, to tackle the problems of poverty, inequal-
ity, and unemployment, SADPA would offer development assistance 
where the opportunity for South Africa’s interest are not undermined to 
the detriment of its people.
conclusIon
As South Africa continues to consider the future of its involvement in 
seeking solutions and stability in the complex and old crisis in Somalia and 
finding finality to the drawn-out assistance to the never-ending crisis in the 
DRC, three issues come up sharply in respect of the country’s post-conflict 
interventions. The first is the fact that all interventions derive their success 
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or failure from the objective conditions in the crises which South Africa 
responds. Where the situation is ripe for mediation and stabilization, the 
country’s approach succeeds in a limited time. But where the interven-
tion occurs in an ongoing conflict with no conditions for subsiding, as in 
Somalia and the DRC, it gets drawn out. The second is that South Africa’s 
interventions are generally framed by the broad thrust of South Africa’s 
foreign policy and worldview. Thus, its commitment to stabilizing Africa 
and enable a renaissance that will benefit South Africa’s diverse economy 
underpins its decisions on interventions. Thirdly, South Africa is laden 
with the responsibility of playing a lead role among other countries in 
achieving the shared goals of the continent on account of its own benefits 
from African solidarity during the anti-colonial, anti-apartheid struggle 
and on account of its relative capacities.
Among the lessons evident from engagements like the DRC and 
Burundi is the fluidity of the concepts of mediation, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding as South Africa applies them. South African peacekeepers 
and the domestic mission support team which includes civilians play diver-
gent roles in helping the state to recover. These roles are often not just 
military but a blend of military, civilian and police.
South Africa’s peacebuilding initiatives in Africa highlights important 
novel approaches promoted, while offering vital lessons for all stakehold-
ers to improve upon. Among the lessons learned are the need to avoid 
adopting a narrow security prism to interventions in complex conflicts 
and refrain from attaching conditions to aid. It is also the need to avoid 
the use of many middle men in such interventions as some major actors 
do in order to avert security risks. It is important to engage local partners, 
inquiring from them about the conditions and solutions as well as directly 
responding to their needs. It is also wise not to overcrowd or the host 
country’s vital bureaucracy, but have interventions that can be done in 
partnership with assisted countries within their capacity.
The case Somalia affirmed that there is still room for improvement 
in the sense that the bilateral engagement with NGOs like ACCORD, 
 without taking cognizance of the Somali government priorities or allow-
ing the latter to control the funds and define what they should be used 
for seemed like funds with strings can generate negative perceptions 
about using own institutions and exporting solutions. This single exam-
ple suggests that South Africa is more successful in those cases where it 
was directly involved from the conceptualization of the peace process like 
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mediation. This in part could explain the heavy investments in the DRC 
and Burundi processes. In these two cases, South Africa demonstrated 
high-level political commitment, familiarity with the issues, and felt suf-
ficiently involved as part of the key stakeholders to the process, which is in 
contrast to Darfur and Somalia, where its involvement is in solidarity with 
the international community and thus a posture in engagement of actors, 
and less political commitment.
Today, with the South African Council of International Relations put in 
place to lead on discourses around foreign policy, there is lieu and time to 
broaden this discussion and work with the government toward addressing 
its challenges in policy implementation evidenced in the case of Somalia 
where a neat balance needs to be struck between meeting foreign policy 
objectives and responding to domestic challenges in manners where inter-
vention is appreciated externally and its dividends well received by the 
South African populace.
 notes
 1. Telephonic interview with Mr. Sivu Maqungo, Deputy Permanent 
Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations.
 2. Interview with Kwezi Mngqibisa, Coordinator of SA-Somalia Project, 
ACCORD South Africa, July 15, 2015.
 3. Gift of the Givers (GOTG) is the largest NGO operational in Mogadishu 
presently. Next in line are the Iranian and Turkish Red Crescent.
 4. Ibid. Also note that the exchange rate as of 2012 was about 1 rand = 0.122 
US$. Thus, ZAR80 million = $US10 million. In this text, exchange rates 
generally approximate the USD values when the pledge or aid was 
disbursed.
 5. Interview with an official at the Office for Diaspora Affairs, Mogadishu, 
August 23, 2015.
 6. Interview with a Somali Civil Society Activist, Mogadishu, August 25, 2015.
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The gradual shift in the economic and political gravity towards the Global 
South, particularly the Indo-Pacific, is also reflected in the increased role of 
these rising powers in stabilising countries emerging from conflict. While 
in terms of amounts of financial resources deployed by them, aside from 
China whose assistance figures are ambiguous, may not appear very large, 
the question to be addressed is whether these new actors have brought a 
different approach to issues of peacebuilding, more especially with refer-
ence to projects being demand-driven and owned by recipient societies.
China, and to a lesser extent India, is accused of tailoring its assistance 
to take advantages of natural resources available in African countries. 
This criticism is further buttressed by the conviction that such flows from 
‘emerging donors might increase the recipients’ debt levels, ignore envi-
ronmental and social impacts, and focus on extracting resources … result-
ing in an erosion of the progress that has been made in the traditional aid 
community in these areas’ (Dornsife 2013). On the other hand, these ris-
ing powers do not see themselves as donors but as development partners; 
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their assistance may be tied but has no policy conditionalities attached to 
them, are demand-driven and are premised on non-interference in the 
affairs of recipient countries (Dornsife 2013; Roopanaraine 2013).
Going deeper, what are the strategic goals and interests of these ris-
ing powers? What motivates them to extend assistance to other, develop-
ing countries? And are these motivations different from that of traditional 
donors? Do they differentiate between ‘normal’ development and peace-
building? Does peacebuilding imply a sequenced approach with securing 
peace as the first priority, followed by state-building and then develop-
ment? And are the projects taken by these rising powers perceived to be 
successful by the governments and people of the recipient countries?
The emerging powers generally, and India specifically, because they 
see themselves as partners and not donors, are driven by a different set 
of motivations. Having suffered from colonialism which involved not 
just pauperisation but also loss of political agency, the emerging powers 
focused on the need to become economically self-sustaining, though in 
the age of globalisation this is a more nuanced view. Sharing experience 
and technology was seen as the best way to overcome the lack of capital. A 
primacy to national sovereignty and hence non-interference in the inter-
nal affairs of each other meant that the concept of conditionality was not 
accepted though tied aid was—both to overcome the need to import from 
the developed countries and in the spirit of mutual gain. Like traditional 
donors, political and strategic considerations cannot be ignored, even if 
the approach is context-specific.
A critical look at India’s role in Afghanistan would be used to examine 
these sets of questions dealing with the role, innovations and effective-
ness of the rising powers in building peace. India has been the fifth larg-
est bilateral donor in Afghanistan, and the largest outside the developed 
countries. This offers a unique opportunity to study the performance of 
a non-traditional donor in a conflict-affected country; it can be no one’s 
case anymore that Afghanistan is a country that is ‘actually’ emerging from 
conflict, and yet the country over the past 14 years has made tremendous 
strides in many fields, for example, school education, health coverage, 
communications, role of civil society, growth of a free media and holding 
regular elections including a peaceful transition of power.
The format of the chapter is that, after a brief introductory section, 
the second section will trace India’s emergence as a donor, examining its 
driving principles and the evolution of its instruments. This too needs 
substantial elaboration since there is general lack of knowledge, as well as 
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misconceptions, about the size of India’s development assistance as well 
as misgivings about India’s presence in this field, hitherto the preserve of 
donors from developed countries. The third section will look at India’s 
role in Afghanistan, its development initiatives, the strategic factors driving 
its Afghan policy and will briefly compare India’s development interven-
tions with that of the United States. The fourth section will look at how 
India’s development partnership is perceived in Afghanistan and whether 
it contributes to peacebuilding, or is divisive and exclusionary. The con-
cluding section will attempt to draw lessons from India’s development 
engagement with Afghanistan with a view to strengthening peacebuilding 
efforts in countries emerging from conflict.
IndIa as donor1
Contrary to general perception, bolstered by the fact that India is the larg-
est borrower from the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), India has been involved in bilateral, and multilateral, development 
partnership since the early days of its independence. In 1949, the newly 
independent Burma (now Myanmar) faced a serious crisis in its balance of 
payment. Prime Minister Nehru organised a meeting of Commonwealth 
countries that raised six million pound sterling on concessional terms for 
Burma; India’s own contribution was one million pounds. In addition, 
India extended a bilateral special concessional loan of Rupees five million 
to Burma to buy rice from India.2
India was an active participant in the setting up of the Colombo Plan 
for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia dur-
ing 1950–51. Though the Colombo Plan was initially designed within the 
traditional developed country donor-developing country recipient frame-
work, it soon evolved as the pioneer instrument of South–South coop-
eration centred on ‘technical cooperation and sharing of development 
experience.’ During these early years, India extended technical coopera-
tion partnership under Colombo Plan as well as extended financial assis-
tance to its neighbours, for example, ‘loans of around 200 million rupees 
to Myanmar and 100 million rupees to Nepal’ in the 1950s (Chanana 
2009).
From the outset, India’s approach was quite different from that of the tra-
ditional donors (developed countries). For India the driving force was devel-
opment partnership, and it did not see itself as a donor even when it extended 
concessional loans, advances in Indian budgetary parlance. India saw itself 
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as a part, albeit leading one, of the group of developing countries emerging 
from decolonisation with under-developed economies. The common history 
of colonisation and emphasis on economic growth bound these countries 
together. Anti-colonialism meant that egalitarianism and partnership, not 
aid, should be the focus. What further made India adopt its own path was 
the Cold War that threatened to divide the world into two, opposing camps. 
Loath to lose their independence and freedom of action that they interpreted 
joining either camp meant, India and the others sought their space. The 
adoption of Panchsheel, or five points, at the Bandung Afro-Asian summit 
in 1955 was the result, to be followed in 1961 with the launch of the non-
aligned movement. Panchsheel committed these countries to respect each 
others’ sovereignty and not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
While recognising the political cause of their under-development 
(colonialism), in the circumstances India felt it necessary to work with its 
partners on addressing the economic cause of such under-development 
through technical cooperation and the sharing of experiences. The driv-
ing principles of India’s development partnership with other developing 
countries were expanded to include egalitarianism, country ownership, 
demand-driven and lack of conditionalities (even where there was tied 
financing). The latter is significant as mutual respect for sovereignty ruled 
out imposing any conditions as lenders do. However, the lack of hard cur-
rency and desire for self-sufficiency meant that tying aid to purchases from 
lending country was accepted. Separately this refusal to join either camp 
enabled India and others to access financial and technical assistance from 
both camps and from multilaterals.
India did not set up a dedicated agency for external development part-
nership; instead it was run and coordinated by the Ministry of External 
Affairs (MEA) which drew on expertise of the relevant line ministries. 
India formalised its technical assistance efforts by establishing the India 
Technical and Economic Cooperation programme (ITEC), again located 
in MEA. ITEC has six main channels:
 1. Training of workers from state-owned enterprises, bureaucrats and 
policy makers nominated by the partner countries;
 2. Feasibility and consultancy services related to specific development 
projects;
 3. The sending of Indian experts to the requesting country;




 5. Donation of hardware to partner countries; and
 6. Humanitarian aid for disaster relief (Indian Technical and Economic 
Cooperation 2013).
For government of India, ITEC was about partnership and learning 
from each other, quite different from traditional aid. To quote MEA 
(2012), ITEC’s basic proposition is that ‘…cooperative efforts of the 
developing countries were as important as assistance from developed 
countries and international organizations.’ The training component has 
grown very substantially, and in 2012, it covered 200 different train-
ing programmes, of varying durations, at forty training institutions with 
a total of 5000 training slots (Ministry of External Affairs 2012) ITEC 
Program has evolved and grown over the years and MEA (2012) reports 
that ITEC and its sister programme, Special Commonwealth African 
Assistance Programme (SCAAP) has covered 161 countries in Asia, Africa, 
East Europe, Latin America, Caribbean as well as Pacific and Small Island 
countries, and is funded by government of India. It is estimated that by 
2010, there were ‘more than 40,000 alumni of the ITEC program around 
the world’ (Ramachandran 2010).
India’s development partnership programmes in general, including 
ITEC, are dollar-for-dollar of much greater value since these are over-
whelmingly incurred within India and its developing partner countries 
adjusting for purchasing power parity. In other words, India’s exter-
nal development budget of US$1.3 billion for 2013–14 would actually 
translate into effectively 4/5 times larger amount for a developed donor 
country.3
India’s development assistance has also been increasing at a reasonably 
fast pace, particularly since 2000, ‘increasing seven-fold between 2000 and 
2014. In 2014, Indian development assistance stands at about $1.3 bil-
lion’ (ICRC 2014). This amount may be a slight underestimation as there 
are other items not fully caught in the budget documents. ITEC is the 
single largest component, US$589 million out of this amount. Figure 7.1 
tracks the growth in India’s development assistance in recent years. The 
Indian government also makes sizeable contributions to multilateral 
organisations, including the World Food programme, U.N. Development 
Program and the World Health Organization.
In fact, this tripling over five years is unprecedented, but even at 
the lower 2012–13 levels, India’s development assistance budget ‘was 
comparable to Austria’s foreign aid budget for the same year and higher 
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than the foreign assistance of four of the 23 DAC countries in 2011’ 
(OECD 2012). India’s development assistance budget for the year 
2015–16 includes a grant element of US$878 million and US$180 
million earmarked for capacity development (including formal univer-
sity education in India). There is also a target for extending Letters of 
Credit (LOCs), US$2 billion for Africa and US$500 million for other 
countries.4
Earlier, Indian financial assistance was limited to its immediate neigh-
bourhood but that has since changed, though the former still dominates 
the flow of funds. In fact, but for developments in Afghanistan, discussed 
later, and the opening up of Myanmar which made these two countries 
receive larger and larger amounts of assistance, the share of the neigh-
bourhood would have been considerably less. Myanmar received US$83 
million in 2013–14, a steep jump from just US$10 million four years ear-
lier. Significantly, India’s aid to Africa has grown at a compound annual 
growth rate of 22% over the past ten years (Ramachandran 2010). The top 
three aid recipients of India’s development cooperation are Bhutan (49%), 



























Fig. 7.1 India’s development assistance, 2009–2014
Source: Indian Government
Note: Excludes line of credit
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Realising that the government would be unable to meet from its budget 
the increased call from its development partners for assistance, India shifted 
gears over the years 2003–4, spanning two different governments. First, 
India would be discontinuing the system of offering concessional loans, 
learning from the HPIC experience where it had to write off advances to 
Guyana and others, it shifted to outright grants, and also introduced a 
new instrument, LOCs administered by India’s Exim Bank with govern-
ment picking up a major part of the interest charges, allowing partner 
countries to pick up highly concessional loans for investments in areas of 
their choice. This has allowed India to expand its development partner-
ship portfolio considerably without a concomitant charge on its budget, 
with government’s own commitment limited to the interest subvention 
charges. Exim Bank raises its capital from international bond markets since 
it needs hard currency for its borrowers. LOCs are tied instruments and as 
a rule, a minimum of 75% of goods and services procured under the LOC 
(with a relaxation of up to 10%) must be sourced from Indian companies. 
However, there is a very substantial grant element, varying from 56.4% 
for HPICs, 37.3% for low-income countries/LDCs and 34.4% for middle 
income countries (Arora and Mullen 2017).
The process starts with request received from borrower countries for 
specific projects. MEA’s Standing Committee decides whether to move 
ahead, and if so, the amount of exposure and recommends the case to 
the finance ministry. The finance ministry checks availability of budgetary 
resources and finalises the terms and conditions, based on the borrowing 
country’s income classification. The LOC is operated through EXIM bank, 
but the procurement process followed is that of the borrowing country. 
There is no oversight of this by India at all, respecting their sovereignty.
LOCs have become extremely popular and high-level diplomatic visit 
to such partner countries most often result in announcement of new/
enhanced LOCs. Exim Bank has now in place 226 Lines of Credit, cov-
ering 63 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Oceania and the CIS, 
with credit commitments of US$16.9 billion; the total amount of con-
tract approvals is US$7.18 billion, and amount disbursed, US$5.77 bil-
lion (Mathew 2015). Annex I has an illustrative listing of projects.
Doubts have been raised whether these credits should even be thought 
of as development assistance since LOCs are seen to be promoting the 
exports of Indian goods and services. However, the level of tied credit, at 
75% of these loans is ‘comparable to the de facto tied aid given for example 
by the US Agency for International Development. Also, the Organization 
 RISING POWERS AND PEACEBUILDING: INDIA’S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN 
136 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines on 
what is to be considered as ‘soft loans’ categorises such concessional 
Government of India-backed and Exim-bank distributed LOCs as devel-
opment assistance.6
Africa has become the largest user of Indian LOCs, 52% of actual dis-
bursals and 45% of amount committed (Mathew 2015). At the recent 
India–Africa summit (Oct 26–30, 2015), attended by 41 heads of State/
government out of 54, ‘India promised $10 billion in new credit and 
$600 million in grant aid to African countries, over five years’ (Gupta 
2015). India–Africa Development Fund would get an infusion of $100 
million and India–Africa Health Fund of $10 million. The grant would 
also include 50,000 scholarships in India over the next five years.
Utilising its strength in the IT and IT enabled services (ITES) sector, 
India would spend a total US$125 million in setting up the Pan-African 
e-Network project. It is meant to assist Africa in capacity building by way 
of imparting quality education to 10,000 students in Africa over a five-year 
period in various disciplines from some of the best Indian Universities/
Educational Institutions. Besides, this would provide Tele-Medicine ser-
vices by way of on line medical consultation to the medical practitioners 
at the Patient End Location in Africa by Indian Medical specialists in vari-
ous disciplines/specialties. India would cover the cost of supply, installa-
tion, testing and commissioning of hardware and software, end-to-end 
connectivity, satellite bandwidth, O&M support, and providing the tele- 
education and tele-medicine services to 53 African countries for five years.
Forty seven countries have signed up for it. The first phase of the Pan- 
African e-Network Project, inaugurated in February 2009, covered 11 
countries, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Seychelles. The twelve 
countries launched in 2010 included Botswana, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, Uganda 
and Zambia.
Regular Tele-Medicine and Tele-Education services have already 
been started on this network. The Tele-Medicine consultations are regu-
larly being conducted from Super-Specialty Hospitals from India to the 
African countries on need basis. In addition, regular Continued Medical 
Education (CME) sessions have started (2009) from 11 Indian Super- 
Specialty Hospitals. Regarding Tele-Education services from India, more 
than 2000 students from Africa have enrolled in five different top- ranking 
universities in India in various disciplines (Pan-African 2016). India has 
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also contributed US$200 million to NEPAD and is involved in other 
African-led initiatives.
India’s guiding principles, though not formally articulated at one 
place, is reflected in its approach to development partnership generally. 
That India’s development assistance flows primarily to countries in its 
neighbourhood should not be a surprise. The subcontinent continues 
to have the largest numbers of poor people in the world, though not in 
percentage terms. State formation in many of these countries, or parts 
within, is still challenged by insurgencies, terrorist violence and weak 
capacities. As India seeks to emerge as a global power, its own eco-
nomic achievements and military capability would not compensate for 
any disarray or state failure in its immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, 
in addition to seeing others as similarly placed on account of historical 
reasons and consequently as partners in economic development, India 
has to sufficiently invest in its neighbourhood to ensure that they too 
are able to grow economically. This is seen as an important factor in suc-
cessful State-building. Politically, India cannot be seen to be located in a 
troubled region. This adds strength to India’s basic ethical approach to 
development partnership. An analysis of Indian development assistance 
to Afghanistan will show whether or not it is driven by these general 
principles.
IndIa’s development partnershIp wIth afghanIstan
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Kabul on December 25, 
2015, to jointly inaugurate with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani the parlia-
ment building built by the Indian government. His visit was a big hit in the 
Afghan media, especially the social media. The government of Afghanistan 
decided to name one of the blocks of the building after former Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who had offered to build this pow-
erful symbol of democracy as a sign of Afghanistan–India friendship and 
partnership. It was in his time that India re-engaged with Afghanistan 
in the aftermath of the US intervention that dislodged the Taliban in 
late 2001. The pace of engagement accelerated almost immediately, and 
despite fatal attacks on Indian targets including diplomats, development 
staff and projects, has maintained its momentum.
That India has emerged as major development partner, arguably the 
fifth largest bilateral donor over the 14-year period, to Afghanistan should 
not have come as a surprise to analysts who have worked on Afghanistan 
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on the ground. India’s development partnership with Afghanistan goes 
back to the 1950s, and till transit trade through Pakistan was not an 
issue, was Afghanistan’s largest export market for dry fruits. The civil war 
(1992–96) and subsequent Taliban rule caused a break, though India 
did extend humanitarian assistance through UN agencies (Mullen 2013) 
(Fig. 7.2).
India’s total commitment for the reconstruction of Afghanistan is 
US$2 billion, with more than half disbursed. It has funded/co-funded 
three very important infrastructure projects, the construction of the 
218 km road from Delaram to Zaranj which gives Afghanistan access to 
an alternate port, Chahbahar in Iran; it has reconstructed and expanded 
the Salma Dam which would produce 42  MW of power and irrigate 
75,000 hectares of land when fully commissioned by mid-2016; it has 
co-funded and built transmission towers over the Hindu Kush as part of 
the Northern Electric Power System (NEPS) that has brought electric-



































































Fig. 7.2 India’s development cooperation with Afghanistan: commitments and 
expenditures, 2002/03–2013/14
Source: Rani Mullen.2014
“IDCR Report: The State of Indian Development Cooperation.”
New Delhi: Indian Development Cooperation Research, (Spring)
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• Food assistance to primary school children and construction and 
rehabilitation of schools ($321 million disbursed),
• Supply of 250,000 tonnes of wheat,
• Construction of a power line from Pul-i-Khumri to Kabul ($120 
million),
• Annual scholarships to study in India—higher education (initially 
500 per year, increased to 675 and then to 1000),
• Construction of Delaram-Zaranj road ($150 million),
• Construction of the Salma Dam Power Project (US$200 million),
• Construction of the parliament building ($27 million disbursed; 
budget $178 million), and
• Small Development Projects, initially in the South East, and then 
extended all over the country.
(Annex II has a comprehensive listing of all Indian development and 
humanitarian initiatives in Afghanistan.)
It would be useful to look at a few of these initiatives to better under-
stand what India brings, and does not bring, to the table of State-building/
peacebuilding before comparing the Indian approach with that of tradi-
tional donors.
India’s biggest humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan, supply of 1 
million tonnes of wheat in the form of High Energy Biscuits (HEB) dis-
tributed to 2 million school children across Afghanistan, also has a strong 
development impact. Midday meals are shown to be strong motivational 
factors in increasing enrolment. The World Food Program (WFP), a UN 
agency is the implementing partner. This supply to Afghanistan was done 
despite the logistical hurdles posed by Pakistan which had to be overcome. 
Similar hurdles had to be overcome to deliver 250,000 tonnes of wheat as 
humanitarian assistance, by technically making delivery to Afghanistan at 
an Indian port, so that it could travel overland from the Pakistani port of 
Karachi to Afghanistan.
While the reconstruction and renovation, and subsequent further 
upgradation of Afghanistan’s only children hospital, the Indira Gandhi 
Institute of Child Health, initially built with Indian assistance about 4 
decades back, was a visible intervention in the health sector, what earned 
the Indian government considerable goodwill all over the country was 
the stationing of Indian medical missions in cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, 
Kandahar, Mazar and Herat. However, after attacks on Indian doctors 
in Kabul leading to fatalities, most had to be shut down. In the decade 
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that they operated, they treated hundreds of thousands of patients every 
year. India is also involved in upgrading medical training and diagnostics 
facilities. India also accepted the Afghan request to support the Afghan 
Red Crescent Society (ARCS) to treat Afghan children suffering from 
Congenital Heart Disease (CHD). Financial assistance of US$5 million 
would be given to ARCS over a period of five years beginning 2015, with 
the first tranche of US$1 million already released. Financial assistance 
provided by India will be utilised for the ongoing treatment by ARCS 
of Afghan Children at Artemis, Max and Fortis Hospitals in New Delhi. 
These hospitals have also offered special concessional rates for treatment 
of these children.
In order to increase the ‘visual’ presence of the government all over 
Afghanistan, India supported the expansion of the national TV network 
by providing uplink from Kabul and downlink in all the 34 provincial capi-
tals, a force multiplier for national integration. Similar consideration drove 
the upgradation of telephone exchanges in 11 provinces.
Recognising that the Afghan government’s lack of capacity could seri-
ously constrain its ability to deliver services to its citizens, a key require-
ment for building peace, India initially offered 500 short-term training 
annually slots under ITEC, a figure since increased to 675. At the request 
of President Karzai for deployment of Indian civil servants as mentors in 
Afghan ministries, India tied up with UNDP’s Capacity for Afghan Public 
Administration (CAP) programme and deputed 30 Indian civil servants 
who were placed in different ministries. This was a rare occasion where 
government of India partnered with another bilateral/multilateral agency 
in the actual implementation of any development partnership programme; 
in this case, there were other bilateral funding programme too. This was 
continued when CAP was modified and became the National Institutional 
Building programme.
However, capacity building exercises like training and deputing experts 
as mentors have their limitations. Afghanistan, as a war ravaged country 
has serious issues with higher education. India, initially offered 500 annual 
long-term university scholarships for undergraduate and post graduate 
degrees. This was increased to 675 scholarships in 2009, and to 1000 in 
2012–13. And since 2014, 20 of these scholarships are also offered for 
pursuing PhD programmes in different subjects. The entire selection pro-
cess is done by the Afghan government, in line with India’s policy of no 
conditionality. It has been estimated that since 2001, ‘more than 10,000 
Afghan students have studied in India on ICCR scholarships, with some 
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7,000 returning home armed with an education and technical skills, which 
they are using to drive Afghanistan’s stabilization and development.’ In 
addition, ‘some 8,000 Afghan students are pursuing self-financed degrees 
in different fields across India’ (Haidari 2015). During his recent visit, 
Prime Minister Modi announced 500 long-term scholarships for children 
of security personnel who have lost their lives on duty.
India has also accepted the Afghan government’s request to set up 
a full-fledged agriculture university at Kandahar, a priority for a coun-
try where the majority of their labour force is in agriculture, but where 
due to war, productivity levels are a fraction of what they were pre-1979. 
Separately, India has made available 614 Agriculture scholarships (BSc, 
MSc and PhD). India has also involved its private sector for running 
vocational training in Kabul, and funded a reputed Indian NGO, Self 
Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) to train 1000 Afghan women in 
different skills and vocations.
After many stops and starts caused by insecurity and supply bottlenecks, 
the Indian assisted reconstruction of the Salma dam in Chishti district of 
Herat province is almost completely commissioned. The dam work and 
its supply lines were frequently attacked, allegedly at Iran’s instance as the 
power generated by the dam (42 MW) would eliminate Herat’s depen-
dence on Iranian supply, as well as by the Taliban (Plot to 2013). At the 
height of the construction work, there were more than 2000 workers in 
three shifts, including around 700 Indians.7 The total cost of the recon-
struction is US$200 million.
As referred to earlier, India partnered with other bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors to bring electricity to Kabul, and many other areas in 
planning and executing NEPS. This is one of the largest, and definitely 
the most technologically challenging infrastructure projects ever under-
taken in Afghanistan. Besides India, the other partners were the ADB, 
the United States, Germany, Japan, WB and Islamic Development Bank, 
a rare instance of so many internationals working in a coordinated manner 
led by the government of Afghanistan. Over four years, more than 1300 
massive pylons were erected to hold transmission lines stretching from 
the Uzbekistan border to Kabul. The most difficult stretch was over the 
perennially snow-bound, avalanche-prone Hindu Kush Mountains, tower-
ing more than 3800 metres above sea level, was planned and executed by 
India. Further, an Indian company was the common contractor installing 
the transmission towers and lines. To add to the complication, the com-
pany manufactured most of its materials in India, but due to transit issues, 
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the entire material ‘had to be shipped from India to Iran, and then driven 
through Turkmenistan, into Uzbekistan, and finally into Afghanistan at 
Hairatan, in the north’ (Asian Development Bank 2009). India has also 
set up three substations and is setting up one more. India’s share of the 
project cost is US$120 million.
India was able to demonstrate both its technical expertise as well as 
the ability to deal with, and work together, with multilateral agencies and 
bilateral agencies notorious for working alone. The project not only earned 
the government of Afghanistan much goodwill by providing electricity to 
upward of 4 million people but suddenly improved their quality of life, a 
huge gain for government’s credibility. Paradoxically, though USID was 
an integral part of NEPS, it separately executed many redundant (in view 
of NEPS) and non-viable power projects including generating stations 
that had no fuel linkage or would produce expensive power (McCloskey 
et al. 2015).
In a rare departure from its practice of directly executing its projects, 
though taken up at the request of the host government, India has partnered 
with the government of Afghanistan (Ministry of Economy) in implement-
ing the community-based Small Development Projects (SDP). It would 
also be useful to compare the SDP with Afghanistan government’s flagship 
National Solidarity Program (NSP), which is also community-based.
The SDP was launched in 2006 initially covering seven insecure, under- 
developed border provinces in 2006, with a view to allowing local commu-
nities to invest in their priority needs and in the process better connecting 
with the Afghan government.8 It has since been expanded to all provinces. 
Government of India initially allocated US$10 million in phase one, which 
was supplemented by US$20 million in phase two. The third phase signed 
in November 2012 when President Karzai visited India substantially hiked 
the allocation to US$100 million, to be utilised by 2016. SDP’s priority 
is to target the most vulnerable but as these are mostly in insecure areas, 
implementation becomes an issue. The Ministry of Economy (MoE) is 
the nodal ministry at the national level and its provincial directorates act 
as nodal points in their respective provinces. The steering committee has 
representatives from all concerned line ministries as well as the President’s 
office. Specific proposals from communities are endorsed by the Governor 
and the Provincial Development Council (PDC) and sent to the MoE, 
which in turn then sends them for vetting to the concerned line ministries, 
on whose budgets these proposals are borne. Till the time of writing, the 
Embassy of India had approved 124 proposals, with another 185  proposals 
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in different stages in the pipeline. Some of these approved projects have 
been completed, while others are in different stages of implementation, 
which is difficult in insecure areas. The health sector dominates with 67 
approved projects followed by small, rural development projects (21) and 
education (17).
Review meetings are held every two weeks and the Council of Ministers 
is briefed every two months. Based on difficulties faced in implementa-
tion, more powers are being given to provincial governors. Presently all 
procurement decisions are taken by the line ministries and often small mis-
takes by provincial staff leads proposals being returned for rectifications 
or fresh processing. MoE is working on improving capacities at local/
provincial level. There is a high local ownership from the community up 
to the ministers’ level. The Afghan government convened a national con-
ference on SDPs in end-2012, attended by 400 participants from across 
the country, representing civil society, provinces, ministries and so on. 
The conference laid down the criteria for allocation of funds to provinces 
keeping in mind the need for balanced growth. The intensive consultative 
nature of SDP policy formulation and implementation does slow down 
the process but ensures ownership.
It is worth comparing the SDP to another flagship project of the gov-
ernment, the National Solidarity Program (NSP). )The latter was far big-
ger, comprehensive in its coverage and in operation for much longer than 
the SDP. The NSP is a community-based recovery programme created to 
help in the recovery from decades of conflict, initially through rebuild-
ing rural infrastructure, inspired by the success of Indonesia’s Kecamatan 
Development Program. The actual choice of the project in NSP is left to 
the community. A community development cluster (CDCs) of around 25 
households is established through secret ballot (mixed and single sex) by 
the facilitating partner (FP), often an NGO.  The Government releases 
block grants to each CDC whose representatives in discussion with their 
facilitating/implementing partners chooses the specific intervention that 
is of the highest priority to them. NSP has since covered most of the coun-
try and is funded from the general development budget of the country, 
which in turn receives budgetary support from donors, both multilateral 
and bilateral. Within the government, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation 
(MRRD) runs the programme. The programme was considered very suc-
cessful as it contributed to improving rural connectivity and agricultural 
productivity. MRRD’s capacity was also strengthened, and it is regarded 
one of the star performers of the government.
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Both the NSP and the SDP have their strengths and weaknesses. While 
NSP is quite participative at the community level, and creates the basic 
units of democratic choice, though doubts have been expressed about it 
in practice in different parts of the country, it operates outside the govern-
ment system. The facilitating/implementing partner gets the credit, not 
the government as a whole. Its biggest lacuna is the complete absence of 
ownership outside MRRD, quite unlike SDP. At the same time, NSP has 
created considerable local, economic assets that are very useful to the com-
munity. However, leading from this, its second basic problem is inability 
to scale up and create projects that bring about sustainable, favourable 
economic outcomes. Third, what happens to the CDC once the project is 
over or when the NSP winds down? The resulting frustration could pro-
duce cynicism and reversion to more atomised behaviour patterns.
The SDP could do well to replicate CDC-like consultative mechanism. 
It would also do well to look at additional resources, including by diverting 
from non-productive programmes and by attracting other donors. Better 
tracking would improve accountability and lead to better outcomes.
Both the SDP and the NSP emblemise a different approach to peace-
building and development than that exhibited by many traditional donors 
in Afghanistan. Reflecting the belief that ‘State-building and peacebuild-
ing are primarily internal processes,’ (DFID 2010) then-finance minister 
Ashraf Ghani ‘demanded that assistance was to be channelled through 
the ministries, and aligned with national plans and priorities’ (Strand 
2014). Many donors including the USAID, Japan and most UN agen-
cies, preferred to execute projects themselves, often without even coordi-
nation with the government. The international military in particular with 
their Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the Commanders’ 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) spent very substantial sums of 
money, for example, US$80 million in three quarters of 2005, aimed at 
‘winning hearts and minds’ (Karp 2006). Unfortunately, tactical consid-
erations such as rewarding friendly individuals and groups, or the need 
to ‘deliver development’ drove such investment decisions. This was true 
at both the battalion as well at national levels. In the bargain, basic ‘prin-
ciples for assistance were set aside for military and political objectives, 
leading to nepotism and corruption as the Kabul Bank scandal illustrates’ 
(Strand 2014). The ISAF and PRT approach, though called ‘winning 
hearts and minds,’ was a top-down process that did not address an imbal-
ance between areas receiving lots of resources and others that received 
little or none. They also reflected ‘quick fixes’ that were less effective 
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than longer-term development approaches. Ghani’s position recognised 
that peacebuilding and state-building are intrinsically linked and must be 
internally driven.
Indian development partnership is highly valued in Afghanistan, even 
though the total amount committed and disbursed is miniscule compared 
with that of the traditional donors. This is because it is in response to felt 
demands articulated by the Afghan government and as response to them 
shows in line with the needs of the people, is value for money and appro-
priate to the local conditions. It compares very favourably with the perfor-
mance of a donor like the United States (USAID, military, Department of 
Agriculture etc.), as detailed in Table 7.1 (compiled mainly from analysis 
in McCloskey et al. 2015).
Table 7.1 Appraisal of US aid to Afghanistan
‘In just six years, the IG has tallied at least $17 billion in questionable spending. This 
includes $3.6 billion in outright waste, projects teetering on the brink of waste, or projects 
that can’t—or won’t—be sustained by the Afghans, as well as an additional $13.5 billion 
that the average taxpayer might easily judge to be waste’
Afghanistan SIGAR has only examined a small percentage of the $110 billion effort to 
rebuild and remodel
‘Super colonial’ attitude … the American military dismissed a local NGO in Kunar as 
unimportant because it was ‘just Afghans working there’
  •  $8.4 billion was spent on counter-narcotics programmes that were so ineffective that 
Afghanistan has produced record levels of heroin—more than it did before the war 
started
  •  In 2008, the Pentagon bought 20 refurbished cargo planes for the Afghan Air Force 
at a cost of US$486 million, but there were no spare parts and it was ‘a death trap,’ 
according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Sixteen 
of the planes were sold as scrap for the grand sum of $32,000
  •  $335 million power plant in Kabul, rush job, ended up $181 million over budget, 
diesel-powered plant is so expensive to run ($ 245 million per year), the Afghans are 
only using about 1% of its capacity, intermittent use is actually harming the 
equipment and putting it on the path to ‘catastrophic failure’
  •  State Department spent $106 million into refurbishing a compound in  
Mazar-e- Sharif to be a consulate but which cannot be used as it is deemed unsafe
  • $25 million blown on a fancy military headquarters nobody used
  • $14.7 million spent on a storage facility the military never used
  •  $34.4 million programme to push Afghan farmers to produce soybeans. However, 
the crop doesn’t grow well in northern Afghanistan and Afghans weren’t particularly 
interested in eating it
  •  USAID spent nearly $8 million on tree planting and sapling programme after being 
told by Afghan government and its own staff that it would fail
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Before concluding this section, it is important to point out that 
India’s development partnership extends beyond funding and imple-
menting projects in Afghanistan, and is guided by specific, regional fac-
tors, namely peace and stability in its neighbourhood. In the past, the 
development of jihadism as a strategic instrument to confront the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan had negative consequences for India once 
the Soviets went home. The jihadis were simply diverted to India, espe-
cially to Jammu & Kashmir, which saw a raging insurgency that soon 
degenerated to terrorism. The collapse of the Afghan State allowed the 
sponsors of such jihadi groups to run training camps in Afghanistan for 
such groups, allowing them both the space to do so and the scope to 
deny any role in supporting terrorist groups. India simply cannot see a 
failed State in its neighbourhood or a State under the control of jihadi 
terrorists. India ‘recognises that social and economic development of 
Afghanistan is vital to regional security’ (Price 2013). Consequently, 
India was instrumental in pushing for Afghanistan’s membership of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Its mem-
bership was approved at the 13th SAARC summit in Dhaka (2005), and 
Afghanistan formally joined at the 14th Summit in New Delhi (2007) 
(Al-Madani 2005). The price India had to pay for this was the admission 
of China as Observer, along with Japan, the United States, South Korea 
and the European Union. This emphasis on regional cooperation has 
two implications. One is that India wants much greater economic ties 
between countries in the region, leading to mutual interdependence. 
Two, recognising that it is overwhelmingly the biggest economy in the 
region, India realises its responsibility to achieve this; hence India’s 
active role in Afghanistan. As a result, the total value of trade between 
the two countries reached US$280 million in 2010, from just US$80 
million in 2001. India ‘represents Afghanistan’s fifth largest source of 
imports, and India accounts for 20 per cent of total Afghan exports’ 
(Al-Madani 2005).
As demonstration of India’s motivations, at the ‘2012 Kabul ‘Heart 
of Asia’ conference, India offered to lead two confidence—building mea-
sures, intended to support Afghanistan and integrate it into the regional 
economy.’ This included linking chambers of commerce, recognising that 
trade and investment was about private entrepreneurs taking the initia-
tive. Within India there is confidence that it can ‘take a lead in facilitat-




With this is mind, government of India facilitated the hosting of an 
Investment Summit on Afghanistan in New Delhi (June 2012). The Indian 
foreign minister highlighted certain emerging sectors as being potentially 
very productive, namely ‘mining, infrastructure,  telecommunications, 
agro-based and small-scale industries, health, pharmaceuticals, education 
and information technology’ (Price 2013).
Development partnership and peacebuilding can never be divorced 
from politics, but to be sustainable must be mutually beneficial, which 
the India–Afghanistan partnership has shown to be. It would, therefore, 
be correct to say that ‘India has been an important economic assistance 
partner for Afghanistan, and can help in other fields to prevent destabiliza-
tion’ (Ayres 2015).
afghan perceptIon of IndIa’s development 
partnershIp
Discussions with a cross-section of decision makers, civil society represen-
tatives, strategic community in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, surveys 
conducted from time to time by different agencies as well as articles in 
the Afghan media all lead to the unambiguous conclusion that India is 
the most liked country, that Indian projects are favourably looked upon 
and that these are seen as contributing to peace building since they meet 
the ‘felt-needs’ of the Afghan people and society. As a respondent com-
mented—any project that contributes to upgrading the economy auto-
matically contributes to peace building. He added ‘Indian projects are 
unique and varied.’ On peacebuilding, another respondent said that ‘help-
ing our economy and facilitating daily lives of the people through better 
roads, communications, the Salma Dam and humanitarian assistance has 
contributed to peace building in its own way.’
Specifically, responding to local pressure from the Herat region, the 
government of Afghanistan has renamed the Salma Dam as the India–
Afghanistan Friendship Dam. This project is seen as hugely liberating 
western Afghanistan from dependence on foreign supply, will ensure reli-
able and consistent electric supply and has the potential to economically 
transform the region.
Similarly, the naming of one of the blocks of the new parliament build-
ing as Atal block in honour of former Indian prime minister is symbolic 
in a country where symbols are very important. A photo tweet showing 
the parliament building as India’s gift and another photo showing the 
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destroyed Dar-ul-Aman palace in Kabul as Pakistan’s gift went viral in 
the Afghan social media.9 The present writer has worked in Afghanistan 
for years with the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMA), later 
as a consultant for UNDP, was frequently told by Afghans across the 
country and classes how they appreciate India’s development assistance 
as it was primarily targeted at education, health and in establishing demo-
cratic institutions. And in responding to local needs. As former Deputy 
Minister of Energy Ahmad Wali Shairzay said ‘The government wanted 
to import power, but they needed investment. That’s when ADB and the 
Government of India came in’ (Asian Development Bank 2009).
India is seen as a model partner in terms of dollar value and Indian 
projects were not seen as divisive. A respondent who has had a lot of expe-
rience dealing with donors compared NATO/ISAF assistance unfavour-
ably with India’s. According to him, the former constructed roads to meet 
their needs of supplies and to avoid attacks on their camps. He was par-
ticularly critical of their quick impact projects (QIPs) and CERP as these 
were tactically driven, including to be seen as ‘rewarding’ local command-
ers or strongmen, which has been divisive. Indian aid has not been divi-
sive. Respondents reminded that Indian development partnership began 
in the 1950s, and post 2001, India is the largest regional development 
partner, by contrast China’s support till date has been only US$125 mil-
lion. Many respondents pointed that India has not indicated any priorities 
and left it to the government. SDP was seen by a few who mentioned it 
as better than NSP, which was not sustainable. India’s higher education 
scholarship was much appreciated since human development is an Afghan 
priority. One respondent was critical of the choice of subjects; according 
to him, Afghanistan needed graduates in mining, engineering, IT, MBBS, 
and not so many political scientists or sociologists. Capacity building, 
particularly in technical fields was seen to have benefitted from ITEC. 
Ministry of Energy and Water officials rating it very useful and pointed out 
that a number of their staff had gone to India for masters’ degree. In the 
course of implementing NEPS, the Indian state-owned enterprise, Power 
Grid Corporation had trained their Afghan counterparts, which was much 
appreciated. And the government of India in the Salma Dam contract, has 
made the contractor responsible for running the plant for one year, hand-
holding the take-over process so that at the end of the year, Afghan staff 
would be in a position to take over.
Regarding cooperation and coordination with international develop-
ment partners, the Afghans pointed out that the WB and ADB route their 
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support through the budget and there is good coordination. Regarding 
India and KFW (Germany), the support is off-budget but coordination 
is good. The USAID support is off-budget and the coordination is not 
so good. In the selection of projects, the European Union selects and 
implements on its own but they coordinate with the government. Branch 
offices of line ministries in provinces are involved. However, they operate 
in the safe areas in the north. WB and ADB support projects selected, and 
designed by the government. Both institutions fund such mutually agreed 
projects but monitor them rigorously. In the case of KFW, the govern-
ment proposes but they have own priority; procurement is by them, but 
there is close coordination with the government. The government pro-
poses projects to India, which then implements it.
Afghanistan has seen high, if fluctuating, growth rates since 2001. This 
has created jobs in the service sector. However, necessary skills are at a 
premium, so there are limitations to growth being driven by it. This is par-
ticularly so since external agencies and external financial support is being 
retrenched. Since literacy rates are still very low, only agriculture and 
related activities like food processing, dairy and so on can drive growth. 
A number of respondents suggested that India should step up its sup-
port for this sector. With China’s recent decision to gift Afghanistan a few 
hundred tractors, one respondent wanted joint India–China support for 
agricultural development.
Many specifically referred to India as Afghanistan’s ‘best friend’ and 
the general expectation of respondents that it should do more, specifically 
‘just keep helping us in every possible way.’ Besides the general com-
ments were some specific examples and suggestions that could be used 
both to influence India’s approach to development assistance specifically 
as well help evolve global consensus on facilitating peacebuilding and 
State-building.
India’s record in executing big projects, other than NEPS, was seen as 
something that needs improvement, even accounting for the insecure areas 
where Indian projects were (eastern Herat, Farah, etc.) and problems of 
transit through Pakistan. The reliance on Indian state-owned enterprises 
was identified as the reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs. Lack 
of supervision and monitoring along with lack of discretionary decision- 
making with the Indian Embassy in Kabul were also issues, for example, 
once Delhi tightened the screws and accepted greater local discretion both 
the Salma dam and the parliament building project picked up momentum 
and finished far faster than what its progress till date had shown possible.
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The Indian performance in executing the difficult task of laying trans-
mission towers over the Hindu Kush has been much appreciated by both 
Afghans and international partners. This was a technically complicated 
project, made more difficult by the fact that though it is an integrated 
one, its different components were executed by different agencies using 
different decision-making processes, different funding routes, different 
reporting norms, different monitoring and so on, and yet it worked well. 
And yet, other than NEPS and a few other projects, India prefers to act 
alone, and it simply refuses to pool money together with other donors. 
While it does extend budgetary support to Nepal and Bhutan, these are 
for historical reasons and an exception. This has two disadvantages that 
actually militate against India’s approach to development partnership. 
One, it deprives countries like Afghanistan the benefit of large projects 
which require multi-donor support, particularly where Indian technology 
and approach would be most appropriate and cost-effective, for example, 
the Indian contractor who built the transmission line from the Uzbek bor-
der to Kabul could only come in because an Indian entity was tasked with 
part of the work. Absent the Indian presence, work funded by the other 
donors could conceivably have been executed but more expensively. Two, 
if more untied funds were extended to the Afghan government, it would 
be able to be seen as exercising more sovereign functions and also directly 
meet more of its citizens requirements. This point, however, cannot be 
over-stressed since India would not in the near future have the economic 
wherewithal to really contribute by way of ‘cash’ support.
The present writer can speak from personal experience that quite often 
India is seen as a role model in Afghanistan, both for firmly establishing 
democracy and for its economic achievements. As part of developing their 
national development strategy, the government and donors had jointly 
established broad sectoral consultative groups and narrower, subject-wise, 
working groups. Having attended many such meetings across sectors and 
subjects, the common feature that was clear was the desire to learn from 
India. The request would be to speak from the Indian experience, and 
not as a representative of the UN, as it was felt that such experience was 
more relevant to the local context. In a similar vein, the present writer 
underwent driving lessons in the United States with an Ethiopian lady as 
the instructor. She remembered and named her Indian school teachers 
(Mr Gupta and Mr Sharma) and said that her superior, another Ethiopian 
who was a senior academic in his country, also had Indian school teachers. 
A former Indian ambassador to Ethiopia mentioned that during the call 
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on, the then President (Meles Zenawi) remembered his school teacher, 
an Indian named Mr Nair. There is a lesson in this for both India and for 
major donors. India effectively discontinued sending school teachers to 
developing countries, particularly low-income, and now restricts ITEC 
to technically qualified personnel. Similarly major donors could think in 
terms of collaborating with India to send such, relatively lower techni-
cally skilled personnel to low-income countries. This would be major costs 
savings with much better development outcomes. In Afghanistan, the 
USAID and a few others did use Indian training institutions for capacity 
building of Afghans for the same reasons, but this could be expanded.
Similarly, while supporting institution building, instead of trying to 
superimpose models of mature, high income democracies, donors could 
look at relevant experience from not just India, but Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and so on. This would have greater resonance 
and lead to more sustainable outcomes. Development partnership should 
be more broad based to be effective.
This section cannot be complete without referring to an issue of major 
disappointment among many Afghan respondents, and that was in India’s 
diffidence in supporting the Afghan national security forces (ANSF). A 
number of respondents expressed frustrations about India’s refusal to step 
in a big way in supporting ANSF beyond a few training slots, and supply 
of relative less defensive equipment.10 There was visible disappointment 
that ‘India’s response to our request for supply of arms and equipment 
has not been what we expected’ despite the fact that the 2011 India–
Afghanistan Strategic Partnership does include security cooperation.’ As 
a result, Afghanistan was ‘forced to look elsewhere.’ A number of respon-
dents were emphatic that ‘India must do much more in forcing Pakistan 
to curb down its terrorism … India has a good dialogue with the United 
States and should use that opportunity to leverage the US to put pressure 
on Pakistan.’ Another respondent was clear in his prescription that ‘India 
should not look at Afghanistan through the prism of Pakistan.’
This is a subject where it would be difficult to find agreement. On the 
one hand, India was the earliest to point the finger at Pakistan for using 
terrorism as an instrument of State policy, well before the rest of the world 
would even consider it. Logically, as an Afghan respondent told us that 
since both India and Afghanistan have suffered from Pakistan-sponsored 
terrorism, India should more actively support Afghanistan’s efforts to 
combat terrorism. On the other hand, there is the view that though 
India ‘can do more, but New Delhi's concerns about poking a Pakistani 
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hornets’ nest have limited the security partnership’ (Ayres 2015). The jury 
is still out whether India’s more active security support to Afghanistan 
would have helped the process of stabilisation in that country, and the 
region, or made it worse.
Afghan interlocutors were also asked about their perception of China 
as a stakeholder in Afghanistan, and not just as a development partner. 
There was general acceptance that China was a powerful neighbour and 
had played an active role in training and arming the Mujahideen against 
the Soviets. They had established contacts with various leaders, groups, 
tribes and so on and these were kept alive even after the withdrawal of the 
Soviets.
China’s principal interest in Afghanistan was perceived to prevent the 
destabilisation of Xinjiang province and that it would participate in eco-
nomic reconstruction only where it advances its own economic interests. 
There was general agreement that China was not interested in domestic 
economic and social issues affecting the Afghans and would not mind 
Taliban coming to power or sharing power. And that it would stay away 
from direct military involvement. On Aynak where a Chinese firm won 
a global tender to develop the world’s largest copper deposits, a respon-
dent predicted that China would not begin work in Aynak Copper mines 
till 2019, and that ‘nobody knows that they will do so even after that 
date.’
India’s role in Afghanistan was seen as a security threat both by China 
and Pakistan. Respondents were in agreement that ‘there is no compari-
son between the development assistance provided by India and China. 
Nobody would write about what happened to the various projects under-
taken by China after 2002.’ There was a specific reference to the highways 
built that were of poor quality and required resurfacing within no time. 
Consequently, the Chinese companies concerned had to leave because 
of widespread criticism. There was another reference to the hospitals in 
Kabul which were repaired and opened had to be closed the following day, 
due to the scale of construction defects. Not one patient was treated there. 
In support, the respondent gave a news item (Smith 2012). Afghans also 
mentioned that even Chinese brothels had to close down and that ‘every 
Afghan knows about it and it was in the media too.’
A respondent was apprehensive that while China was powerful by itself 
but when combined with Pakistan, ‘it was awesome and the Afghans 
know what it means to be at the receiving end of this combination.’ Many 
suggested that both, China and Pakistan have been in touch with the 
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Taliban—together as well as independently. It was stated that after the 
ouster of Taliban from Afghanistan, the Chinese met the Taliban in the 
gold mines being developed by China in Balochistan (they could not 
provide any specific details on this.) As regards arming the Taliban, they 
were emphatic in saying that the Chinese provided not just small arms 
but also HN-5 anti-aircraft missiles, mines, components for IEDs and 
how to fabricate them, and rocket-propelled grenades. As per the Afghans 
the Americans were aware of this and had even raised the issue with the 
Chinese. But when it came to arming the ANSF, the Chinese are hesitant 
to provide anything other than some token small arms.
conclusIon
India’s emergence as a donor is yet to impact on the global develop-
ment assistance framework and systems. However, India’s impact in 
Afghanistan, and other neighbouring countries as well as the creep-
ing presence in Africa can potentially lead to making the system more 
accountable and ensure more cost-effective delivery. At this moment 
of time, India and the traditional donors are on parallel tracks and as 
in monetary terms, India’s contribution is miniscule even compared to 
China’s, and it really does not matter. Fears about China’s and India’s 
takeover of Africa are grossly exaggerated in so far as India is concerned. 
Its present LOC exposure in Africa plus the targeted US$10 billion 
over the next five years would still be under US$18 billion. Its impor-
tance lies in its local impact that helps technologically upgrade the local 
industry and unleash agricultural potential, cost-effective and value for 
money. But in the larger interest of peacebuilding, both India and the 
traditional donors can learn from the other, and in some ways, seem to 
be doing so.
India has just overhauled its LOC guidelines, moving closer to the 
western model of development assistance but still respecting such partner-
ship as being demand-driven. A number of weaknesses came up after a 
detailed review of past projects funded by LOCs (Mathew 2015)
• Weak project conceptualisation and lack of project synchronisation
• Change in scope and nature of LOCs by borrowing country
• Over-reliance by partner countries on a few Indian companies 
for project proposals and implementation
• Effects of political cycles/security issues and so on.
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The new approach provides for evaluation of long-term economic ben-
efits, highest standards for ethics, Integrity Clauses in loan agreements, 
inspection of all documents, wide publicity of all procurement, system 
of pre-qualification of contractors/consultants, vetting of contract docu-
ments (milestone-linked payments, performance guarantee, retention 
money, penalty for delay, ethics and integrity clauses). Country classifica-
tion would also follow IMF norms, and repayment schedules and element 
of concession have been further liberalised. Additionally, if there is a joint 
venture with an Indian entity, the borrowing country could use the con-
cessional loan as its equity in the project, allowing both for Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) and large infrastructure projects. For African coun-
tries, the requirement to use Indian goods and services has been brought 
down to 60%. However, there is no requirement to use anything but the 
borrowing countries’ own systems, so respect for sovereignty remains.
The international community is also moving towards greater flexibility, 
value for money and respect for national systems. Following SEWA’s suc-
cessful skilling project for Afghan women, USAID gave it funds to run 
similar programmes for Afghan women, and USAID’s use of Indian train-
ing institutions increased. Similarly, the WB has changed its conditionality 
on using its own procurement policy if it is satisfied that the borrower’s 
processes are robust, for example, it has declared India’s Power Grid as 
one such entity, so henceforth if Power Grid were to be the recipient of 
any WB loan, it can use its own processes.
The international community must also accept that India would pri-
marily be involved in its own neighbourhood. In terms of LOCs, the 
order of exposure is Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Ethiopia, Mauritius, 
Myanmar, Sudan and Mozambique. The two largest single loans are to 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka but since both are recent, and being transport 
focussed, have long gestation periods, disbursements are still relatively 
less. But India is sensitive to its neighbourhood and readily adopts flex-
ible approaches, for example, ‘in 2010, India extended a US$ 1 billion 
LOC to Bangladesh for transport infrastructure, requiring that 85% of 
procurement of goods and services be from India. This was modified in 
2012, bringing down Indian content to 30%. And US$ 200 was converted 
into ‘non-conditional grant.’11 Similarly it extends financial support to Sri 
Lanka, both for building 50,000 houses for IDPs affected by the civil war 
as well as for the rehabilitation/reconstruction of three main rail lines.
The way forward for India would be to increase its engagement with 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It does take part 
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in some dialogue but not enough. It neither follows DAC’s development 
assistance classifications nor does it report its assistance figures to DAC. It 
must give up its fears about being swamped by big, traditional donors and 
display greater confidence. India has much relevant experience to offer, 
and to learn. Similarly, the insular world of traditional donors must walk 
the talk on country ownership and demand-driven assistance. The road 
to effective peacebuilding would continue to challenge all involved and 
constant learning is the minimum required.
annex I: IllustratIve lIst of projects funded 
by letters of credIt
• Supply of railway locomotives and coaches to Angola—rail is a 
cheaper mode of transport than road, farmers are able to seek better 
markets, facilitated exploration of Kassinga Mines
• Supply of buses (single and double decker) to Bangladesh—improved 
public transport availability, eased traffic congestion and air pollu-
tion, generated employment for women and men
• Tractor assembly plant constructed in Benin, leading to increased 
supply of tractors—substantial improvement in cultivation of 40,000 
hectares benefitting 1 million people
• Cement Plant constructed in Djibouti—reduced dependence on 
imports, but problems due to many partners
• Three sugar factories constructed in Ethiopia—delayed due to logis-
tics but two running very well, third one still in problems due to 
complexity of operation including working with farmers
• Construction of national Assembly building in Gambia
• Tractor assembly line in Gambia—higher agricultural productivity
• Construction of cricket stadium in Guyana—needed for World Cup, 
foreign exchange earner
• Tractor assembly plant constructed in Mali—farm mechanisation has 
led to 30% increase in agricultural productivity, reduced dependence 
on imports for tractors
• High Voltage transmission line erected between Mali and Cote 
d’Ivoire—stable, affordable power supply to Mali
• IT Park in Mozambique—500 students trained, new ventures estab-
lished by local entrepreneurs
• Manufacturing plant/assembly line for Tata Tractors in Myanmar
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• Constructed Nyabarongo Hydropower project in Rwanda—country’s 
biggest, once fully commissioned, would supply 25% needs of country
• 350 public buses supplied to Senegal—as part of NEPAD
• Supply of water pumps to Senegal—country’s irrigation cover has 
doubled, rice production up by 177%
• Railway coaches and locomotives to Senegal—improved, and faster, 
public transport
• Improvement of railway infrastructure in Senegal
• Rehabilitation/reconstruction of three trunk rail lines in Sri Lanka—
improved transport, peace dividend post-end of civil war
• Construction of Um Dabakir Power Plant (4×125 MW) in 
Sudan—will contribute to one-sixth of Sudan’s total power demand
• Supply of police vehicles to Zambia—improved reach of police
• Supply of tractors to Tanzania—higher agricultural productivity and 
improved food security
• Assisted craft exchange programme with artists from India and 
Zimbabwe—knowledge sharing, adoption of better techniques, 
higher productivity
annex II: IndIa–afghanIstan development 
partnershIp
(List and figures taken from the Embassy of India website http://eoi.gov.
in/kabul/?0707?000.)
Cumulative level of Indian assistance in Afghanistan amounts to US$2 
billion—a very significant amount for a developing country, largest for any 
neighbouring country, and the fifth largest bilateral donor.
It has been India’s endeavour to act in conformity with the best aid- 
effectiveness principles, taking fully into account the local government pri-
orities, in coordination with other donors, using local sub-contractors and 
materials as far as practical, and with minuscule proportion of budget on 
security and salaries. These ‘overhead costs’ are significantly lower in case 
of Indian projects than in those undertaken by other donors.
Four areas of support.
• Large infrastructure projects
• Humanitarian assistance
• Capacity building initiatives, and
• ‘Small Development projects’
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 a. Large and medium infrastructure projects, for example
• Construction of a 218  km road from Zaranj to Delaram for facili-
tating movement of goods and services to the Iranian border (the 
project has been completed and handed over to Government of 
Afghanistan);
• Construction of 220 kV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to 
Kabul and a 220/110/20 kV sub-station at Chimtala, completed and 
handed over; two more sub-stations are being constructed at Doshi 
and Charikar for which material, brought by air from New Delhi is 
being transported to the project sites.
• Construction of Salma Dam in Herat province (ongoing project, fol-
lowing approval of the revised project cost by the Cabinet in January 
2013, work has resumed gradually from March 15.
• Construction of Afghan Parliament building.
• Setting up of five toilet-cum-public sanitation complexes in Kabul.
• Upgradation of telephone exchanges in 11 provinces (completed and 
handed over);
• Expansion of national TV network by providing an uplink from Kabul 
and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals for greater integration of 
the country (completed and handed over).
The above list is not exhaustive.
 b. Humanitarian Assistance, including the following:
• provision of free medical services and medicines through Indian 
Medical Missions (IMMs) located in Kabul and other cities of 
Afghanistan.
• Provision of food assistance of 1 million MT of wheat in the form of 
HEB distributed to approximately 2 million school children across 
Afghanistan, daily under a ‘School Feeding Program’ administered 
by the WFP.
• Assistance of 2.5 lakh MT of wheat to Afghanistan.
• Reconstruction and renovation of Indira Gandhi Institute of Child 
Health (IGICH) Gifting of ten ambulances.
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 c. Capacity Building initiatives like:
• Reconstruction and renovation of the Habibia School in Kabul;
• Award of 500 ICCR long-term university scholarships (for under-
graduate and post graduate degrees) and 500 short-term Indian 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) vocational training 
slots for Afghan nationals annually from 2006 to 07 onwards (since 
2009, both ICCR and ITEC slots were increased to 675 annu-
ally and it has been decided to grant 1000 scholarships for Afghan 
Nationals (administered by ICCR) during the period 2012–13 to 
2020–21.);
• Up to 258 Special Discretionary ITEC slots have been offered to 
Afghan Ministry officials for training programmes in India—over five 
such training programmes have been organised and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industries, the Ministry of Agriculture and so on. 
have already had their personnel trained in various disciplines under 
this new scheme;
• Deputation of 30 Indian civil servants under UNDP’s Capacity for 
Afghan Public Administration (CAP) programme; ongoing Indian 
contribution to UNDP’s National Institution Building Program 
(NIBP) which finances attachment of Indian civil servants as Capacity 
Development Advisors (CDAs) in Afghan government institutions—
there are ten Indian CDAs currently working in various important 
Ministries of the Afghan Government;
• Signing of ‘twinning agreements’ between related Indian and Afghan 
Ministries;
• Setting up of an India–Afghan Vocational training centre for train-
ing 3000 Afghans in carpentry, plumbing, welding, masonry and 
tailoring;
• Project by Indian NGO SEWA for setting up Women’s Vocational 
Training Centre in Bagh-e-Zanana (Kabul) for training 1000 
women in garment making, nursery plantation, food processing and 
marketing.
• 614 Agriculture scholarships (BSc, Msc and PhD) have been made 
available to Afghan students under an Indian Council for Agriculture 
Research (ICAR)-administered scheme. Sixty Afghan agriculture 
students are presently studying in various Indian agriculture univer-




 d. Small Development Projects, community-based, in vulnerable border 
areas, in the fields of agriculture, rural development, education, 
health, vocational training and so on. that can have direct and visi-
ble impact on community life, and with focus on local ownership 
and management. The Small Development Projects were imple-
mented in two phases—the first in July 2006 comprising projects 
worth US$11,216,179 and the second in June 2008 comprising 
projects worth US$8,579,537. Sixty-five per cent of the projects 
are reported to be 100% complete. Some of them are awaiting final 
clearances of concerned authorities for completion certificate. 
Seventy-six projects have been completed, 34 projects are ongoing, 
6 projects await tender finalisation with Afghan line Ministries, 
while ten projects await MEA approval. Till date, US$13.135 mil-
lion has been released to our Mission under phases I and II of Small 
Development Projects. The implementation of the projects is done 
entirely by Afghan government agencies (with advisory inputs from 
Indian Embassy), which helps in building local capacity towards 
project management. A MoU for implementation of the third phase 
of the SDP scheme was signed during President Karzai’s visit in 
November 2012 with an additional provision of US$100 million. 
Administrative and financial approvals for 60 projects, at an esti-
mated cost of USD 14.223 million, under the third phase of the 
SDP scheme have been received from MEA in June 2013. The 
MoUs (in English and Dari) for each of these 60 projects have been 
finalised and waits signing. The third phase of SDPs is to be com-
pleted by 2015–16.
The future contours of the Indian assistance programme in Afghanistan 
were illuminated during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, in May 2011. The PM had announced a further 
increase in India’s aid commitment to Afghanistan by USD 500 million, 
thus raising the cumulative Indian commitment to US$2 billion.
new schemes
• Donation of 1000 buses for the Kabul and other municipalities 
with provision for maintenance support, training and infrastruc-
ture. Afghanistan has selected Delhi Integrated Multi-modal Transit 
System (DIMTS) as the Consultant to manage the process of pro-
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curing the buses and creating the structures for their maintenance 
and running. DIMTS has submitted a revised proposal.
• Donation of 500 tractors for Afghan farmers; provision of seeds and 
other assistance for the agricultural sector.
• Medical package consisting of the treatment of Afghan patients in 
select hospitals in India over the next three years to be implemented 
through the Afghan Ministry of Public Health;
• Rehabilitation and professional upgradation of the National Malaria 
and Leishmaniasis Centre of Afghanistan; and the
• Upgradation of the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health, includ-
ing the neo-natal and maternal care unit.
• Setting up of a National Agricultural University.
• US$50 million Buyers Credit Line to promote exports and attract 
Indian business to Afghanistan.
• Grant of US$10 million for preservation and revival of Afghanistan’s 
archaeological and cultural heritage and cultural exchanges.
• Grant of US$4 million to the Government of Afghanistan for the 
restoration of the historic Stor Palace in Kabul.
• Assistance in setting up an Afghan National Institute of Mines. To 
begin with, the Government of India has offered training at ISM, 
Dhanbad, for up to 180 resource persons in the Ministry of Mines, 
Government of Afghanistan from April to December 2013. Training 
is to be imparted in 12 disciplines related to Mining for batches of 
15 each. Five training modules (for 15 × 2 = 30) resource persons 
have been completed.
• Assistance in setting up of a computer laboratory at Habibia School.
• Supporting the second phase of the Confederation of Indian Industry 
(CII) Skills Development Program for providing vocational training 
to Afghan nationals.
• Establishment of a Jawaharlal Nehru Chair of Indian Studies at 
Kabul University
In pursuance of the decision of Prime Minister of India and President of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to support the ARCS to treat Afghan 
children suffering from CHD, Government of India has decided to grant 
financial assistance of US$5 million to ARCS over a period of five years 
beginning 2015. Financial assistance provided by India will be utilised for 
the ongoing treatment by ARCS of Afghan Children at Artemis, Max and 
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Fortis Hospitals in New Delhi. These hospitals have offered special con-
cessional rates for treatment of these children. The first tranche of US$1 
million has already been disbursed to ARCS and additional disbursement 
would be made over the next four years.
annex III: lIst of persons wIth whom 
the afghanIstan–IndIa partnershIp was dIscussed
(Team consisting of Lt Gen PK Singh (Retd), Lt Gen PC Katoch (Retd), 
Maj Gen BK Sharma (Retd) and Mr Shakti Sinha at Herat, October 2/3, 
2015; Kabul September 3/4 and November 21/22, 2015, and Mazar-e- 
Sharif, December 17/18, 2015)
 1. Dr Rangin Dafdar Spanta, Chair AISS Advisory Board, former for-
eign minister, former NSA
 2. Dr Sayeda Mojgan Mostavi, Deputy Minister of Publications, min-
istry of Information & Culture
 3. Dr Davood Moradian, Director, Afghan Institute of Strategic 
Studies
 4. Azizullah Royesh, educational consultant, Marefat Civil Capacity 
Building Organisation
 5. Habibullah Fouzi, Member, International Relations Committee, 
High Peace Council
 6. Shahmahmood Miakhel, Country Director, United States Institute 
of Peace
 7. Abbas Noyan, general secretary, Rights and Justice Party
 8. M. Ashraf Haidari, Research Fellow, AISS/Director of Policy & 
Strategy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
 9. Eng Sebghatullah Tamim, Excellent Planning & Construction 
Company
 10. Ahmed Saeedi, political expert, civil society
 11. Lt Gen Abdul Hadi Khalid, former Deputy Minister of the Interior
 12. Dr Moheb Spinghar, Director General, Institute for Diplomacy, 
MOFA
 13. Mr Mohammad Ismail Rahimi, Deputy minister, Ministry of 
Economy
 14. Ehsanullah Zaki, Chief of Staff to First Vice President, former MP 
and Jumbish party activist
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 15. Wahidullah Shahrani, former minister of mines, former commerce 
minister and opposition politician
 16. Eng Kohistani, acting Deputy minister/DG, Ministry of Energy & 
water
 17. Eng Osmani, Minister of Energy & water
 18. Mr Murad, Minister of Economy
 19. Mustafa Aria, Director, Aid Coordination, Ministry of Finance
 20. Amrullah Saleh, former Director NDS and opposition politician
 21. Mohammad Naeem Aubzada, Director, TEFA, Kabul
 22. Ahmad Sulaiman Aslam, Ministry of Finance
 23. Feridudin Ilham, Deputy Head of Public Relations and Outreach
 24. Humayun Khairi, Office of First Vice President
 25. Maj Gen Masood Ahmad Azizi, Deputy Minister of the Interior
 26. Mrs Homayra Etemadi, Deputy Chief of Staff under President 
Karzai
 27. Abdul Jabbar Ariyaee, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Education
 28. Mrs Nasrine Abou Baker, Office of CEO
 29. Dr Mirwais Balkhi, Centre of Strategic Studies
 30. Prof Rafiullah Niazi, Director, Academy of Science
 31. Hashem Rasouli, The Voice of Afghanistan
Plus many members of the media, think tank researchers, senior officials 
in ministries of economy, energy and water, agriculture, finance, indepen-
dent directorate of local governance, independent administrative reforms 
and civil service commission, Ambassador of India and his staff.
notes
 1. This section (India as donor) draws heavily on Rani D. Mullen, ‘India’s 
Development Assistance: Will it Change the Global Development Finance 
Paradigm?’ Prepared for the Workshop on Innovation in Governance of 
Development Finance: Causes, Consequences & the Role of Law Conference 
April 8–9, 2013, Gießen & New York University School of Law. Can be 
accessed at http://www.iilj.org/newsandevents/documents/mullen.pdf
  And Lt Gen PK Singh, above cited.
 2. Mullen, op cit.
 3. Mullen estimates that a thousand dollars would easily allow for a person’s 
three weeks’ training in India.
 4. This has allowed India to expand its development partnership portfolio 
considerably without a concomitant charge on its budget, with govern-
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ment’s own commitment limited to the interest subvention charges. Exim 
Bank raises its capital from international bond markets since it needs hard 
currency for its borrowers.
 5. Information from compilation by IDRC, found in Mullen, op. cit., based 
on Government of India Budget, Grants & Loans to Foreign Governments, 
Statement 11 of the Expenditure Budget, Ministry of External Affairs, 
Government of India.
 6. Mullen, op cit.
 7. Discussions with senior officials at the Ministry of Energy and Water, 
Government of Afghanistan, November 21, 2015.
 8. Extensive discussions were held with the officials of the Ministry of 
Economy, Kabul and with concerned Embassy staff, September third and 
November 21, 2015.
 9. Cell phone coverage in Afghanistan is over 60% of the population.
 10. These discussions were before the December 2015 supply of the four 
promised helicopter gunships (Mi 25).
 11. Mullen, op cit.
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CHAPTER 8




Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is one of the most visible examples of 
a rising power’s approach to a conflict-affected country. Since its high- 
profile intervention during the height of the famine in 2011, Turkey has 
elevated its level of engagement with Somalia and has committed to robust 
humanitarian assistance, development aid, and civilian capacity to resusci-
tate the fragile state. Over the years, a “Turkish model” of engagement has 
emerged. It is characterized by the quick delivery of assistance and pro-
grams with Turkish personnel on the ground. The Turkish model is also 
noted for its emphasis on soft power attributes such as business interests 
and cultural affinity such as Turkey’s Muslim identity. This approach is in 
contrast to other “traditional donors” in Somalia who are often accused 
of being overly bureaucratic, slow, and isolated, either bunkered in the 
airport in Mogadishu or providing aid remotely from other neighboring 
countries (Wasuge 2016).
However, there are a myriad of actors with different interests and objec-
tives engaged in the country. These range from the neighboring states of 
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Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, to traditional donors such as the United 
Nations and the UK, as well as more recent regional actors such as South 
Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey. Despite the longev-
ity and level of financial investment, none of these actors have received 
the level of international attention that Turkey has since its high-profile 
intervention in the country in 2011. This chapter seeks to shed light on 
Turkey’s activities in Somalia, particularly its approach to peacebuilding. It 
draws on interviews with Somalis to explore their perspectives on Turkey’s 
engagement, while also placing these activities firmly in the context of 
other external actors in the country and Somalia’s conflict dynamics.
SomalIa context
On February 8, 2017, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) was 
elected as the ninth president of the Federal Republic of Somalia. He has 
inherited a weak and fractured state, with the previous government fail-
ing to achieve many of the benchmarks it set for itself when it came to 
power in 2012 (Arman 2017). Much of the lack of progress stems from 
the fragile nature of the state—as one recovering from a long civil war. 
This is a point put succinctly by the Finnish Minister for International 
Development, Pekka Haavisto: “When fragile states lack legitimacy and 
the trust of their own people, rapid state-building efforts can actually work 
against rather than for peace building, inspiring resistance from those who 
fear how state authorities will wield their new power” (Menkhaus 2014). 
On top of that, Al-Shabaab continues to launch attacks on the government 
and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), upon which the 
government is dependent upon for its existence. Adding to the govern-
ment’s challenges is the high number of internally displaced people (IDPs) 
in the country. There are an estimated 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia, with 
369,000 people thought to be displaced in and around Mogadishu alone 
(UNHCR 2016). Most are headed by women. About 4.9 million people 
are in need of humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 2016). Additionally, 
there are third-generation Somalis in refugee camps in Yemen, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, and Kenya who are slowly returning to the country and pose a 
unique security risk as a vulnerable group. There is also continued ani-
mosity among the different clans and regional administrations such as 
Puntland and Jubaland, who simply do not trust the fledging federal state.
The root cause of Somalia’s current predicament was the collapse of 
the Somali state infrastructure in 1991. While there had been  increasing 
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interclan warfare and atrocities since the late 1970s, the overthrow of the 
Siad Barre government (1969–1991) and the destruction of state institu-
tions instigated over two decades of conflict and fragility that the coun-
try has yet to recover from. In the absence of an effective government, 
warlords and armed groups loosely affiliated to clans have vied with each 
other for power and dominance throughout the country. The current 
structure of the Federal Government is still based on the exclusionary 4.5 
formula. This equally distributes seats among the four major Somali clans 
(the Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and the Digil and Mirifle). The minority clans, 
who are sometimes referred to as the Fifth Clan, are together allotted just 
half the number of seats of one whole clan receiving 0.5 percent repre-
sentation. This is a deeply unequal system that sidelines all minority class, 
regardless of their population size.
The two main sources of conflict in Somalia are the clan structure 
of Somali society and competition over resources and their distribution 
(Somali Peace Line 2016). This has been particularly prevalent regard-
ing the role of the state and its resources. Clans are a source of patron-
age, security, and justice for most Somalis—a status that has only been 
heightened in the stateless paralysis of the country. On the one hand, 
there is a strong culture of blood revenge or alternatively blood com-
pensation (Diya) that can further heighten conflict. On the other hand, 
the clan system is also the source of traditional Somali conflict-resolution 
methods such as the Shir Beeleed (clan assembly), led by the clan Elders 
or Guurti. The Shir Beeleed is a slow and time-consuming negotiation 
and dialogue technique that can last for weeks or even months (Balthasar 
2013).
This delicate balance between peace and conflict in the clan system has 
been further exacerbated by international interventions and meddling by 
neighboring countries, ostensibly due to security concerns. Since the Cold 
War, development and humanitarian aid has been diverted into the Somali 
war economy, first under President Siad Barre and later by clans. In the 
early 1990s, a series of UN-led peace operations attempted to support a 
statebuilding process and provide security for aid workers in the spiral-
ing insecurity and famine ravaging the country. These missions, however, 
quickly became mired in the politicization of aid and became targets of the 
worsening interclan and warlord infighting (Harper 2012). The situation 
continued to escalate, culminating in the infamous Black Hawk Down 
incident in 1993 and the withdrawal of USA and other troop-contributing 
countries.
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The result of these debacles has been enduring. A decade would pass 
before the next generation of peacekeepers arrived in Somalia with the 
launch of AMISOM in 2007. Meanwhile, the neutrality and security of 
humanitarian aid workers were compromised by these events, forcing 
donors to relocate their headquarters and international staff away from 
Somali communities and adopt a hands-off approach. This often meant 
operating outside the country, for example, in Nairobi, and employing 
intermediaries inside Somalia to deliver aid. The result of this approach 
meant that Somali recipients were burdened by a slow, bureaucratic aid 
system with little to no consultation with communities and the frequent 
diversion of aid into local war economies. This long-distance approach is 
the modus operandi that developed for many traditional donors work-
ing on Somalia. Traditional donors are often identified as state agen-
cies or international NGOs from Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), such as Norway, the USA, Italy, and Canada.
Since the mid-1990s, Somalia has been the site of proxy wars among 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti, all of whom have, at times, allied 
with various Somali clans, regional administrations, or political groupings 
in order to destabilize a rival or gain access to a resource. Ethiopia invaded 
Somalia in 2006 to oust the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in south- 
central Somalia. While this was achieved quickly, Ethiopia was forced to 
stay until 2009 to prop-up the unpopular but internationally recognized 
Transitional Government of Somalia. It was in response to the harsh 
counter- insurgency operations employed by Ethiopia that Al-Shabaab 
emerged (International Crisis Group 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya continue 
to align with regional administrations in Somalia to support a federal sys-
tem with a weak central Somali state. The decision to add Ethiopian and 
Kenyan soldiers to AMISOM alongside Ugandan and Burundian troops 
has been considered a controversial move given the hostility and suspicion 
most Somalis feel toward both countries (Geeska Africa Online 2015).
turkISh ForeIgn PolIcy PrIorItIeS: exPlaInIng 
turkey’S Involvement In SomalIa
Much has been made of Turkey’s high-profile intervention into the dev-
astating 2011 famine that stalked south central Somalia. The perceptions 
regarding this singular event often belie the historical relations between 
the two countries and the growing interest of Turkish authorities in 
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Somalia in the years preceding it. Turkish and Somali officials have empha-
sized the historical relations between both countries, which stretch back 
to the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. At the height of World 
War I, the Ottomans armed Somalis in their rebellion against the British. 
Despite a cessation in Somali–Turkish relations for much of the Cold War, 
Somalia was nonetheless one of the few locations in Africa where a Turkish 
embassy was opened, in 1979. The embassy remained active until its clo-
sure in 1991 at the beginning of the country’s civil war. It was reopened 
on November 1, 2011. With the exception of General Çevik Bir as force 
commander for UN Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 1993, the 
Turkish state had no relationship with Somali authorities until the visit of 
President Sheikh Sharif of the Transitional Federal Government in 2009, 
which began to pique the interest of Turkish authorities.1
There are a number of factors that underpin Turkey’s engagement in 
Somalia. Humanitarianism was the underlying motive behind Turkey’s 
initial engagement in 2011. At the height of the famine, which coincided 
with the holy month of Ramadan in August 2011, a period of fasting 
and charity, a huge public awareness campaign was run by Turkish NGOs 
and celebrities showing images of emancipated women and children. The 
impact of this campaign was decisive in mobilizing the Turkish public 
and state attention on the plight in Somalia. An estimated $57 million 
was raised from private donations alone (TIKA 2013) while around 500 
Turkish nationals arrived in Mogadishu to help deliver aid (Lough 2012).
Humanitarian aspirations remain a motivation for Turkish engagement 
in Somalia. In March 2011, Turkey gave $122 million work of humanitar-
ian aid to Somalia (Daily Sabah 2017). Turkey’s broader activities, however, 
should also be seen within the broader foreign policy priorities context, in 
particular Turkey’s image as rising power. Over the past few years, Turkey 
has pursued a range of activities such as gaining a seat at the UN Security 
Council (2009–2010), high-profile events like the World Humanitarian 
Summit in 2016 and increased commitment to aid and security support 
in general. Between 2012 and 2014 alone, Turkey’s Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) increased by nearly 30 percent from $1.2 billion in 
2012 to $3.6 billion in 2014 (TIKA 2014). Turkey’s desire to promote 
its image as a rising power is succinctly highlighted by a 2012 Turkish 
International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) report that 
states, “In 2012, there has been a decrease in the amount of development 
assistance provided by traditional donors; whereas Turkey’s development 
assistance increased by 98.7% in one year. In this framework, Turkey is 
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now defined as an “emerging donor” and strengthens its “donor” role 
each passing year” (TIKA 2013, 21).
In many ways, Somalia has become an opportunity for Turkey to illus-
trate not only its commitment to addressing shared international issues, 
but also to project its image as a rising power. Turkey’s discourse reflects 
these aspirations. At the UN’s High-Level Partnership Forum on Somalia 
in Istanbul in February 2016, President Erdoğan said, “Somalia, which 
was on the verge of destruction and totally hopeless back in 2011, is rising 
to its feet with the efforts we and our international partners make… With 
Somalia, the Turkish model of aid has gained recognition in literature” 
(Presidency of the Turkish Republic 2016). Such discourse is aimed not 
only at the international community but also at Turkey’s own citizens. 
Turkey’s engagement in Somalia, for example, has boosted the image of 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader Tayyip 
Erdoğan, appealing in particular to the Party’s constituency of conserva-
tive and religious voters (Sucuoglu and Stearns 2016).
In addition to being an example of Turkey’s rising power status, Somalia 
should also be seen in the context of Ankara’s efforts to expand its eco-
nomic and political relations. Over the past decade, Turkey has expanded 
its engagement in areas beyond its traditional sphere of the Balkans, the 
Middle East, and Central Asia. In 2014, Turkish ODA reached 29 African 
countries (TIKA 2016). Like other rising powers, economic interests are 
intricately linked to Turkey’s foreign policy and its aid. In what has become 
a template replicated in other countries, the Turkish state’s presence in 
Somalia was accompanied by the opening of a new embassy, TIKA offices, 
new Turkish Airlines routes, and an influx of development programs and 
commercial activities. Turkish exports to Somalia have increased from an 
estimated $3.5 million in 2009 to $115 million in 2016 (Turkish Statistics 
Agency 1996–2017). Turkish Airlines has a lucrative route to Mogadishu, 
and Turkish companies have secured numerous contracts in Somalia.
In February 2016, President Erdoğan and then-President Hassan 
Sheikh Mohamud co-hosted a Private Sector Investment Conference in 
Istanbul to promote Turkish investments in Somalia across a range of areas 
such as energy, information and communications technologies, and agricul-
ture. There has also been interest in Turkish companies expanding beyond 
Mogadishu to Puntland in the north and Juba in the south (Sucuoglu and 
Stearns 2016). Additionally, Turkish state aid, which focuses on techni-
cal assistance and infrastructure development, combines both economic 
and development opportunities for Turkey and the recipient country. 
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Rebuilding of infrastructure such as roads and construction of hospitals 
and mosques has created jobs for both local Somalis and Turkish com-
panies (Achilles et al. 2015). Somalia offers not only an untapped market 
for Turkish businesses but also a gateway into other African countries. 
Interviewees from Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan have all expressed 
interest in Turkey’s activities, highlighting its work in Somalia (Rising 
Powers Conference 2016).
The top three donors of gross ODA for Somalia between 2014 and 
2015 were the USA with $205.4 million, followed by the UK at $195 mil-
lion and Turkey, which provided $194 million (OECD 2015). EU insti-
tutions were the fourth largest donor to Somalia with $180 million and 
Sweden the fifth with $72 million (OECD 2015). Turkey is among one 
of the top donors to Somalia and is the only non-DAC member of this 
group. Yet its engagement in Somalia differs remarkably.
Soft power has underpinned Turkey’s engagement in Somalia. Its 
image as a relatively prosperous democratic Muslim-majority country with 
historical ties to the country distinguished Turkey from traditional donors 
and made it an attractive partner. The visible engagement by Turkish offi-
cials and Turkish projects on the ground, and the high visibility of their 
projects such as from refurbishing buildings, has supported its positive 
image. Finally, the high-profile visits of President Erdoğan, the opening 
of Turkey’s huge embassy in downtown Mogadishu, and the establish-
ment of direct flights between Mogadishu and Turkey have all bolstered 
the ties between the two countries. In addition to this use of soft power 
and cultural affinity, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is characterized by 
the high visibility of its projects and their quick and direct delivery of 
aid on the ground. Turkey has a holistic approach, engaging in diplo-
macy, humanitarian relief, and development programs simultaneously in 
Somalia.2 The Turkish model is also noted for its emphasis on business 
interests. Interviews with Turkish aid officials, NGO representatives, and 
beneficiaries on the ground have revealed three central principles that 
seem to drive Turkey’s success. These are unconditionality, bilateralism, 
and non-securitization of aid and personnel.
Securitization has become more visible in the twenty-first century. 
Commonly referred to as the “securitization of personnel” or “compound-
ing of aid” (Duffield 2010), representatives of international humanitarian 
agencies and relief organizations are confined to heavily fortified living 
and working quarters in conflict zones. These render agents of traditional 
actors immobile and alien to the needs of beneficiaries on the ground. This 
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bunkered mentality has been particularly prevalent in traditional donors’ 
approaches to Somalia since the 1990s. For many years, international dip-
lomats and other personnel that worked on Somalia have been based in 
Nairobi and fly into the Mogadishu airport for a few hours, staying in the 
compound, and turn around and depart the same day.
By contrast, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia has, in part, been defined 
by the presence of officials and personnel on the ground. While security 
is taken seriously with guards at Turkish offices, Turkish personnel still 
live in Somalia. Turkey has built one of its largest embassies in down-
town Mogadishu, where Ambassador Olgan Bekar and other officials live. 
Turkey’s consulate in Hargeisa, Somaliland, is occupied by a Turkish rep-
resentative. Turkish aid groups, teachers, and others who work on Somalia 
continue to be based in the county, despite the fragile security situation 
(Wasuge 2016; Sucuoglu and Stearns 2016). This approach has a num-
ber of advantages over the bunkered practices of traditional donors. One 
is that it reduces the cost of programs by reducing the expense of bro-
kers that are so frequently used by traditional donor agencies and country 
missions. Their presence on the ground also means that Turkish officials 
and personnel can react more quickly to changing dynamics. They can 
better monitor programs and consult with recipients on the quality and 
relevance of programs. Contrary to traditional donors, Turkey does not 
have rigid procedures or systems of delivery that must be adhered to. The 
daily flights provided by Turkish Airlines facilitate greater transportation 
of products and personnel when necessary.
Turkey works with a number of multilateral initiatives on Somalia. 
These include signing up with platforms like the New Deal for Somalia, 
hosting international meetings and supporting AMISOM. Despite this, 
however, bilateralism in general is still the defining attribute of Turkey’s 
engagement to recipient countries. Roughly 90 percent of all Turkish aid 
efforts globally are coordinated directly between Turkey and the donor 
recipient country. For example, in 2014, just 2.4 percent of Turkey’s 
ODA ($88 million out of $3.6 billion) was provided through multilat-
eral contributions (TIKA 2016, 11). The main reason why Turkey prefers 
bilateral arrangements is the effectiveness of this model in expediting the 
process and delivering tangible results, according to the Turkish officials 
who have frequently commented on this issue.
There has often been criticism of Turkey for failing to coordinate 
with donors in Somalia and acting unilaterally. But there are a number 
of  reasons for Turkey to work outside multilateral institutions. Speed and 
efficiency are highly valued by Turkish officials who are output orientated 
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(Sazak et al. 2015, 9). In contrast, Western donors and multilateral institu-
tions focus on processes and systems. Such an approach, while intended to 
ensure that things are done correctly, is criticized by both Turkish officials 
and Somalis interviewed, for being too slow and bureaucratic. For exam-
ple, Turkish diplomats apparently felt frustrated when they attempted to 
collaborate with AMISOM on training Somali soldiers in 2013. Their plan 
was met with resistance from some AMISOM partners such as the USA 
(Wasuge 2016). Frustrated with the lack of progress, Turkey decided to 
start working with the Somalia National Army bilaterally. Similarly, with 
the exception of a brief hiatus in 2013, Turkey has provided direct budget-
ary support to the Federal Government of Somalia. The payments have 
ranged from $4.5 million to $6 million in recent years (Olgan Bekar’s 
speech, Rising Powers Conference 2016). This is an aspect of the New 
Deal that other donors have failed to do, citing concerns with transpar-
ency (Hearn 2016).
Some respondents noted that traditional donors’ overly bureaucratic 
approach, with multiple offices, systems, and officials to work with, often 
overwhelmed and stifled the functioning of the recipient country’s frag-
ile state institutions.3 Bilateral engagement seems to be more manage-
able for recipient states. However, the bilateral model also brings out 
a number of serious coordination problems, especially in the areas of 
personnel deployment (level of expertise and personnel insurance pack-
ages), absence of a reliable monitoring and evaluation model and lan-
guage constraints. Turkey, nonetheless, remains acutely aware of the 
international analysis of global dynamics but prefers bilateral develop-
ment assistance arrangements.
turkey’S aPProach to PeacebuIldIng In SomalIa
Since 2011, the majority of the Turkish state’s activities have been engaged 
primarily in Mogadishu. This remains the case as officials interviewed 
for this study point out that it is the area with greatest need. Over these 
years, Turkey has, however, expanded its political engagement to include 
Somaliland, Kismayo, Puntland, Galkayo, Baidoa, and Beledweyne, among 
others (Olgan Bekar’s speech, Rising Powers Conference 2016). There is 
no general framework or policy document publicly available that guides 
such activities or outlines the annual goals of Turkey’s work in Somalia. 
Rather than having their own specific priorities, officials state that they try 
to develop projects in consultation with Somalis while conscious of their 
own available capacity and strengths.4
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While each project may not be conceptualized in terms of a grander 
peacebuilding goal or “reconstruction” as Turkish officials term it,5 
Turkey’s approach to Somalia, particularly south central, falls into two cat-
egories: statebuilding and social peacemaking. According to the Turkish 
Ambassador to Mogadishu, Olgan Bekar, providing humanitarian assis-
tance, development aid, and statebuilding support simultaneously is key 
to lasting peace and stability in Somalia:
“Peacebuilding and state building in Somalia require a comprehensive 
approach. This comprehensive approach also requires a humanitarian 
approach, humanitarian aid, political engagement, security and develop-
ment assistance… A purely humanitarian approach to protracted conflict 
areas and conflict-affected countries offers only a short-term solution. 
Assisting affected countries simultaneously and in tandem with long term 
development tools increases the resilience and capacity of the beneficiaries. 
This in the long term reduces the vulnerability and increases the capacity 
of the recipient local actors to respond to humanitarian crisis themselves.” 
(Rising Powers Conference 2016)
Dr. Kani Torun, Ambassador Bekar’s predecessor in Mogadishu, also 
underlines the indispensability of statebuilding for peace in Somalia:
State building is very important, because I have seen the kind of destruction 
that can happen to a society without a functional state as a result of a civil 
war … [Therefore] state building was our priority; we worked with the state 
particularly to improve the way in which the state operated … one area we 
worked with the government closely was the security area. Turkey worked 
with the police and army to build strong security forces to provide security. 
Security investment and other things will come. Even aid is related to secu-
rity. (Rising Powers Conference 2016)
Turkey’s holistic approach encompasses a wide range of projects. This 
includes rehabilitation of infrastructure such as buildings, institutional 
capacity building, social service support in communities, and direct engage-
ment on social relations through education initiatives and cultural events. 
Ambassador Bekar illustrates the virtue of this approach with the Digfer 
hospital (renamed Erdoğan General Hospital in 2015) in Mogadishu:
We demolished the old Digfer hospital and built a new Mogadishu research 
and training hospital. This was a big improvement with 220 beds. Then we 
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equipped it and sent doctors and nurses and other personnel to run the hos-
pital. But we did not run it on our own; we developed a good partnership 
with the Somali side and established a joint management with the Somali 
management staff. Today we provide internships and trainings for young 
Somali doctors. (Rising Powers Conference 2016)
At the international level, Turkey has been engaged in a number of 
multilateral initiatives on peacebuilding issues in Somalia. It has partici-
pated and hosted peace processes and donor conferences, including the 
Istanbul I and II conferences with the UN in 2010 and 2012, respec-
tively. The 2012 conference focused on Somalia’s post-transition future 
and brought together over 300 Somali civil society groups (International 
Crisis Group 2012). Turkish state representatives, including President 
Erdoğan, have also frequently pushed Somalia up on the international 
agenda through speeches and statements at UN meetings. Turkey is also 
a participating state in the Somali New Deal, has hosted its High-Level 
Partnership Forum in 2016, and is a co-chair with the USA on the work-
ing group on security. Signed in March 2013, the New Deal was meant 
as a guide for external actors engaging in Somalia and outlined a three- 
year statebuilding and peacebuilding roadmap (2014–2016). Of the seven 
states that have signed up to New Deal agreements, Somalia is the only 
country where the framework has been most successful, being used to 
define national priorities and align budgets. Prior to this, there were no 
existing frameworks or strategy agreements with donors, and the Federal 
Government of Somalia took early ownership of the New Deal to try to 
assert its burgeoning authority (Hearn 2016, 8).
At an interstate level, there are a range of Turkish ministries, and state 
and semi-state agencies working in Somalia. These range from TIKA, the 
Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), and the Turkish Red Crescent 
(Kızılay), to a myriad of State Ministries in the areas of health, educa-
tion, and defense. Each of these ministries and state agencies are capable 
of enacting their own bilateral projects. In addition to these actors, the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Prime Minister 
have been involved in mediation attempts. There is a disagreement 
between burgeoning regional administrations such as Puntland, Garowe, 
and the central government in Mogadishu. The Turkish government has 
played a role in facilitating talks.
The most high-profile mediations facilitated by Turkey are ongoing dis-
cussions between the Somaliland government and the Federal Government 
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in Mogadishu (Garowe Online 2016). Some of these mediation attempts 
have been overseen by former ambassador Dr. Kani Torun, who has initi-
ated talks between the Federal Government and Somaliland. Describing 
his approach, Dr. Torun says, “When I talked to them, I did not talk the 
way career diplomats talk … by the book, if you will. I instead talked as 
if I were one of them. When they saw my sincerity as well as my open 
and frank engagement in discussion, they had trust and initiated the talks 
with the federal government” (Rising Powers Conference 2016). Progress 
has been slow, but Turkey has succeeded in getting representatives of the 
Federal Government and Somaliland to talk to each other more often.
Alongside this consistent intra-state engagement, Turkey’s programs 
and approach to Somalia have evolved. Most of the Turkish state aid until 
2013 can be classified as humanitarian assistance.6 Turkish humanitarian 
aid dropped from $77 million in 2011 to $27 million two years later in 
2013 (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014). This aid was largely in the 
form of emergency food, medical services, and supplies to IDP camps in 
and around Mogadishu area. Since 2013, the Turkish state engagement 
in Somalia has focused on capacity-building and technical assistance pro-
grams. For example, in 2013, both the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Turkish Central Bank began to provide technical assistance and 
training to their Somali counterparts (Sazak et  al. 2015). The Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affair had been helping its counterpart to establish its 
own internal server.7 Since 2014, Somali diplomats have also participated 
in bilateral and international training programs with Turkey’s Diplomat 
Academy in Ankara. These exchanges have been accompanied by greater 
cooperation and training between the Turkish and Somali Armed Forces 
through two agreements signed in 2010 and 2014 (Today Zaman 2012). 
Such activities are closely associated with statebuilding and peacebuilding 
for Turkish officials who argue that fundamental services and institutional 
capacity need to be strengthened to provide legitimacy to the Federal 
Government and, therefore, counter the allure of extremists.8 Many of 
these state capacity programs are intended to improve local security and 
social services.
At a local level, Turkey’s education programs such as scholarships, 
sponsorship of orphanages, and religious–cultural initiatives are specifi-
cally aimed at changing dynamics and conditions in local Somali society.9 
In particular, Turkish officials view education programs as important 
peacebuilding initiatives that can challenge the allure of extremist narra-
tives. Since 2011, Turkish officials estimate that nearly 3000 scholarships 
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have been provided to Somali students from both state and NGOs.10 The 
presence of these initiatives, through the Turkish offices in the country or 
personnel directly delivering support to communities, also challenges one 
of the central conflict drivers in the country—brokers. According to one 
Turkish Red Crescent official, “Our representatives have always delivered 
their supplies to the recipients’ camps on their own without involving any 
brokers. If the security situation is not conducive for us to go to a certain 
site, we don’t go there, but we also do not entrust our supplies to some 
third entity who we know would not deliver it to the address it was sup-
posed to go and would make profit out of it by selling it.”11 Ongoing 
security challenges that have targeted them have caused Turkish person-
nel to be more cautious. And yet, Turkish officials and personnel remain 
the most visible foreigners in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, through 
their offices and projects (Wasuge 2016).
Since 2013, Turkish peacebuilding in Somalia has also adopted a visible 
military presence. Turkey’s pledge of financial and military training assis-
tance to AMISOM indicated that its activities in Somalia would no lon-
ger be limited to humanitarian and development assistance. At the time, 
Turkey had committed $1 million financial support to AMISOM and had 
undertaken the training of a modest number of Somali troops and police-
men in Turkey (Achilles et al. 2015). Furthermore, the Turkish military 
is opening a training facility for the Somali Armed Forces in Mogadishu 
in 2017. This is Turkey’s first military base abroad. Reportedly, to be run 
by the Turkish Armed Forces personnel, the academy will have up to 200 
Turkish officers and is expected to train over 10,000 Somali National 
Army troops as well as soldiers from other African nations (Hurriyet Daily 
News 2016). The academy is envisaged as a center for excellence for train-
ing missions encompassing the entire continent.
There was another marked shift in Turkey’s approach to Somalia in 
2015. Turkish public–private enterprises that characterized the frenzied 
environment until 2013 had evolved. Improvement in domestic security 
had been accompanied by an increase in private Turkish companies that 
won contracts in a number of key sectors. Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle 
International Airport is managed by Favori LLC (Favori LLC Website), 
as is Mogadishu Port by Albayrak (The Somali Investor 2015). There 
are also strong signals from bilateral investment conferences and meetings 
between officials from Turkey and Somalia that Turkish businesses intend 
to explore new opportunities in provinces such as Puntland (Sucuoglu and 
Stearns 2016, 25).
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Since 2015, the capacity-building programs of the Turkish state have 
entered their second stage with a greater emphasis on sustainability and 
local ownership. This involves the transfer of responsibility and adminis-
tration of Turkish programs to their Somali counterparts. An example of 
this is the garbage collection program in Mogadishu. The Turkish govern-
ment has delivered equipment so that it will be run solely by Somalis.12 
Similarly, Sifa Hospital in Mogadishu, which is run by the Turkish Health 
Ministry, is being co-administered with the Somali Ministry of Health. 
Today, civil training programs are administered either on the ground in 
Somalia or more often in Turkey partly due to the continued insecurity in 
the country.13
Somalia is still the largest recipient of Turkish aid in Africa, but this is 
changing. The focus on collaboration and capacity-building programs has 
resulted in a decline in the spending and projects allocated to Somalia. 
Turkish officials, however, argue that this does not signal a declining com-
mitment by Turkey.14 In 2014, nearly 70 percent of TIKA’s $8.3 million 
budget in Somalia went on health sector-related projects while admin-
istrative and civil infrastructure was at 20.5 percent (TIKA 2016, 136). 
This is equivalent to $5.7 million and $1.6 million, respectively. These 
numbers do not include spending from Turkish NGOs. Turkish officials 
highlight President Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Mogadishu in January 2015 
and on June 3, 2016. To them, these visits illustrate the importance of 
Turkey–Somali relations to Erdoğan’s administration and signal the coun-
try’s strong commitment to Somalia.
reSPonSe and PercePtIonS oF SomalIS
The Somali response to these myriad of Turkish activities and actors has 
been generally positive. Turkey’s approach is seen as practical; their proj-
ects are tangible and of good quality, say most Somalis. “They brought 
orphanages, education. The best hospital was built by them. They train 
and build capacity, service delivery and business.”15 Through such proj-
ects, people feel that Turkey has contributed to the rejuvenation of the 
war-torn Mogadishu: “Look at the airport, for a country that has been 
out of touch for 25 years to have that kind of airport … They are planning 
to build- have built roads, the Turkish. They brought this town back.”16 
This sentiment is shared by many interviewees. The Somali Ambassador to 
Turkey has stated that the “(Turks) ha(ve) returned a sense of normalcy to 
people, which is necessary.”17 Turkey’s activities are credited with helping 
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to change the narrative around Somalia as a failed state and the image of 
Mogadishu as a no-go-area. In particular, Turkey’s approach has chal-
lenged the Nairobi-based model of long-distance aid that many traditional 
donors and international organizations have used for Somalia.
From a Somali perspective, Turkey is distinguished from other actors, 
even African states, by its impact on the ground, “The Turkish move 
around freely with no protection, no guns, nobody else can do that.”18 
The visibility of both Turkish projects and personnel on the ground is 
perceived as a successful aspect of their approach, “They (the Turkish) 
are not politically visible, they are in the community and that is the most 
important aspect—a community-centered approach.”19 The community- 
centered projects of Turkey are felt to positively contribute to peacebuild-
ing. According to a Somali civil society actor, Turkey “provides for basic 
needs. Terrorists recruit younger people with no hope for the future but 
through providing the basics, the Turkish help to mitigate the allure of 
what the terrorists promise.”20 This sentiment is reiterated by the Somali 
Ambassador to Turkey, who believes that Turkey’s maximum value is in 
scholarships and programs which have provided opportunities for Somali 
youth.21
Despite the expansion of some projects to other parts of the coun-
try, Turkey’s engagement in Somalia remains overwhelmingly focused 
on Mogadishu. With few exceptions, the benefits of these programs have 
been felt primarily by residents in Mogadishu. If the goal of these proj-
ects is to support the legitimacy and stability of the Federal Government, 
then it is geographically limited. Given the historical perception of 
Mogadishu as the center of patronage and oppression is still potent, 
Turkey risks being perceived as biased toward the capital. The potential 
negative implications of this have already been felt with Somaliland par-
ties implying Turkey favoritism of the Federal Government’s goal of a 
united Somalia.
In Somalia, Turkish nationals were seen through the prism of fellow 
coreligionist and not as another foreign power pursuing its own interest. 
This has started to change. A criticism levied by Somalis is that Turkish 
state agencies and business could do more to hire local people, “They are 
all Turkish companies not Somali private sector, we have nothing to do 
with it.”22 While there are no numbers to verify these claims, the percep-
tion that Turkish entities are excluding Somalis is significant. If Turkish 
state agencies and companies were importing Turkish workers to work on 
Turkish projects, it would create an insular dynamic that does not benefit 
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local communities or youth. While such an approach may avoid some local 
conflict actors such as gatekeepers, it would also deprive communities of 
economic opportunities that could support peacebuilding and undermine 
the capacity-building efforts of Turkish state actors.
Somalis also highlight interstate conflict at the international level 
between Turkey and other states. In particular, the specter of the Somali 
state as a source of personal patronage reemerges in the minds of Somalis 
regarding the controversy over the awarding of Mogadishu Port ten-
der to a Turkish company: “There was no transparency in the procure-
ment of the tender for the port, which resulted in suspicions of foul play 
by the West. The Turkish were criticized as not being honest.”23 While 
donor officials stress that there is and must be international cooperation 
on Somalia, this does not allay the perception among Somalis that “(t)
here is no coordination between the West and the Turkish which creates 
conflict.”24 International rivalry over business and contracts is a legitimate 
concern for Somalis given the history of the country and its susceptibility 
to regional and global shifts.
other actorS In SomalIa
There are a range of actors and countries engaged in Somalia. These 
include neighbors, donors, as well as new actors. When asked, however, 
which states they believe were conducting peacebuilding activities in 
Somalia, interviewees identified only Turkey. Other notable countries such 
as the UAE and, to a lesser extent, China were identified by interview-
ees as relatively new actors working in Somalia but not on peacebuilding. 
China is a relatively new actor, opening a small Embassy in the Jazeera 
Palace Hotel in Mogadishu in 2014. While China’s activities in Somalia 
are minor compared to its ventures in other African countries, it has alleg-
edly signed a number of trade deals, mostly recently with Puntland, to 
conduct oil explorations (Garowe Online 2016).
The Gulf States, in particular the UAE, were identified as another set 
of actors that are increasingly influential.25 The UAE is reported to be 
focusing on the provision of basic commodities and services, similar to 
Turkey. However, there exists a perception that the UAE is attempting 
to compete with Turkey in order to gain influence and visibility (Somali 
Peace Line 2016). This has allegedly meant that although actors from the 
UAE are welcome, many are wary of their motives. The UAE’s activities 
in Somalia have not been without controversy. It is alleged that it has 
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been providing heavy ammunition to Puntland, Jubaland, and South West 
State.26 The UAE plans to establish a military base in Somaliland and has 
signed a 30-year contract to manage its largest port, Berbera (Maina and 
Ibrahim 2017). This has been criticized as contradicting the sovereignty 
and integrity of Somalia (Radion Dalsan 2017), in which Somaliland is 
seen as a region of the country.
Local Somali actors that were interviewed clearly distinguished between 
the activities of states and non-state actors. In describing the activities of 
organizations such as the World Bank and the European Union, it was 
stated that they are service providers and focus primarily on systems.27 
Examples of these systems were cited as human rights, accountability, 
transparency, and good governance. This was contrasted to the approach 
of states that are perceived to be more practical in their engagement.28
Somali civil society members interviewed stated that the support from 
African states is not as welcome as that from Turkey, the Gulf States, and 
some Asian countries. In fact, it was stated in one interview that often 
other Africans are grouped with state actors from the Global North.29 The 
main reason for this appears to be the historical tensions between Somalia 
and her neighbors, especially Ethiopia and Kenya. It was stated that local 
dynamics come into play and while on paper it appears that Al-Shabaab 
is being undermined, recruitment levels remain high. According to inter-
viewees, Somalis feel betrayed by the African continent, particularly the 
African Union, which has permitted perceived interference from these 
regional actors who are believed to be pursuing anti-Somali agendas. 
Somali interviewees allege that the presence of peacekeepers from these 
regional powers has created a conflict of interest.30
AMISOM is considered a controversial force by many Somali respon-
dents. Established in 2007, its mission, among others, is to reduce the 
threat of Al-Shabaab and provide security to enable stabilization, rec-
onciliation, and peacebuilding processes in Somalia. The inclusion of 
Ethiopian and Kenyan troops has proved controversial and is a source for 
the distrust around AMISOM. However, in some instances, AMISOM 
itself has become a source of conflict. AMISOM troops have faced accusa-
tions of discrimination, rape, assault, sexual exploitation, and the killing of 
Somali civilians (Human Rights Watch 2015). For example, in July 2015, 
AMISOM troops were accused of killing six family members, as they were 
celebrating a wedding in the coastal city of Merka (Human Rights Watch 
2015). These actions have made AMISOM unpopular in Somalia (Somali 
Peace Line 2016). Some AMISOM tactics have also alienated the mission 
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from the very people they are supposed to protect. Somali interviewees 
mentioned that AMISOM troops frequently target Somali youth, particu-
larly young men in Mogadishu, rounding them up and interrogating them 
on whether they are part of Al-Shabaab. Somali respondents noted that 
these actions have in fact turned some youth toward the group (Somali 
Peace Line 2016).
Perceptions are important, and they matter even more in fragile envi-
ronments such as Somalia. As in most conflict-affected states, a large num-
ber of external actors are engaged activities in the country. Much work 
has been done to improve the livelihoods of Somalis. The effect of these 
many activities, initiated by different actors with divergent motivations 
and goals, can be very damaging given the conflict dynamics in Somalia. 
The motives behind the delivery of this support are not always transpar-
ent, and consequently benign intentions can be negatively perceived, as 
some of observations from Mogadishu confirm.
concluSIon
It is clear that the situation in Somalia is extremely complex and fragile. 
There are many latent issues that are not easily perceived from the outside. 
Statebuilding efforts in Somalia, which are an inherent conflict-riddled 
process, are a source of tension with disagreement over the structure of 
the Somali state. Another latent issue is the fragility of state institutions 
themselves that are unable to contain and address conflict through pro-
cesses and systems. This leads political or business disagreements to spread 
to the public sphere. The inability of the Somali state to protect and sup-
port its citizens is also another issue which pushes civilians to seek alterna-
tive sources of power and survival.
In this complex and fragile context, the number and diversity of actors 
working in Somalia, from states to international institutions, and NGOs, 
with different values, approaches, and priorities, can cause harm. Based on 
the information gathered from the interviews, the approach of some actors 
in Somalia, such as the UAE, Ethiopia, Kenya, and AMISOM, is distrusted 
by Somalis.31 A noteworthy point is the fact that rather than being the 
most welcome in Somalia, some actors from other African states are often 
the least welcome. This is important in highlighting that the  sentiments 
and perceptions of the local population in environments emerging from 
conflict play a big role in the success of peacebuilding initiatives.
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Not all activities conducted in the name of building peace appear to be 
contributing toward this objective. In the crowded donor environment 
and the fragile security situation in Somalia, the level of coordination and 
cooperation required for donors to be conflict sensitive is almost impos-
sible without stifling the efficiency, aptness, and therefore effectiveness 
of programs. This is one of the main differences in the approach of tra-
ditional donors and that of other recent actors in Somalia. As previously 
mentioned, while traditional actors are said to focus more on systems, 
checks and balances, new actors such as the UAE and Turkey appear more 
concerned with the quick delivery of products or services. One inter-
viewee stated that Somalis value tangible projects, and the problem for 
traditional donors is that systems cannot appear overnight and as a result 
of their focus on this, less is expected from them.32
Turkey’s peacebuilding initiatives in Somalia highlight important 
alternative approaches, while offering vital lessons for all stakeholders 
to improve upon. The Somalia case study reveals several best practices, 
implemented by the Turkish state and its agencies that may be applied to 
other post-conflict reconstruction settings. Deployment of personnel in 
conflict-affect areas, consulting and responding quickly to stakeholder’s 
and recipient’s needs, refraining from securitizing and attaching condi-
tions to aid, avoiding middle-men or brokers in order to avert security 
risks, engaging local partners, and not overcrowding the fragile institu-
tions of the host country’s vital bureaucracy are some of the approaches 
that Turkey brings to the spectrum. Some of these modes of engagement 
are similar to those espoused by traditional donors. However, while tradi-
tional donors appear to become stalled in the processes of ensuring princi-
ples are followed Turkey shows more flexibility and openness to changing 
procedures to meet the goal.
The Somali case study has also affirmed that there is still room for 
improvement for Turkey’s peacebuilding activities in Somalia. The bilat-
eral engagement on the ministerial level with Somali entities, without 
informing other Turkish state organizations, leads to overcrowding of the 
theater and waste of resources. Although Turkey has taken concrete steps 
to address some of these issues by coordinating some of its efforts with 
the international community and organizations, on a domestic level inter-
agency cooperation still lags. Worse, institutional and legislative remedies 
to unravel this knot linger. Therefore, Turkey should use the Somalia case 
to single out some of its coordination issues and devise a solution that can 
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be generalized to uproot similar problems that recur in Turkey’s other 
overseas missions.
Turkey’s diplomatic and humanitarian presence in Somalia demon-
strates more than anything the resolve of rising powers to supporting frag-
ile states in reconstruction. Somalia, contemplated by many as risky for 
humanitarian work, indicates the resolve of new actors in hedging the risks 
and intervening not just where there is peace to keep. This is quite in line 
with recommendations from the UN Advisory Panel for the review of the 
Peacebuilding Architecture, which posits that peacebuilding should cut 
across the conflict spectrum and not only come when normalcy has been 
established.
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IntroductIon
The positive movement towards political and economic reformation in 
Myanmar, (also known as Burma), began in the wake of reform processes 
since 2010 to the current administration under President Thein Sein, and 
has attracted the attention of various international actors interested in 
assisting the Myanmar government, economically and politically. Central 
to this attention has been the ongoing peacebuilding process in Myanmar, 
specifically the potential war-to-peace transition in the country as cease- 
fires and other political agreements between the Myanmar government 
and armed opposition forces are crafted. Both traditional partners as well 
as new actors in Myanmar diplomacy have developed policies and have 
approached the country’s government to gather more information about 
how they could contribute positively to building sustainable peace in the 
country. This question became more pressing during the period leading 
up to the state elections on 8 November 2015. This vote, while not per-
fect, was the most inclusive in the country in decades, and was seen as a 
barometer on the overall reform process as well as ongoing attempts to 
develop a peace plan for the periphery of the country. The landslide win by 
the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by former dissident 
Aung San Suu Kyi, promised to jump start many needed reforms in the 
country. Although the military-backed constitution prevented Ms. Suu 
Kyi from assuming the position of president, she currently serves as ‘State 
Councillor’, a position akin to that of a prime minister, and also holds the 
positions of Foreign Minister and Minister of the Office of the President. 
Her colleague within the NLD. Mr Htin Kyaw, assumed office in March 
2016. After her first year in office, she acknowledged that much more 
work needed to be down in the areas of governmental reform, economic 
development and peacebuilding, and in March 2017 suggested that she 
would be in a position to step down if the public was dissatisfied with her 
performance.
When speaking of the ‘reform’ processes in Myanmar at present, one 
can identify four separate streams which can be differentiated but are 
nonetheless very closely tied together as this report will examine:
 1. A transition from military rule to an intermediate ‘mixed’ system of 
civilian-military governance, with the promise of a return to full 
civilian administration and democratic institutions in the near term.
 2. The end of civil conflicts in the periphery of Myanmar as govern-
mental and opposition forces agree to a cease-fire and a peaceful 
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resolution to political disputes which have plagued the country for 
over five decades.
 3. The conversion of the Myanmar economy from a command system 
to a liberalising one, developing stronger trade ties and private busi-
ness development. This is key to alleviating the ongoing problem of 
widespread poverty, which is viewed not only as a socio-economic 
crisis but also a security threat.
 4. The expansion and diversification of Myanmar’s diplomatic contacts 
not only with other Asian governments, (including ASEAN), but 
also with major international actors including Western Europe and 
the United States.
This study of new actors in peacebuilding focuses on the role of external 
players in the second of these four processes, but mindful of how that pro-
cess relates to the other three vital areas of reform that Myanmar has been 
undertaking. The study focuses especially on two countries which have 
played differing but prominent roles in peacebuilding, namely China and 
Indonesia. These countries represent three distinct types of actors in terms 
of their engagement in the country. Indonesia represents an emerging 
actor in Myanmar’s diplomacy, both as a single player as well as a promi-
nent member of ASEAN. Indonesia is still often categorised as a develop-
ing country but for the last decade or so has been viewed as an emerging 
market and as a stabilising force in Southeast Asian security. Jakarta has 
been seeking to develop its peacebuilding policies in recent years, with 
Myanmar being as a key case study. Bilateral relations were established 
during the early period of Indonesia’s independence in January 1948, and 
solidified after Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, a move supported by 
most governments in the region, including Indonesia.
On the other hand, China represents another new actor in peacebuild-
ing arena with different characteristics. In some ways, calling China a 
‘new’ actor in Myanmar peacebuilding is a mis-categorisation, given that 
the two neighbouring countries have had longstanding diplomatic and 
economic contacts since the independence of Burma, and Beijing was one 
of the few regional governments to maintain ties with Myanmar during 
that country’s period of diplomatic isolation between the late 1980s and 
2010. However, in recent years China has been seeking to improve its 
identity in Myanmar through various diplomatic initiatives, due to public 
concerns about both its dominant role in the Myanmar economy as well 
as its previous good relations with the pre-reform military governments 
(SLORC and its successor, the SPDC).
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Since 2014, there have been disputes across the Sino-Myanmar bor-
der, as well as signs of a cooling in political relations between the two 
states. Beijing nonetheless continues to see Myanmar as a vital partner 
both in energy trade as well as the ambitious plans of President Xi Jinping 
to develop port facilities in the Indian Ocean as part of China’s ‘Belt and 
Road’ regional development initiatives first introduced by the Xi Jinping 
government in 2013. Beijing is wary of the possibility of enhanced Western 
engagement in Myanmar, seeing warming relations with the United States 
as especially difficult given the current strategic ‘rebalancing’ policy in Asia 
announced by the Obama administration in 2011 which many policymak-
ers in China have perceived as tacit containment of Chinese power.
As a response, Beijing has been seeking to develop greater soft power in 
Myanmar in the face of developing diplomatic and trade competition from 
the West, especially the United States, Western Europe, and Australia, 
but also from Japan, India and other governments in Asia. Although it is 
likely that the next government in Myanmar will continue to diversify the 
country’s foreign policy and possibly return to a more non-aligned strate-
gic identity which was the norm before the end of the 1980s, Beijing by 
necessity will continue to be a major part of Myanmar’s regional relations 
given China’s status as a rising power and due to geographic realities.
This project seeks to compare the approaches to peacebuilding under-
taken by these three external actors to gauge their policies as well as mea-
sure their successes on different levels in the transition period leading up 
to the November 2015 elections and beyond. After the analyses of these 
case studies, it will useful to briefly analyse comparative cases of other dis-
tinct peacebuilding actors in Myanmar, namely Norway as well as India, 
Japan and Switzerland, to provide further information regarding similari-
ties and differences in approaches to peacebuilding concepts and practices. 
These four external actors for reasons of economy, focus and parsimony, 
but there are of course many other examples of foreign actors which have 
also begun to engage Myanmar, both economically and politically.
The two main cases of China and Indonesia are perceived as new (or 
emerging) actors, although arguably neither term is wholly accurate, 
whereas Norway and Switzerland are more ‘traditional’ Western donors. 
Japan can be seen as a ‘returning’ actor given that Tokyo’s diplomatic 
and economic presence in what was then Burma was very strong until 
the 1980s, and India is certainly not a stranger to Myanmar politics, but 
has been at best a minor actor in peacebuilding but is seeking to take 
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advantage of the developing reforms to better improve its position, both 
on a unilateral basis as well as due to concerns about Beijing’s growing 
strategic presence in the Indian Ocean.
IndonesIa’s engagement In myanmar
Rationales and Strategic Objectives
While Indonesia’s engagement in Myanmar’s transition, particularly in the 
area of peacebuilding, can be viewed as relatively recent, the foundation of 
the relationship between the two countries goes back more than half a cen-
tury. Burma was listed as one of the first countries to recognise Indonesia’s 
struggle for independence, and the two governments appreciated each 
other’s independence struggles with European colonial powers. In 1947, 
only two years after Indonesia’s founding fathers President Soekarno and 
Vice-President Mohammad Hatta declared the country’s independence 
from colonial powers, the Burmese government gave permission to open 
an Indonesian Office in Rangoon (now Yangon). The Burmese leaders at 
that time even addressed the Indonesian diplomats as representatives of 
the Republic of Indonesia in front of the Dutch authorities who at that 
time refused to acknowledge Indonesia’s independence.
During those difficult times, in 1949 the Burmese government accepted 
the request of the Indonesian government to allow for Indonesian Dakota 
RI-001 aircraft to land in Mingladon Airport, Rangoon and later helped 
to set up the first commercial Indonesian Airways in Burma. Furthermore, 
the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, together with Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru, continued to rally support for Indonesia’s strug-
gle against its former colonial power by organising the Conference on 
Indonesia in New Delhi to condemn military activities conducted by the 
Dutch (Indonesia Embassy 2001).
Bilateral relations were very much watered down during Myanmar’s 
isolationist period. Myanmar under the socialist system, which led to 
later economic traumas, created even less incentive for ASEAN countries, 
including Indonesia, to revoke its relations with the country. Hopes that 
Myanmar would be in a position to join ASEAN were dashed in the wake 
of the uprising which broke out in August 1988, followed by the consoli-
dation of military rule in the country and the annulment of the results of 
the 1990s elections. ASEAN as the only regional organisation in the area, 
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was heavily pressured to respond to the situation. Even after Myanmar 
joined ASEAN, relations between the country and other members were 
brittle, especially in the wake of the 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’ and the 
government’s mishandling of aid after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.
Compared with China, Indonesia has fewer geopolitical and geo- 
economic interests in Myanmar. Indonesia shares no border with 
Myanmar, and strengthening bilateral economic ties has been a struggle 
especially due to the low interest from the Indonesia’s business sectors 
in venturing into Myanmar’s still-emerging market. One of the results 
from the Second Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) 
between Indonesia and Myanmar in late December 2011, the two lead-
ers committed to increase the trade volume to US$500 million by 2015 
(Zaw 2012). Then around one year later, during the third meeting of the 
JCBC, as a follow-up to President Yudhoyono’s state visit to Naypyitaw 
in April 2013, the two countries raised the expectation to achieve US$1 
billion trade value by 2016 (Winarti 2013). Nevertheless, there are several 
means to explain Indonesia’s motivations to engage with Myanmar. The 
first is at the domestic level. Based on the elaborations above, a long-term 
relationship which was established since the early period of Indonesia’s 
independence between the two countries has created a solid basis for 
the Indonesian government throughout the history to develop ties with 
Myanmar. Due to generous pre-independence support given by Myanmar 
in the past, Indonesian policymakers have an implicit ‘indebted’ feeling, 
which has obliged the country to return the favour to Myanmar.
The second domestic factor is a combination of Indonesia’s internal 
need and ambition to spread its newly adopted value—democracy—in the 
region in order to create an improved environment for its own democracy 
to grow at home. In the wake of the 1998 protests and the first direct 
presidential elections in 2004 which brought to power Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, Indonesia managed to overcome its internal political and eco-
nomic challenges to install a civilian government after thirty-two years of 
semi-authoritarian government during the New Order era (1965–1998), 
and embrace democracy as its new identity. Besides implementing various 
policies at the domestic level to deepen its democratic project—direct elec-
tions, autonomy, security sector reform, and so on, interestingly Indonesia 
has been also aiming high to project its democracy abroad, in order to 
create a supporting environment for its own democracy to grow to the 
fullest. As elucidated by former Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda,  ‘[S]
ince a democracy works best in a democratic environment, we should also 
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like to see the further growth of democratic values in our own neighbour-
hood.’ (Wirajuda 2005).
Myanmar has become a focus for Indonesia to project its democracy 
for various reasons. Other than historical debts, more importantly because 
the two countries see some similarities between them. Indonesia was once 
under the rule of General Soeharto during the 32 years of New Order 
era, which is very much the situation Myanmar is currently in. During 
the era of President Yudhoyono, who was a retired general, Indonesia 
enjoyed special relationships compared to other countries which allowed 
its engagement with Myanmar to flourish, even allowing for some dia-
logue on sensitive issues such as the ongoing Rohingya question. One 
of the reasons, as mentioned by an Indonesian foreign ministry official is 
simply because the Myanmar government is comfortable working with a 
government which has a history of ‘military thinking’, and still has mili-
tary issues to resolve in politics (Macan-Markar 2013). This is particularly 
true as both countries are facing challenges of ethnic conflicts as well as 
separatism in their territories. Both governments are also facing gaps in 
the relations between the majority and minority groups, notably along 
the religious lines—Indonesia is majority Muslim while Myanmar has a 
Buddhist majority. Therefore, at least from these aspects, there are some 
modalities to tap on for Indonesia to projecting its democracy.
Regional factors have also shaped Indonesia’s recent policies. Myanmar’s 
location in the Southeast Asian region, and also its proximity to China and 
India, means that whatever happens in Myanmar immediately comes to 
the attention of countries in the region and of ASEAN itself. Indonesia’s 
interest in engagement is further fuelled by its more consistently defining 
itself as a natural leader in the region and in ASEAN, which Myanmar offi-
cially joined in 1996. Indonesia has more or less shared the same interests 
with other ASEAN member countries’ founding members on the need 
to embrace the Indochina countries and bring them into ASEAN, par-
ticularly in the case of Myanmar, which the organisation granted observer 
status to in 1991. The biggest interest of ASEAN at that time was to 
restrain increasing Chinese influence in the region which was seen as 
breaking Myanmar’s traditional neutralism and transforming the coun-
try into China’s ‘satellite’ in the region as well as creating an entry point 
for Beijing to better influence Southeast Asia, given China’s long border 
with Myanmar and the latter country’s placement on the Indian Ocean 
(Weatherbee 2009), which has emerged as an essential maritime trade 
route for Beijing as it enhances its trade with Africa and the Middle East.
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Moreover, ASEAN’s founding members, including Indonesia,1 viewed 
engagement with Myanmar as crucial to close the loophole for major pow-
ers, especially Western countries, to intervene unilaterally in the region. 
Due to severe criticism from those outside powers, particularly the United 
States, over Myanmar’s human rights violations, there has been a very 
strong interest from ASEAN countries for Southeast Asia to become an 
autonomous regional order where the members become masters of their 
own region, as indicated in Indonesia’s initiatives back in 1971, and even 
now in the post-2015 agenda, to establish the ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN) in ASEAN (Anwar 2005). Relations between 
Myanmar and other ASEAN members, especially Thailand, remain prob-
lematic in some areas, but since the reform process in Myanmar began five 
years ago more doors have been opened for a deepening of the Myanmar- 
ASEAN relationship.
Types of Engagement
Generally, Indonesia’s engagements with Myanmar have been established 
in most sectors, especially in political, economic, development, and mili-
tary ones. Compared to other actors in the region, such as Singapore, 
Thailand and China, Indonesia can be considered as relatively newcomer 
in term of its economic engagement with the country. It can be said that 
Indonesia has within the past few years begun to reap some economic 
benefits from the country’s carefully tended engagement with the military 
regime in Myanmar.
In 2014, total exports from Indonesia to Myanmar reached US$566 
million in value which dominated by non-oil commodities, such as palm 
oil, cigarettes, clothing (sarong), and traditional medicines. Alternatively, 
Indonesia’s imports from Myanmar rose significantly from US$73 mil-
lion in 2013 to US$122 million in 2014, and dominated by non-oil 
commodities such as beans, especially mung beans and soybeans and 
also seafood products (Kompas 2009). In 2015, the Indonesian gov-
ernment was exploring the establishment of direct banking connec-
tions and to allow more flight connections between the two countries 
(Garuda Indonesia 2015). Then, to boost investments in Myanmar, cur-
rent Indonesian President Joko Widodo, during the ASEAN Summit in 
Naypyidaw in 2014, announced plans to augment Indonesia’s invest-
ments in Myanmar in three sectors: mining, telecommunications and 
infrastructure (Dunia 2014).
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 Non-Political Engagements
There are several sectors in the Myanmar economy which Indonesian 
companies have just recently become involved in within the past five years, 
including construction, telecommunication, and banking. Some lead-
ing construction companies such as Ciputra Group, Lippo Group, and 
Wijaya Karya (WIKA) have shown interest in taking advantage of almost 
15% increase within the period of 2009–2013 in Myanmar’s construction 
needs. WIKA has undertaken a US$270 million multifunctional develop-
ment project in Yangon, involving commercial and residential units to be 
accomplished in 2017. Lippo Group, on the other hand, has been plan-
ning to invest US$1 billion to building 20 hospitals over the next three 
to five years and also aimed to seek opportunities in retail sector (Firdaus 
2015; Antara News 2015). In 2013, the Indonesian state-owned tele-
communication company Telkom won the tender to participate in mod-
ernising the information and communication technology in the country 
(Telkom 2013). Later on, in banking sector, the Indonesian state-owned 
bank, Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) just built its first representative office 
in Yangon in November 2014 (Sipahutar 2014).
In the development area, Myanmar has been regarded as one of key 
partners to be engaged under Indonesia’s framework of South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) of Indonesia. As a result of the second 
Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) between Indonesia 
and Myanmar, as recorded in the Blue Book on Indonesia-Myanmar 
Capacity Building Partnership, Indonesia has committed itself to pro-
viding assistance in the form of training and seminars/workshops as well 
as experts in the area of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), micro- 
finance, national reconciliation, agriculture, local governance and media 
during the period of 2013–2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). The 
Indonesian government, through its state-owned electricity company, also 
committed itself to providing technical consultation assistance to help 
Myanmar to address its national electricity losses which reached up to 26% 
(Xinhua 2013). Besides this regular assistance, Indonesia has also helped 
Myanmar during emergency situations including the aftermath of Cyclone 
Nargis in 2008.2 Jakarta also donated US$1 million to the Tripartite Core 
Group, composed of three members from the Myanmar government, 
three members from ASEAN and three representatives from the United 
Nations, for the victims of Cyclone Nargis (Shin 2009).
In terms of military engagement, there are limited interactions, there 
have been limited interactions, including regular military training courses 
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and particularly on medical courses provided by the Indonesian armed 
forces so far. For the past two years, the Indonesian military has engaged 
in sharing specific knowledge and experiences on the role of the military in 
a democratic state. As of now, there are three military officers in Indonesia 
attending courses in the National Defence Institute (Lemhanas/Lembaga 
Ketahanan Nasional) in Myanmar.3 Recently, there has been interest from 
the Myanmar government to purchase various defence products produced 
by Indonesian companies to enhance the capabilities of Myanmar’s mili-
tary and police (Tempo 2014).
 Political Engagement
In addition to these economic and development engagements, Jakarta 
has been focusing further in its political engagements with Myanmar. 
However, this initiative, rather then being placed in a bilateral framework, 
was instead framed in a regional setting, especially through Indonesia’s 
aspiration to nurture its leadership role in ASEAN. The country has tried 
to regain its central role within ASEAN as soon as it was relatively able to 
cope with its internal struggles between 1998 and 2002. When Jakarta 
chaired ASEAN in 2003, it came up with a very aggressive proposal of 
creating ASEAN Security Community (ASC)—which later modified into 
ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC).
The most critical ideas brought forward by Indonesia within ASEAN at 
that time was to insert the new principles of democracy, good governance 
and rule of law, as well as the promotion and protection of human rights 
as ASEAN’s shared norms and values—points which were unthinkable or 
even an anathema for ASEAN to mention in the past, since some member 
countries are still categorised as ‘non-democratic’ or ‘semi-authoritarian’ 
states. Within this context, Indonesia has played an active role in persuad-
ing the non-democratic member countries of ASEAN toward observing 
these new ASEAN’s common values and norms—which then later even 
brought higher by creating the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) movement 
in 2008, with a mission to convert ASEAN countries into more robust 
democracies.
Indonesia’s political engagements—after Indonesia’s reformation era—
with Myanmar started in 2003 when the Indonesian foreign minister Ali 
Alatas, a very capable diplomat, visited the country, after he was appointed 
as the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar. From the outset, no 
major breakthrough seemed to take place since the military junta contin-
ued to run the Myanma political affairs as usual. Even four years later, in 
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2007, when President Yudhoyono sent a retired reformist general, Agus 
Widjojo, to Myanmar, officially to attend the funeral of former Prime 
Minister Soe Win, but with a mission to convince the military junta to 
start thinking about political reform following the brutal military crack-
down of anti-government protests led by Buddhist monks, nothing can be 
claimed as a significant result. The Indonesian president could not even get 
a guarantee that his plan to visit the country would bring some significant 
outcome, which then made him eventually postpone his visit indefinitely 
simply not to lose face. The momentum then arrived for Indonesia to 
again reassert its role, this time in a deeper fashion, after Cyclone Nargis.
Immediately after the disaster laid waste to much of Myanmar, the mili-
tary junta shut down access for humanitarian aid to enter the country and 
help the victims, despite the authorities’ lack of capabilities to provide such 
emergency relief. Indonesia’s then-foreign minister, Hassan Wirajuda, 
known for pushing ASEAN to embrace new principles of democracy and 
human rights, took the initiative to place ASEAN at the forefront, since 
entreaties from many Western governments to persuade the junta to allow 
emergency ingress into Myanmar came to no avail. Aside from Indonesia’s 
humanitarian assistance to send capable experts involved in dealing with 
Indian Ocean tsunami disaster in Aceh back in 2004, more importantly 
Jakarta played an instrumental role to persuade the military junta, with 
some pressure, to reconsider its restrictions on foreign disaster assistance. 
The foreign minister, in one meeting, basically offered the Myanmar gov-
ernment two options. First, it can allow an ASEAN-led mechanism to help 
coordinating the whole humanitarian assistance that were coming in to 
the country. Second, the junta could simply do nothing but would have 
to explain what was the meaning of Myanmar joining ASEAN in the first 
place. As a result, ASEAN then was given the role of aid coordination as 
the Myanmar belatedly opened up access for humanitarian assistance to 
flow into the country.
It is important to note that rather than being a one-way effort, 
Indonesia’s overall engagement with Myanmar was made possible due to 
Myanmar’s developing interests towards Indonesia’s political processes 
from the very beginning. Under the New Order era, led by President 
Soeharto, a Burmese delegation at that time led by the then-Chief of 
Intelligence Unit Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt visited Indonesia in 
December 1993 to study the Indonesian military’s ‘dual function’, defence 
and politics, system. Such interest has still been expressed today, since 
such a system has been perceived by many stakeholders in Myanmar as 
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providing a gradual and stable transition from military into full civilian-led 
government in later years. Furthermore, many stakeholders in Myanmar 
also expressed interest in learning about Pancasila, the formal philosophi-
cal foundations of the State of Indonesia, particularly the idea of Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika (‘Unity in Diversity’), the official maxim of Indonesia, since 
the two countries have shared almost similar challenges with ethnic diver-
sity and associated periodic political tensions.
While there has been some internal criticisms of the Indonesia gov-
ernment to be late when it comes to reaping the benefits of its early 
political investments in Myanmar, to some extent there is an interesting 
finding that such ‘unfortunate’ situation has somehow situated Indonesia 
in a better position compared to other actors, such as China, India and 
Japan, which have expanded their economic interests in the country 
(Chachavalpongpun 2010). Indonesia has been able to secure more trust 
to play a role of peace-builder, which will be elucidated in the next section, 
due to its relatively low-key presence in terms of business or economic 
activities in Myanmar so far.
Role in Peacebuilding/Peace-Related Areas
Indonesia’s governmental role in peacebuilding in Myanmar is unique, in 
the sense that it has been directed more towards larger and more high- 
level contexts, including projecting democracy as the basic foundation to 
create sustainable peace. Here, Jakarta has been focusing itself to share its 
experiences in democratic transitions, including on how to manage with 
the ‘messy’ side effects of such processes. What makes it different is the 
emphasis on the usage of ‘democratic’ methods that are different from 
what the traditional actors, mainly Western countries, used to apply.
It is certainly not an easy task to grasp how the Indonesia policymakers 
define the term peacebuilding. When directly asked about their under-
standing on the term, most of them relate it with the UN definition, in 
which peacebuilding is a set of activities conducted after peace has been 
relatively achieved through the sigining of peace agreement between the 
conflicting parties. Within this context, then, some argued that peace-
building itself is relatively a new experience for Indonesia and the country 
has just started to learn the process during the Aceh peace process which 
taken place after the Tsunami disaster severely hit the province in the end 
of 2004. As stated by one general, “Peacebuilding is also something new 
for Indonesia. We learn it in the case of Aceh. There is no template, we just 
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follow the needs of the ground.”4 This argument has been confirmed by 
Indonesia’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he went on to describe 
how the Indonesian government at that time involved in the process 
to bring former combatants from Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka) group members to enter into normal civilian life, including to 
regulate the distribution of lands and establishment of local government.5
Then, when asked whether Indonesia’s roles in Myanmar can be cat-
egorised as peacebuilding efforts, most of them were not too sure. This is 
reflected from the comment given by the former Indonesian Ambassador 
to Myanmar (2008–2013), Sebastianus Sumarsono, when being inter-
viewed regarding Indonesia’s active role in the country:
I am not sure whether those things are part of peacebuilding … Not only in 
peacebuilding, but in many aspects of life we participate in helping Myanmar.
Such a view was also confirmed by Minister Wirajuda as he argued 
that it is hard to say that peacebuilding has taken place in Myanmar since 
peacemaking has not taken place in the country.6
Principles
There are several principles upheld by the Indonesian government to 
indicate democratic ideas in its engagement with Myanmar. The first, 
and the most important, is sharing. Fully aware of differences between 
the two countries, the idea behind this sharing is to provide Myanmar, 
once an isolationist state, with real evidence that transition into a demo-
cratic civilian-led government is not an impossible idea, as demonstrated 
in the Indonesian case. It is always debatable whether Indonesia’s past 
experience, with its dual-function military and semi-authoritarian regime, 
is a good example to present. However, one argues that at least the 
Indonesian case presents an alternative to the Myanmar’s leaders for the 
country to follow in walking the path of limited democratic reform and 
economic development (Renshaw 2013). Based on interviews with sev-
eral Indonesian stakeholders, the ‘sharing’ activities conducted so far are 
aimed not only to share best practices, but also more importantly dis-
cuss Indonesia’s  mistakes of the past, which should not to be repeated in 
Myanmar. Moreover, by elucidating the concept of ‘sharing’, Indonesia 
positions itself not as being superior to its Myanmar counterpart, with the 
former dictating to the latter, but rather as a partner on equal footing.
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The second principle, which is the consequence of the ‘sharing’ 
approach, is to work at the pace that is comfortable for all, especially the 
partner country, while giving some pressures when necessary. For the 
engagement to achieve success, Indonesia believes that it is important 
spend more energy and time to build confidence and trust, especially with 
the government, and wait until the initiative for change comes from the 
local stakeholders in order to grow the sense of ownership of the reform 
process. According to one director in MoFA, the approach should be 
based ‘on their request, not ours because it involves changing of the cul-
ture and mindset of the society [regarding the democracy promotion]’.7 
Such an approach often been criticised not only by Western countries, but 
also by some segments of Indonesian society, as being too accommoda-
tive, powerless, or even ineffective. However, the Indonesian government 
particularly believes that it is very crucial not to give an impression of 
seeking to impose a worldview on others, as it may create counterpro-
ductive results. Former Minister Hassan Wirajuda when confronted with 
this criticism, made an interesting argument as he described Indonesia’s 
approach to Myanmar when it persuaded the military junta to receive an 
ASEAN-led humanitarian assistance into the country in the aftermath of 
Cyclone Nargis disaster. According to him, Indonesia at that time actu-
ally made a straightforward movement by ‘taking the bull by its horn’ 
when the Indonesian government challenged the regime in Myanmar to 
consider the meaning of its participation in ASEAN should the ASEAN- 
led proposal also being rejected. While he strongly disagree with sanction 
mechanism to ‘punish’ Myanmar, as implemented by many Western coun-
tries, Wirajuda argued that there is no reason not to be able to apply what 
he called as ‘constructive engagement’ as shown from the case above. The 
spirit, according to him, should be like helping a family member in which 
‘rebuking’ is justified to the extent that such action would bring better 
result than sanctioning.8
Projects
There are various projects related to peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar 
which have been implemented so far. The major theme for Indonesia’s 
peacebuilding engagement in Myanmar is to sharing experiences in dem-
ocratic transition on topics such as military reform, election processes, 
capacity building for parliament and political parties, and recently also 
managing ethnic relations, especially related to ethnic minority groups 
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and questions of local autonomy/decentralisation. Those projects mainly 
took form in activities, such as visit, training, workshop, dialogue and 
so on which conducted by different agencies, starting from ministries, 
think tank institutions, local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
as well as international NGOs. The main implementing agency so far 
is the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), particularly the 
Directorate of Technical Cooperation which is responsible on all pro-
grammes within the framework of Indonesia’s South-South and Triangular 
Cooperation (SSTC), including Indonesia’s peacebuilding projects in 
Myanmar. Almost all of the projects,9 organised by government agencies 
as well as non-governmental institutions, were funded through a triangu-
lar framework, meaning that they received funding from the third parties.
One implementing institution, which is closely linked to the Indonesian 
MoFA, is the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD). The IPD, which is 
independent from the government in terms of its management and fund-
ing, was formed by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, with the support 
of the state-run Udayana University. Its original primary function was to 
implement the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF)—Indonesia’s ambitious 
intergovernmental forum to promote democracy by gathering countries 
which regard themselves as democratic to share their experiences to non- 
democratic countries but have ‘aspired to be more democratic’. The par-
ticipants are from across the Asia-Pacific as well as the Middle East, and 
Myanmar is also a member.10
Recently, the organisation has been transformed into a fully indepen-
dent institution which makes it no longer under the aegis of Udayana 
University. Specifically in Myanmar, IPD has organised different activi-
ties related to promotion of peace and democracy. Before designing cer-
tain programs/activities, the IPD first conducted the scoping mission in 
Myanmar to undertake needs assessment and scoping analyses, with the 
results being used to develop suitable programs and activities which would 
meet the expectations of different stakeholders in Myanmar.11 Based on 
consultations with the local stakeholders, the IPD implemented several 
activities in Myanmar, as illustrated in Table 9.1 below. Within those activ-
ities, most of the programmes were focused to provide capacity building 
in democracy and peace building, the role of media, parliament, political 
party, election, regional autonomy, ASEAN leadership, (especially when 
Myanmar was preparing to assume the ASEAN chair in 2014), a national 
human rights body, as well as administrative reform, development (agri-
culture) and economic decentralisation.
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Table 9.1 IPD’s programs in Myanmar 2013–2014
Program Place Date Counterparts/beneficiaries
1. Indonesia-Myanmar 








Myanmar MoFA, MISIS, MDRI 











Myanmar MoFA, MISIS, MDRI
3. Two-days dialogue on 







Fifty delegates from various 
institution in Myanmar, i.e. 
political parties, parliament 
members, MISIS, MDRI, 
Myanmar Peace Centre, Union 
Solidarity and Development 
Party (USDP), National League 




dialogue on parliamentary 
building 2014
Bali 7–9 April 
2014
Attended by 25 participants 
from Myanmar
5. Election visit program 
to the indonesian 
presidential election 2014 







MDRI, Myanmar Center for 
Strategic and International 
Studies
6. Workshop on sharing 
experiences on 
development institutions: 
can decentralization bring 








Academics, policy makers and 
government officials from 
Myanmar, Lao, and Vietnam
Sources: IPD’s website, and information from the Directorate of Technical Cooperation, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
On the subject of elections, Indonesia has carried out different pro-
grammes, such as capacity-building in election monitoring and security 
maintenance, during the Myanmar electoral process. Here, it is interest-
ing to note that while few projects were initiated and coordinated by the 
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Indonesian government, some others were actually initiated and carried 
out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including interna-
tional NGOs, while Indonesian cases have been selected as references for 
Myanmar to take the lessons from. Here, we can see some useful col-
laborations existing between traditional Western donors with Indonesian 
partners who have the knowledge and experiences to better engage with 
Myanmar under reform.
For example, during the Myanmar election in 2010, the Indonesian 
embassy in Yangon sent a team to five different regions in Myanmar as 
observers.12 Toward the upcoming national election in November 2015, 
Indonesia through the cooperation with different agencies has also been 
engaging to provide its support. As reported by local media, Indonesia has 
managed to provide some consultations to the Myanmar police in their 
preparation for election security requirements (Htoo 2015). Regarding 
the technicalities of election preparation, recently the Asia Foundation 
sponsored a tour for a delegation from Myanmar’s Union Election 
Commission (UEC) to visit Indonesia which included a meeting with the 
chair and commissioners of the Indonesian National Election Commission, 
the local election commission in Yogyakarta, as well as non-governmental 
organisations, such as Perludem, (the Indonesian Association for Elections 
and Democracy), Google’s Jakarta office on how it engaged Indonesia’s 
voters and provided access to 2014 elections information using online ser-
vices, the Institute for Inclusion and Advocacy of Persons with Disabilities 
(sIgab), and Solidaritas Perempuan which particularly focuses its advocacy 
work for women’s rights in Indonesia (Lee and Myint 2015).
Moreover, in the area of law enforcement, the Indonesian government 
in cooperation with the Myanmar government and the British govern-
ment organised an International Training on the Strengthening of Law 
Enforcement in Jakarta on 4–13 June 2015. The training was imple-
mented by Police Educational Institution, (Lembaga Pendidikan Polisi 
Republik Indonesia/Lemdikpol), and attended by twenty-five members of 
Myanmar Police force. According to the press release, such training was 
particularly designed to enhance the capacities of the local police in main-
taining safe environment in the upcoming election in November 2015. 
The Indonesian National Police has been specifically selected due to its 
previous experiences to provide similar capacity-building for Timor-Leste 
in 2013 and Afghanistan in 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).
Another noteworthy project was recently organised by the Habibie 
Centre (THC), which is a think-tank institution in Indonesia, in 
early August 2015  in collaboration with the Henry Dunant Centre 
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(HD Centre) Singapore. The project facilitated a study tour of the mem-
bers of the Union Election Commission (UEC) from Rakhine State in 
order to learn about Indonesia’s experiences to conduct peaceful elec-
tions in the post-conflict areas, particularly in Aceh and Ambon where 
segregation among the former conflicting parties still relatively exists. The 
delegation learned about the roles of the National Election Commission 
(Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU) and the National Election Monitoring 
Commission (Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum/Bawaslu), as well as 
the roles of the local NGOs and international NGOs to monitor the elec-
tion process.
In terms of security sector reform, besides the usual military-to- 
military engagement mentioned earlier, there were some projects carried 
out by think tank institutions. For example, the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta conducted two workshops on 
security sector reform in 2013 and 2014. The first workshop was held 
in Jakarta in September 2013, and attended by fifteen participants from 
Myanmar, comprised of ten high-ranking military officers and five repre-
sentatives from think tanks and NGOs. The second workshop was organ-
ised in January 2014  in Yangon, through the collaboration with local 
NGOs, and attended by around thirty local participants comprised of high 
ranking military officers, police officers, parliament members, advisers to 
the President, and high ranking officers from the Indonesian Ministry of 
Home Affairs, as well as academics and NGOs representatives. In those two 
workshops, the Indonesian counterparts, especially the Indonesian retired 
generals who involved in the reform process shared about Indonesia’s 
military transition process from the dual military system to becoming a 
professional military, democratic civilian control, human rights, as well 
as law enforcement to sustain peace process in conflict-prone areas. The 
Myanmar representatives specifically expressed their enthusiasm to learn 
from Indonesia’s experiences in promoting conflict resolution in Aceh, 
specifically in regards to the Aceh insurgency from 1976 to 2005, as well 
as on addressing the root causes of other communal conflicts in Indonesia.
Another issue, which probably the most salient one in Indonesia’s peace-
building activities in Myanmar, is the commitment to assist the Myanmar 
government in dealing with problems related to ethnic groups, especially 
in relation to the controversial Rohingya issue. Members of the Muslim 
Rohingya community in Rakhine State in western Myanmar claim that 
they are a legal minority within Myanmar, but members of the Myanmar 
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government do not recognise that status, and often eschew the very term 
‘Rohingya’, instead referring to the persons in question as ‘Bengali’ and 
implying that they are migrants from neighbouring Bangladesh without 
claims to Myanmar citizenship. As a country with the world’s largest 
Muslim community, Indonesia needs to address the concerns and pres-
sures from its constituents at home to stop the massive violence and dis-
crimination against the Rohingya ethnic group. Such pressures turned out 
to be a serious regional security threat as a group of Muslim extremists 
launched bomb threats against Buddhist religious facilities, as well as the 
Myanmar embassy in Jakarta, in 2013 (Institute for Policy Analysis of 
Conflict n.d.). At the same time, Indonesia also faces real challenges due 
to the influx in mid-2015 of Rohingya boat people from Myanmar enter-
ing into its territory by boats. Indonesia and Malaysia have so far agreed to 
provide temporary shelters for seven thousand Rohingya Muslims refugees 
and migrants from Myanmar and Bangladesh (Guardian 2015). However, 
violence in Rakhine state between Myanmar armed forces and Rohingya 
militants continues to plague the current Myanmar government.
Indonesia has provided development assistance to the Rakhine state 
in the form of financial and technical aid. While such action is not neces-
sarily distinct, what is important to highlight is the way the Indonesian 
government took on a more balanced approach in order to quench 
the perception of Rohingya problem as a religious conflict of Muslims 
vs. Buddhists. Indonesia decided not to give support on the OIC’s 
(Organization of Islamic Countries) approach to only aid the Muslim 
community in Rohingya, despite of its status as a member in the organ-
isation, a move which would undoubtedly be rejected by the Myanmar 
government (IRIN News 2012). Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla, 
who was the Chairman of the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), back in 2012, 
stated that the PMI would be, by necessity, non-partisan in its assistance 
in Rakhine state, as he reflected on the ways which the Indonesian gov-
ernment addressed similar ethnic conflicts in Indonesia itself in the past 
(Taufiqurrahman 2012). One year later, Indonesia also built four schools 
in Rakhine state, using a donation from the Indonesian government with 
a total of US$1 million (Antara News 2014). Two schools have been dedi-
cated to the Muslim community while two others were built for the local 
Buddhist community.
Aside to government’s efforts, NGO also plays certain peacebuilding 
role in dealing with ethnic problems in Rakhine state. Muhammadiyah, 
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for example, as one of the largest religious based NGO in Indonesia has 
collaborated with other NGOs in the region, including one local NGO in 
Myanmar, to explore possible areas of peacebuilding where it can partici-
pate in dealing with the Rohingya issue.13
Achievements/Measuring Results
Despite Indonesia’s active engagement in peacebuilding in Myanmar, so 
far the government has not developed any standard monitoring and evalu-
ation mechanisms in order to measure achievements as well as to evaluate 
past mistakes/failures from the projects. It is indeed a challenging task to 
measure of what has been achieved so far from Indonesia’s engagement 
in peacebuilding in Myanmar for two reasons. First, there is simply no 
standard mechanism created by the government to monitor and evaluate 
projects of this nature. What normally exists is internal project evaluation 
applied by the donor/funding institutions or agencies, which cannot be 
shared for public consumption. For projects implemented by government 
agencies/ministries, each implementing body or ministry usually does not 
have any obligation to conduct any monitoring and evaluation processes. 
Even if such monitoring does take place, the data collected is usually not 
shared with the public.
Second, and more importantly, Indonesia has been focusing its engage-
ment more on the political aspects of the Myanmar reform process and 
long-term projects more than working on short-term and specific or clearly 
defined areas. The ‘sharing’ approach basically emphasizes the sharing of 
ideas, knowledge and experiences and it is almost impossible to measure 
it quickly to what extent such ideas or experiences have been taken and 
influenced the policies of the Myanmar stakeholders.
The best indicator to measure results or achievements, as suggested 
by Myanmar and Indonesian stakeholders, would be to see the level of 
trust and confidence shown by the elites in Myanmar towards Indonesia’s 
active engagement in the country. For example, the interest expressed 
from  high- ranking military officers, high-level public officials, and also 
recently from the representatives of ethnic groups from Myanmar to par-
ticipate in various events that involved Indonesian institutions as resources 
have shown a considerable success. Based on the interviews with different 
Indonesian stakeholders, they have been urged to continue the projects 
or even to come up with new projects.14 But have we seen any changed 
behaviour? Interestingly, the request for more exchanges in the educational 
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sector to better introduce Indonesia to more sectors of Myanmar society, 
especially among Myanmar’s youth, can be seen from both sides.15 From 
a positive perspective, it can be another indicator that Myanmar society 
welcomes Indonesia’s deeper engagement in the country, but from a 
more negative perspective we can also see that Indonesia’s activities so far 
have only been concentrated on elites, and have not reached the greater 
Myanmar society, yet.
Such trust could also be seen in the most sensitive issue of ethnic 
relations in Rakhine state. While initiatives from many countries and 
international organisations to help were turned down by the Myanmar 
government, President Thein Sein formally asked Indonesia during the 
21st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2012, despite the fact 
that the country is majority Muslim, to help his government in resolving 
ethnic tensions in Rakhine state (Santosa 2012).
Another interesting piece of evidence appeared when President Joko 
Widodo was received as the first guest, among other ASEAN countries, by 
President Thein Sein on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in November 
2014 in Naypyidaw, although not many issues were directly discussed by 
the two leaders. Indonesia has been welcome to expand its economic 
engagements in Myanmar, as President Thein Sein has encouraged his 
Indonesian counterpart to increase its investments, particularly to take 
advantage of the new policy that allows foreign banks to operate in the 
country (Otto 2014).
One unanticipated positive result from these engagements, as argued 
by some Indonesian stakeholders, is that instead of Myanmar simply learn-
ing from Indonesia’s experiences, a two-way learning process has evolved, 
in which Indonesia is also learning from its Myanmar counterparts. For 
example, according to Lt-Gen. (ret.) Agus Widjojo, who was actively 
involved in the Indonesian military reform process, Myanmar actually has 
a better sense of the supremacy of law as compared with Indonesia’s politi-
cal system. According to him, before the Myanmar military deployed in 
conflict-prone areas, such as in the northern regions, the government first 
issued a state of emergency status, while in the Indonesian case military 
action, in most cases, took place before issuing any regulations, placing 
the legality of the military actions into question right from the outset.16
Another example, as shared by a leading think-tank based in Jakarta, is 
the degree of openness shown by the stakeholders from Myanmar, includ-
ing from some of the country’s politicians. During one discussion held 
recently by the Habibie Center in Jakarta which addressed the topic on 
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election in post-conflict areas, the participants were involved in a very 
frank dialogue, an outcome which was not really expected due to the sen-
sitivity of the issue related to the minority group in Rakhine state.17
On the other hand, one of the concerns is about whether the high 
level of interest by Myanmar’s military towards Indonesia’s ‘dual function’ 
military policies in the past would suggest a delay in the process toward 
democratisation in Myanmar. At present, the constitutional amendment 
which requires twenty-five percent of seats in the upper and lower houses 
of the Myanmar parliament to be assumed by members of the Myanmar 
military will not be eliminated in the near future. Indonesia, by compari-
sons, is also struggling to ensure that its own democratisation process 
would not go backward. Former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Hassan Wirajuda described this description succinctly by noting:
During a workshop on security sector reform that I attended in Yangon 
earlier this year, senior Myanmarese military officers told me they had no 
intention of playing an active role in politics, unlike the Indonesian military 
of the past. […] They continued to ask the Indonesians why in the wake of 
reform, our military was able to quickly withdraw from its political role in 
2004, because they said they didn’t think they would be capable of doing it 
as fast as we did in Indonesia.
From the Indonesian side, we understood that their situation is different, 
but we reminded them that when Myanmar becomes a more democratic 
society in line with universal democratic values, the military will have to 
ultimately withdraw from the political stage. They are seriously consider-
ing this, but in terms of timing, it will not be as fast as what we achieved in 
Indonesia. This is nonetheless part of the process of Myanmar becoming an 
open and democratic society. (Wirajuda 2014)
Based on discussions with various Indonesian stakeholders, many chal-
lenges tend to come from within, rather than posed by the conditions in 
Myanmar. The first challenge is the view from some segments of Indonesian 
society that Indonesia is still far from having the capacity to project its own 
democracy and solutions to human rights problems, including some ethnic 
conflicts at home. Secondly, there is the problem of a lack of coordination 
among different agencies in Indonesia, especially among government insti-
tutions. Within the government, for example, while the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs conducted its diplomacy activities to open up communications and 
gain trust from the Myanmar government, the other relevant ministries are 
not really following up to take advantage by bringing in more investments 
into the country in order to reap some tangible economic benefits.




China is considered a ‘new’ actor in the Myanmar peacebuilding process 
despite the longstanding history between the two states since it has been 
only recently that Beijing has sought to modify its ‘hands-off’ approach to 
domestic politics in Myanmar and instead seek to participate more directly 
both in the war-to-peace transition in Myanmar as well as that country’s 
economic reform processes. What also makes the China case distinct is 
that the PRC is widely acknowledged to be rising great power and poten-
tial challenger to American policies in Asia, and has been traditionally very 
sensitive to the security of its borders.
There has been a largely unbroken political partnership between the 
two states ever since Burma became one of the earliest governments to 
recognize the People’s Republic in June 1950. Burma was also the first 
non-communist country to recognise the Maoist government in Beijing. 
Shortly afterwards, a period of what was called ‘Pauk Phaw’ (Sino-Burmese 
kinship) began, based on both states’ support for the ideas of peaceful co- 
existence and decolonisation (Yue 2014). However, Sino-Burmese rela-
tions experienced difficulties, and Burma found it difficult to escape the 
political eddies which were buffeting its northern neighbour during the 
Maoist era. In the late 1980s, when Myanmar began a period of intensified 
diplomatic isolation, spearheaded by the United States and Europe. China 
was one of the few major countries to maintain political and economic 
relations with the military junta.
By the 1990s and after, there were growing impressions by Western 
observers and policymakers that Myanmar had become a de facto subaltern 
state to Beijing, an impression which has often been overstated given the 
more complex political relationship between the two governments dur-
ing the cold war period. Military ties in the form of arms sales increased 
after that period, and Chinese legal and illegal migration to Myanmar also 
increased (Steinberg 2013).
Since the 1990s, energy cooperation has become a core interest in the 
Sino-Myanmar relationship. Oil and gas development projects prolifer-
ated, and in January 2015 the Maday Island oil pipeline which runs from 
the Myanmar coast to the Chinese city of Kunming in Yunnan province, 
formally began operations. Beijing has been seeking to develop alterna-
tive energy transit routes as an alternative to the Malacca Straits, through 
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which about eighty percent of China’s imported oil travels through from 
Africa and the Middle East (Meyer 2015). Despite the rapid drop in fos-
sil fuel prices since the end of 2014 and the slowing Chinese economy 
in 2015, access to foreign energy supplies remains a priority for Beijing, 
given the inherent uncertainty of long-term access. Myanmar remains an 
important partner in the development of these alternative routes as China 
seeks greater access to the Indian Ocean and a diversification of trade 
routes both for trade and for energy imports from the Middle East and 
Africa.
Other areas of bilateral energy cooperation have been more problematic, 
such as the Myitsone hydroelectric dam project, located in Kachin State in 
northern Myanmar and worth about US$3.6 billion and expected to pro-
vide power for China’s Yunnan province upon completion. Construction 
began in December 2009, but further work has been in abeyance since 
September 2011 out of concerns from the Myanmar government about 
the environmental and political impact of the project. In June 2014, 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang called upon the Myanmar government to 
restart the project, and Beijing remains hopeful that the construction can 
resume (Harvey 2011). Economic interdependence between China and 
Myanmar also grew considerably after the late 1980s, with Beijing seeing 
its southern neighbour as an idea test case for China’s developing ‘going 
out’ (zouchuqu 走出去) policies of expanding Chinese business interests 
on the regional and international levels. In addition to Myanmar’s utility 
as a transportation corridor into the Indian Ocean, Myanmar’s supply of 
raw materials and fossil fuels were also of great interest to Beijing as the 
Chinese economy began its ‘take-off’ phase (Yun Sun 2015). In 1988, as 
Myanmar was sinking further into diplomatic ostracism, Beijing signed an 
enhanced trade agreement with its southern neighbour, legalising direct 
cross-border trade and opening the door to military aid from Beijing 
(Legene and Ytzen 2014).
Despite some political differences, China is also remains a major sup-
plier of aid to the government of Myanmar, and here has been bilat-
eral consultation on a variety of areas including industrial development, 
education, corporate social responsibility, and environmental protec-
tion. Much Chinese aid and assistance has been in the form of infra-
structure, including transportation (roads and railways) as well as ports 
and communication.18 China has stressed the idea that peace and sta-
bility in Myanmar should be directly linked to combatting poverty and 
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underdevelopment, especially in rural areas, and so much of China’s eco-
nomic assistance has focused on rural regions of Myanmar including in 
the north.
The border regions remain a security problem for both states, how-
ever, as illustrated for example by the 2009 Kokang Incident, when fight-
ing between the Myanmar military and the rebel Myanmar National 
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a remnant of the CPB, resulted 
in an estimated ten thousand, and possibly as many as twenty thousand, 
refugees crossing the border into China’s Yunnan Province. This was the 
largest refugee flow into China since the Vietnam conflict in the 1970s, 
and the numbers of refugees crossing into Yunnan caught Chinese offi-
cials completely off guard (Storey 2009; Thant Myint-U 2011). The 
‘Kokang Incident’ also explained Beijing’s ongoing interest in Myanmar 
peacebuilding. Any uptick in violence in northern Myanmar could result 
in further refugee flows into China at a time when Beijing was seeking to 
push forward austerity measures in the wake of its economic slowdown 
after 2014.
Border security continues to be a sensitive issue between Beijing and 
Naypyidaw. On the Myanmar side, there have been concerns expressed in 
Myanmar policy circles that Beijing was maintaining at least tacit support 
to armed rebel groups along the border, including the United Wa State 
Army (UWSA) in northern Myanmar (Lintner 2015).19 Myanmar officials 
have been concerned Beijing views these northern armies as potential bar-
gaining chips in maintaining a solid diplomatic and economic relationship 
with its southern neighbour.
Bilateral Economic Relations
Despite the perception that China’s influence would be seriously diluted 
in the wake of the opening of Myanmar to new trading partners, including 
the West, as well as developing political differences, overall trade has con-
tinued to be strong, jumping from US$4.9 billion in FY 2012-3 to approx-
imately US$7.2 billion in FY 2014-5 (Central Statistical Organization 
2015). The addition of new potential trade and investment partners in 
Myanmar may actually be an advantage, rather than a liability for China 
since a diversification of economic partners would dampen the impression 
among some Myanmar policymakers that Beijing has too strong an influ-
ence on the Myanmar economy.
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As well, the issue of illegal logging, supported by Chinese labourers, 
came into focus in July 2015 when 155 Chinese nationals were sentenced 
to life imprisonment for illegal logging activities in northern Myanmar, a 
case complicated by the fact that the Myanmar government was reportedly 
seeking to send out a warning to foreign actors not only about engaging in 
such activities but also about conducting private business deals with ethnic 
militias in the north. Although all the Chinese workers sentences were 
released as part of a widespread amnesty by the Thein Sein government 
later that month, the incident further chilled Sino-Myanmar economic 
relations (New York Times 2015). Chinese authorities also expressed 
disappointment at the slow pace of the Letpadaung copper mine proj-
ect in the Sagaing Region of north-western Myanmar. Protests against 
the project have been common since 2012, and as one Chinese analyst 
argued, delays in the project could be traced to Myanmar’s ‘existing social 
contradictions’ that specifically targeted Chinese business interests in the 
country (Song 2015; Parameswaran 2015). Overall, there does appear to 
be growing support within the government of Myanmar to better vary its 
trade partners.
China and Myanmar also have the opportunity to strengthen their 
economic relationship via new multilateral initiatives. Myanmar was a 
founding member of the Beijing-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) in March 2015, and Myanmar became an early potential 
recipient of development funding via the financial institution as the bank 
began operations in 2016. A US$20 million power plant at Myingyan in 
the Mandalay region is currently under consideration for AIIB funding.20 
China’s ‘Belt and One Road’ (yidai yilu 一带一路), and its accompa-
nying ‘Silk Road Fund’, with an initial value of US$ 40 billion, orga-
nized by Beijing since 2013 may also be of future benefit to Myanmar. 
In an April 2015 interview with the Chinese news agency Xinhua, the 
Chair of Myanmar’s ruling USDP and presidential candidate, U Shwe 
Mann, expressed appreciation for the Silk Road projects, which are very 
likely to involve Myanmar given the country’s key geographic location 
(Wang 2015).
Chinese Diplomacy before and after the Elections
Although China wishes to maintain robust relations with the current 
Myanmar government, Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the opposition 
National League of Democracy (NLD), was invited to Beijing in June 
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2015 and had a direct dialogue with President Xi Jinping, a sign that 
China was still placing a great deal of importance on its Myanmar rela-
tions after the elections and is preparing for a time when the number of 
Myanmar’s foreign policy links will grow and become more diverse.
Cognisant of the current challenges to its reputation in Myanmar, the 
government of China has sought to take more of a soft power approach 
towards its southern neighbour. First, Beijing has attempted to play a 
mediating role in the ongoing peace talks in Myanmar and has offered 
overall support for the successful completion of the negotiations. China, 
along with Thailand, has also hosted recent peace talks (Aung Naing 
Oo 2015). Second, the Chinese Embassy in Yangon has attempted to 
play a more active role in regional aid and assistance, as illustrated by the 
response of the Embassy to massive flooding which took place in western 
Myanmar in August 2015. Beijing released US$300,000  in aid to the 
region shortly after the flooding began and the newly arrived PRC ambas-
sador to Myanmar, Mr Hong Liang, personally oversaw the delivery of 
relief supplies to the storm-affected Sagiang region of the country, while 
individual provinces in China, including Yunnan, also sent aid and sup-
plies (CCTV 2015). China has also been active in developing university 
exchanges, including with the University of Yangon, and seeks to promote 
further linkages among research institutions in Myanmar.21 It remains to 
be seen, however, to what degree Beijing’s attempts at building soft power 
in Myanmar will counteract growing concerns about Chinese influence in 
the post-2015 government and politics in the country.
Chinese Views on Peacebuilding: Towards a Greater Pragmatism
Since China joined the United Nations in 1971, there has been a sig-
nificant evolution of Beijing’s overall views on internal intervention in 
war-to-peace transitions, including in the areas of peacekeeping and peace-
building. These views have greatly changed from negative to positive, as 
demonstrated for example in Chinese views on participation in United 
Nations operations. Once China began to participate in UN missions, 
there was a preference for sending observers only, during the 1990s, 
with one exception being the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) in 1992–1993 where two separate Chinese engineering bat-
talions were deployed, becoming China’s first true ‘blue helmets.’ At the 
turn of the century, China agreed to send civilian police units as liaisons to 
the UN mission in East Timor (Permanent Mission of PRC to UN 2009). 
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These events suggested that Beijing was growing increasingly comfortable 
with peace operations under the UN banner, at least in East and Southeast 
Asia.
Under the administration of Hu Jintao (2002–2012), the Chinese gov-
ernment slowly began to accept both the concept of soft power in interna-
tional relations and the debates behind it. However, there were occasional 
indications that Beijing viewed soft power, like hard power, as a source of 
competition and even possible danger. While the idea of soft power began 
to circulate in the United States and elsewhere in the West during the 
1990s, the concept only began to make tentative appearances in Beijing 
official statements in the following decade. President Hu, in one of the 
first official mentions of soft power, stated during a 2006 speech that ‘how 
to identify the orientation of China’s cultural development to create a glo-
rious new national culture, and enhance the international competitiveness 
of our culture, to enhance the soft power of the State, is a major practical 
issue before us.’ (People’s Daily 2006).
However, once the concept of ‘peaceful rise’ began to be discussed at 
greater length by Chinese policymakers, soft power matters grew beyond 
questions of culture, becoming increasingly folded into spirited debate by 
both government and academia over what role soft power might play in 
gauging the country’s overall power levels, especially vis-à-vis the United 
States. For example, in a landmark 2006 article on the subject of China’s 
developing ‘comprehensive national power’ (zonghe guoli 综合国力), Yan 
noted that if soft power were to be added to the overall measurement of 
power levels, Chinese comprehensive power would still be ‘inferior’ to 
that of the United States (Yan 2006a, 2006b). Under the Hu govern-
ment, international law, including the observance of UN protocols, was 
an increasingly visible part of China’s views on foreign policy and inter-
national institutions as a way of improving this perceived shortcoming 
in comprehensive national power. Southeast Asia has become a crucial 
test case from Chinese attempts to improve its prestige and soft power, 
through various revised policies including developing a more nuanced 
approach to peacebuilding.
Soft power also began to be debated in China since the turn of the 
century within the framework of foreign policy development as the gov-
ernment considered the merits of continuing to adhere to the Deng 
Xiaoping–era doctrine of keeping a low global profile (Li 2008). Included 
was the question of whether China’s rise meant that its foreign policy 
should focus on responsibility to match growing Chinese power. As China 
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began to expand its foreign policy interests under President Jiang Zemin 
in the 1990s, the ideas stressed by Deng during the previous decade about 
maintaining a low profile and not taking the lead in international affairs, 
and ‘hiding one’s light’ (taoguang yanghui 韬光养晦) began to be viewed 
as less viable (Guo 2013). China, at this stage, was in the process of mak-
ing its transition from ‘large developing country’ to ‘rising power’. In 
Beijing’s 2011 White Paper on ‘peaceful development’ (heping fazhan 
和平发展), support for building a peaceful global environment was stressed 
along with the idea that China’s armed forces would develop as a defensive 
force and support military exchanges and develop partnerships both on 
the regional and the international levels (PRC State Council 2011).
However, China’s economic successes and its overall rise, it has been 
argued, have not removed international (and regional) concern about a 
possible ‘China threat’. This has especially been an issue in the United 
States, where it was noted that a weaker and divided China tended to be 
viewed more favorably by the United States while, conversely, a strong and 
externally oriented China is looked upon more negatively. Thus, Beijing 
needed to seek ways of developing its strength while continuing to avoid 
the appearance of challenging the international order. This has proven 
difficult for a variety of reasons. First, China’s rise has been both strategic 
and economic, with both ‘rises’ taking place very rapidly and affecting 
more and more of the international system. The current disputes between 
China and members of ASEAN, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, 
over maritime sovereignty in the South China Sea has accentuated con-
cerns that China is playing more assertive and revisionist role in Southeast 
Asian security. As noted above, Myanmar is seeking to avoid being caught 
in regional disputes between Beijing and Southeast Asian governments 
and may be seeking to return to a more non-aligned stance in its foreign 
policy, placing greater distance between itself and China.
Second, China’s military spending, while still nowhere near American 
levels, has nonetheless increased considerably under Hu Jintao and Xi 
Jinping, and has resulted in greater power projection capabilities, particu-
larly at sea. This has led to questions about whether Beijing would seek 
to address long-standing maritime disputes as noted in the introduction 
to this paper, and even whether China would seek its own de facto ver-
sion of a Monroe Doctrine, an implied sphere of influence in the western 
half of the Pacific (Yoshihara and Holmes 2011). Third, it was suggested 
that despite the country’s soft power development there remained a high 
degree of foreign policy ‘inconsistency’ on Beijing’s part, which has made it 
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difficult for the Chinese government to make optimal use of its soft power 
(Gill and Huang 2009). This has been caused at times by nationalism, 
concerns over potential ‘containment’ policies by the West, and internal 
differences over the future direction of China’s international relations. As 
such, one of the most visible ways by which Beijing is attempting to satisfy 
the dueling demands of building both military and soft power internation-
ally, while under considerable global scrutiny, is through its commitments 
to UN peacekeeping.
China’s increased engagement with international peacekeeping mis-
sions has been acknowledged as a necessary building block for the devel-
opment of Chinese soft power, as well as promoting the idea of China as 
an ‘internationally socialized country’ (Guo 2007; Wuthnow 2008) and 
a ‘responsible power’. The latter concept, facilitates the development of 
Chinese peacekeeping policy by allowing Beijing to define its own peace-
keeping role, to further integrate into the international system without 
necessarily adhering to Western foreign policy models, to critique the 
international system, and to underscore that China is developing into an 
atypical great power which respects international sovereignty (Richardson 
2011). Moreover, China’s peacekeeping commitments since the 1990s 
have allowed that country’s military to operate far away from Chinese soil 
without triggering anxieties from its neighbors or the United States in the 
wake of Beijing’s expanded military budgets and capabilities.
By the beginning of this century, China was openly supportive of the 
peacekeeping idea both as a way of prompting peaceful multilateral settle-
ment of disputes and as a means to include its armed forces in ‘Military 
Operations other than War,’ or Mootw, including humanitarian mis-
sions, disaster relief and increasingly peacekeeping missions. The con-
cept was borrowed from American post–Cold War military terminology 
to refer to noncombat military operations (Gill and Huang 2009; Fravel 
2011). Southeast Asia had been a major beneficiary of Beijing’s changed 
views on peacekeeping, as Beijing was supportive of the development of 
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992–1993 
despite China’s difficult history with that conflict. China was also will-
ing to send civilian policy to assist with the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), despite the fact that the 
major element of that deployment was to prepare for the independence 
of Timor-Leste (Lanteigne 2014). China has been traditionally wary of 
international intervention in separatist crises out of concern for precedent, 
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but has begun to better differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of 
intervention in the name of peacebuilding. War-to-peace traditions via the 
UN are considered ideal models for China and far better options than uni-
lateral or great power-led peacebuilding initiatives. For example, Beijing 
was highly critical of NATO operations in Serbia-Kosovo in 1999, and 
more recently the American and European operations which toppled the 
Gaddafi government in Libya in 2011, actions which Beijing blames for 
starting the ongoing civil war there.
A major element of China’s success in developing its peacekeeping 
practices as a factor in its soft power development is that the country 
has consistently approached overall peacebuilding practices via policies 
more consistent with ‘middle-power’ status rather than that of the great 
power it was quickly developing into. Beijing’s lack of history as a colo-
nial power, and its policies dating well back to the Maoist era of solidar-
ity and support for developing countries and regions including in South 
and Southeast Asia, (the so-called ‘Bandung Spirit’ of the mid-1950s) 
(Cao 2005), have helped underscore the perceptions which Beijing is 
seeking to put forward that China as a state that eschews the great power 
chauvinism and at times hegemonic conduct of previous great powers, 
especially the West.
In its diplomacy in developing countries, China retains many vestiges 
of previous ‘large developing country’ thinking which, in the case of its 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding policies, have served Chinese interests 
very well. However, in light of China’s increasing power and growing 
ever closer to traditional great-power status, an argument can be made 
that the country’s middle-power approach to peacekeeping may be less 
viable in the future. This would have an adverse effect on China’s ability 
to promote peacekeeping as a key component in its soft power develop-
ment. Nonetheless, China continues to maintain ties between soft power 
development and engagement with various forms of peacebuilding/war- 
to- peace transition policies. In September 2015, this commitment was 
further underscored during President Xi’s speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly. Xi offered to commit eight thousand Chinese personnel 
for a standby UN peacekeeping force, as well as offering greater support 
for Un requests for engineering and medical staff, on the condition that 
‘exit strategies needed to be timely formulated and executed.’ (Martina 
and Brunnstrom 2015).
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China and Myanmar Peacebuilding
As a core member of the group of actors seeking to shepherd a successful 
cease fire agreement in Myanmar in the next year, Beijing has attempted 
to soften its reputation in the country in the wake of mistrust both from 
elements of the Myanmar government and the public, while at the same 
time discourage a ‘Western drift’ in Myanmar’s foreign relations given the 
important role the country plays in China’s future regional development 
plans. As well, the events since the beginning of 2015 have also under-
scored the close connection between China’s southern border security and 
the successful completion of the peace process. Due to its sensitivity to 
being perceived as a spoiler or a revisionist power in all four streams of the 
Myanmar peace process, China has chosen to emphasize the role of edu-
cation, anti-poverty measures, and infrastructure in Myanmar as its main 
contributions to the peacebuilding process.
These approaches have been in keeping with its traditional policies of 
aid and assistance which favour keeping a strong separation between gov-
ernance and economics, while also drawing a distinct connection between 
poverty and underdevelopment on one side and insecurity on the other. 
As noted above, Beijing is also stressing that it is willing to work with any 
successor government after the November 2015 vote, as illustrated by 
the willingness of the Xi government to open communications with the 
NLD and Ms Suu Kyi. At the same time, China is also developing a peace-
building policy in Myanmar that incorporates sub-governmental activities 
including educational and training programmes in rural regions, especially 
in the northern provinces, to stress the need for more balanced develop-
ment in the country.22
China, as a participant in the ceasefire process in Myanmar, has also been 
notably active in calling for an end to hostilities between the MNDAA and 
the Myanmar government as part of Beijing’s desire to pacify the border 
between the two states. In June 2015 it was announced that a ceasefire 
would go into effect after four months of coercive diplomacy by China 
(McLaughlin and Zaw 2015). Beijing continues to support a wider paci-
fication of the Myanmar border region s through the development and 
signing of a National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). According to Chinese 
officials based in Yangon and Jakarta, China has approached the Myanmar 
peacebuilding process based on its traditional views of the sanctity of state 
borders and a high regard for sovereignty and the rights of the people 
of Myanmar to take the lead in their political interests. As well, China 
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remains Myanmar’s top trade partner and has been in the best position to 
promote economic development in the country. China’s interest in devel-
oping a strong ceasefire, according to Beijing representatives, was the con-
cerns that the border region become stable and open to legal cross-border 
trade. China has also been a supporter of the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, 
India, Myanmar) trade corridor as part of Beijing’s views that anti-poverty 
policies and peace are closely linked.
However, according to many persons interviewed in Yangon, China still 
has much work to do in promoting itself as a force for peace and stability 
given its long history with the military governments in Myanmar. A senior 
member of the ceasefire negotiation team, representing the Myanmar 
Peace Centre, issued a statement in September 2015 that Beijing was 
interfering with the process and encouraging two groups, the United Wa 
State Army (UWSA) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) 
to eschew an agreement out of a desire to keep a high degree of control 
over the China-Myanmar border region. These charges were vehemently 
denied by Beijing, with the government stressing its support for a com-
plete and comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout Myanmar 
(Wee 2015; Meng 2015).
comparatIve cases of peacebuIldIng actors
Norway
Norway has developed a longstanding, if at times controversial, relation-
ship with the governments of Myanmar over the past decade. The country 
developed a reputation for being an ‘honest broker’ due to its willingness 
to communicate and negotiate with the pre-reform military governments 
in Myanmar. With the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Aung 
San Suu Kyi (2010), Norway had been viewed as helping the question of 
the peace process of Myanmar to gain further international stature. Some 
Myanmar opposition figures have been unhappy with the decision by Oslo 
to meet directly with the military government of Myanmar, but Norway 
has established itself as a key mediator in the peace process. Norwegian 
businesses, most notably the telecommunications firm Telenor, also have 
a high profile in Myanmar (Telenor 2017). However, with the reform 
process continuing and with other countries in Europe, such as Germany, 
increasing their contacts with Myanmar in recent years, there is the ques-
tion of whether Norway’s special role in the country can be maintained.
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Norway played a primary coordinating role among donors in Myanmar 
around peace issues. On the governmental level, there has been much in 
the way of institution-building between Norway and Myanmar in the area 
of peacebuilding. For example, Norway established the twin institutions 
of the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative (MPSI) and the Peace Donor 
Support Group (PDSG) in 2012 at the request of Myanmar authorities 
(Government of Norway 2013). The MPSI was established to engage the 
Myanmar government, the country’s military, as well as non-state armed 
and political groups, civil society actors and communities, in addition to 
international actors, to provide concrete support to the ceasefire process 
and emerging peace process. Various projects have been initiated via the 
MPSI in ceasefire areas and in conjunction with relevant stakeholders.
Yet, the reputation of Norway in Myanmar as a peacebuilding actor 
has been mixed in recent years largely due to the approach which Oslo 
has taken regarding direct contacts and mediation efforts with the dispu-
tants in Myanmar. It has been argued that Norway’s ‘normative’ approach 
to the peacebuilding process in Myanmar was conducted along similar 
lines as Norwegian mediation activities in Sri Lanka during that country’s 
long civil conflict (Sánchez-Cacicedo 2014). While Oslo distinguished 
itself among other Western actors, including the United States, Australia, 
Canada and other Western European countries, which largely sought to 
isolate the military regime in Myanmar since the 1990s, Norway’s sta-
tus as a ‘white knight’ did fall under some criticism from some actors in 
Myanmar and elsewhere in Asia both for Oslo’s willingness to engage 
with political and military institutions in the country which have been 
accused of gross misconduct, but also that Norway’s approach has lacked 
depth and greater understanding of political and socio-economic condi-
tions ‘on the ground’, especially in the embattled northern regions on the 
country.23
Nonetheless, Norway has maintained a distinct status in the country 
both as a result of its peacebuilding efforts and the legacy of the Peace 
Prize, an act which brought the political and security situation in Myanmar 
to global attention and prompted greater international pressure for Ms. 
Suu Kyi’s release and for reforms both in governance and foreign policy 
as well as a halt to the ethnic conflicts in the country (Johnsen 2015). Ms. 
Suu Kyi was finally able to accept the Prize in person in Oslo in 2012. In 
her speech, she stated,
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The Burmese concept of peace can be explained as the happiness arising 
from the cessation of factors that militate against the harmonious and the 
wholesome. The word nyein-chan translates literally as the beneficial cool-
ness that comes when a fire is extinguished. Fires of suffering and strife are 
raging around the world. In my own country, hostilities have not ceased in 
the far north; to the west, communal violence resulting in arson and murder 
were taking place just several days before I started out on the journey that 
has brought me here today. (Suu Kyi 1991)
Norway has been seeking to develop its soft power in the months lead-
ing up the elections, through various forms of aid and assistance to urban 
and rural areas as well as relief efforts in the wake of the August 2015 
cyclone and subsequent flooding in the western regions of Myanmar. 
The government of Norway pledged NoK10 million (US$1.2 million) 
in aid to the region after the flooding began, and has worked towards 
better early warning facilities in order to reduce the number of casualties 
after future such disasters. However, other donations which Oslo made 
to Rakhine State were met with some criticism in Myanmar due to con-
cerns this aid was favouring the Rohingya peoples, which are not consid-
ered a legal minority by authorities in Myanmar, and in a broader sense 
that Norwegian businesses were profiting on the coattails of Oslo’s role 
in the peace process (News and Views from Norway 2014; McGregor 
2015) Two Norwegian firms which have greatly increased their visibility 
in Myanmar since the peace process began has been the telecommunica-
tions corporation Telenor and the state energy firm Statoil. In 2015, an 
agreement was pending to allow Statoil access to a maritime block in order 
to survey for potential oil and gas.
There have been calls, especially from local educational actors, for 
Oslo to better diversify its aid and assistance portfolio in Myanmar 
by offering greater research links, student and faculty exchanges, and 
joint programmes in the country.24 There are plans for the Norwegian 
Embassy in Yangon to move within the city to a more central location, 
and to be based within a ‘Nordic House’ which would share facilities 
with the embassies of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, presenting more 
of a Nordic model of diplomacy to Myanmar.25 Norway has been caught 
up in the final states of the National Ceasefire Agreement, as some of 
the ethnic minority actors involved have requested that Oslo, along with 
the United States, Great Britain, Japan and the European Union be 
included. Earlier in 2015, the government of Myanmar agreed to expand 
the list of witnesses from solely the United Nations, ASEAN and China 
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to include Thailand and India (Lun Min Mang 2015). Norway, how-
ever, was accepted by the Myanmar government as an election observer 
for the November 2015 vote, along with the European Union, Canada 
and Switzerland (Bangkok Post 2015). Although Norway may find itself 
having to compete with a larger array of foreign partners in Myanmar, 
including other Western European actors such as the UK and Germany, 
should the reform processes succeed and the peacebuilding process take 
root, Oslo is still in a strong position to maintain a distinct peacebuilding 
identity in Myanmar.
India
India has developed particular interests toward Myanmar, especially after 
the implementation of its ‘Look East’ policy in the early 1990s. Although 
India is the largest democracy in the world, its engagement with Myanmar 
has focused on economics and development, with no deliberate promo-
tion of democratic values even during the opening process in Myanmar 
five years ago. While New Delhi has been open to the idea of ‘sharing’ 
its democratic experiences, the Indian government has insisted that the 
initiative should purely come from Myanmar, and that nothing should 
be done before India sees a more positive signal from Myanmar. As one 
regional specialist noted, India’s initiative to promote democracy abroad is 
based on ‘realist’ political concerns, which emphasises the country’s stra-
tegic aims, especially countering the expansion of Chinese influence in the 
Southeast Asian region and gaining support in the fight against separatist 
forces in the Indian northeast, and economic interests rather than an ide-
alistic motivation (Cartwright 2009).
Second, in spite of the great improvement in relations between India 
and Myanmar, especially due to the investment activities in infrastructure 
including road and air links, banking services, and information technology, 
the Myanmar government has been very careful to balance its relations 
with India by continuing to engage with China. Yet, at the same time, 
Myanmar is trying as much as possible to maintain this delicate balance 
in order not to step between these two rising Asian giants. Therefore, as 
argued by Kanwal (2010), Myanmar’s deliberate engagement with China, 
framed in economic and military cooperation, has been particularly aimed 
to ‘keep India off balance and prevent its rise as a competing regional 
power.’ Although it has been suggested that New Delhi will benefit by 
default from the current expansion of Myanmar’s foreign policy interests 
and desire to move away from an overdependence on Beijing, there has 
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been little sign that India is any position to directly compete with China on 
the economic or diplomatic front, and there are perceptions in Myanmar 
that India is more interested in balancing Chinese influence than deepen-
ing long-term investment in Myanmar (Jaishankar 2015).
Indian interests in peacebuilding in Myanmar have been framed by 
a strong perceived link between promoting economic development and 
regional stability and a consolidation of the war-to-peace transition in 
Myanmar. Before the military era, Indian entrepreneurs had an high pro-
file in Burma, especially in Yangon, but cross-border relations foundered 
by the 1980s and did not recover until the beginning of the reform era 
and a thawing of relations in the wake of then-Myanmar President Thein 
Sein’s visit to Delhi in 2011 when the beginnings of potential joint proj-
ects were discussed. The focus in India regarding Myanmar is about ‘con-
nectivity’, meaning the building of roads, other transportation links and 
communications between the two states to promote trade and coopera-
tion.26 Related to these areas has been the prospect of developing links 
based on IT, financial institutions and tourism. In regards to the disar-
mament process, India is not a part of the cease-fire negotiations, unlike 
China, and New Delhi has expressed concern about the security situation 
in western Myanmar and especially Rakhine, (although specific mention 
of the Rohingya issue was avoided). Although Indian officials are reluctant 
to speak about diplomatic and strategic competition with China, there is 
an economic dimension to India’s engagement of the region, including 
participating in the port project at Sittwe on the Bay of Bengal. Among 
Myanmar officials spoken to, there was some lingering scepticism about 
whether India’s burst of diplomatic and economic activity in Myanmar is a 
direct product of the desire to ‘check’ Beijing in the Indian Ocean.
As well, India and Myanmar are still addressing border security dif-
ferences, as well as lingering Burmese traditional resistance toward the 
Indians inherited from the unfortunate position of the Indians during the 
colonial era. It has been estimated that there are as many as one million 
Myanmarese of Indian origin. India’s infrastructure projects are still rela-
tively low-key and peripheral, (i.e. only situated at the border areas), com-
pared to China, for example. Furthermore, Indian development assistance 
in order to improve the education and health conditions in Myanmar, 
hampered by low transnational connections between Indian NGOs and 
Myanmar NGOs, have not been sufficient to overcome its deep-rooted 
image deficit there (Egreteau 2011). Thus, such conditions have limited 
India’s role, especially in peacebuilding in Myanmar.
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Japan
Japan and Myanmar have a long post-WWII history of engagement. Japan 
was an occupying power during the Second World War between 1942 
and 1945, but between 1955 and 1988, Japanese aid to the country was 
estimated at US$2.2 billion, and until 1988 Tokyo was by far the largest 
aid and trade partner under the military-socialist era in Burma between 
1962 and 1988. During that period, the Burmese government embarked 
on a de facto ‘Look East’ policy with a strong emphasis on deepening ties 
with Tokyo.
However, as a result of the military coup and the beginning of the 
SLORC government in 1988, Tokyo soon lost much diplomatic and eco-
nomic ground for many reasons. First, under Japanese law, Burma had to 
be re-recognized under the new military government, which caused legal 
and political red tape for almost a year after the coup. Second, the SLORC 
government was less inclined to view Japan as a key economic partner than 
its predecessor. Finally, the United States placed heavy pressure on Japan 
to join in the West’s sanctions regime against the SLORC government, 
badly weakening Tokyo’s economic presence in the country. Even today, 
there remains a bilateral diplomatic dispute as a result of the shooting 
of a Japanese journalist during the 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’ protests in 
Yangon, an incident which the Myanmar government has yet to make a 
formal apology for. Tokyo is therefore in a strong position to play a greater 
peacebuilding role in the future given Japan’s growing economic interests 
in the Myanmar reform process.
Although Japanese trade with Myanmar remains smaller than China’s, 
and has been rising at a much slower rate, estimated at only US$500 mil-
lion in 2008, but rising after the reforms began to coalesce to US$1.5 bil-
lion in FY 2012-3 and then rising to US$1.7 billion in FY 2014-5 (JETRO 
2014; CSO 2015), Tokyo has greatly increased its aid and development 
presence in the region since the 2011 reforms began. Summit diplomacy in 
Myanmar has also been a priority for Japan, as Prime Minister Shinzō Abe 
has made two visits to Myanmar during his second term in office. The first 
visit was in May 2013 when he agreed to write off about US$2 billion in 
remaining Myanmar loans to Japan while announcing new aid initiatives, 
and the second took place in November 2014 when new overseas develop-
ment assistance loans for infrastructure improvements were announced.27
Other Japanese projects elsewhere in Myanmar included loans for 
improving communications in the capital of Naypyidaw, providing road 
L.A. ALEXANDRA AND M. LANTEIGNE
 229
construction equipment in Rakhine and weather monitoring systems for 
various parts of the country. Japan has also been active in developing 
infrastructure in Yangon, providing new grants via the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) for waterworks, hospital upgrades and bridge 
construction, and providing technical assistance with Yangon port facilities 
upgrades and the Greater Yangon Urban Development plan since 2012.
In terms of more direct participation in peacebuilding initiatives in 
Myanmar, Tokyo is a member of the Peace Support Group (PSG) in the 
country along with the United States, Australia, Canada, the EU, Norway 
and Switzerland. During the signing of the cease-fire between the govern-
ment of Myanmar and eight of the ethnic armed groups from the north-
ern edges of the country, the Government of Japan was a participant in the 
signing, as well as the Nippon Foundation, a philanthropic organisation 
with longstanding interests in the peace process (Factiva 2015). However, 
according to the Irrawaddy news service, Japan’s deeper participation in 
the peace process has been hampered by opposition from China, which 
has been against the inclusion of Japanese and Western actors into the 
ceasefire negotiations (Aung Zaw 2015).
Switzerland
In keeping with Switzerland’s venerable foreign policy of neutrality, which 
had been in place for centuries and had been codified and internation-
ally recognised after 1815 (Church and Head 2013), the country has 
sought to play a peacebuilding role in Myanmar through programs ori-
ented towards arbitration and education. Switzerland has been active in 
the current preparations for the Myanmar elections by developing activi-
ties through the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
and other parts of the Swiss government to assist with voter preparation 
and education. Switzerland has called for ongoing dialogue between all 
major actors in the electoral process, including political parties, election 
officials, the media, and civil society organisations. In conjunction with 
the government of Germany and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), Switzerland has also been teaching vocational skills in Myanmar, 
including in areas of industry and tourism.
Myanmar peacebuilding projects undertaken by the Swiss government 
have included drafting a Code of Conduct (CoC) in October 2014 for all 
participating political parties, (estimated to number about ninety by August 
2015), in the November 2015 elections, educating voters and parties on 
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the democratic process, and supporting civil society and media organisa-
tions. These projects were undertaken using a ‘hands-off’ approach which 
specifically avoids any impression of political bias according to one Swiss 
official.28 Among the provisions of the CoC are pledges for all parties to 
respect the right to peaceful assembly and campaign activities, to settle 
disputes between parties in a cordial fashion, to avoid tactics synonymous 
with slander, to avoid discrimination during campaigning as well as the 
visible display of weaponry, and to avoid intimidation and dissemination 
of false information (FDFA 2014; Swissinfo 2015). The Embassy has also 
established mobile units for education on voter rights and responsibilities 
to more remote regions of the country. Plans are also underway for edu-
cational exchanges which would allow students to learn about politics and 
democratisation in Geneva and Bern. These courses would include case 
studies of federalism, which until recently had been a politically off-limits 
subject in Myanmar since for many years the military government in the 
country equated federalism with a unacceptable level of power devolution 
and a heightened risk of ethnic separatism.29
However, the spirit and letter of the CoC were threatened by laws which 
were implemented by the Myanmar government in the months leading 
up the elections, including a controversial ban on political parties from 
criticising the armed forces as well as disrespecting the country’s 2008 
constitution which guarantees the reservation of one-quarter of all seats in 
the upper and lower houses of the Myanmar parliament for the Myanmar 
Armed Forces/Tatmadaw (Slodkowski and Aung Hla Tun 2015). These 
restrictions, however, did very little to prevent the electoral landslide by 
the NLD after the November 2015 vote.
A large majority of political parties agreed to abide by the CoC and to par-
ticipate fairly in the process. Switzerland has also been a supporter of human 
rights development in the country, and has advised on the Myanmar peace 
process via the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Human Security Division (HSD) 
(FDFA 2013). In the area of economic assistance, Switzerland has especially 
concentrated its Myanmar aid programmes in the country’s south-eastern 
regions, including Kayin and Mon provinces. This region was chosen due 
to its compatibility with Swiss development initiatives for Myanmar, includ-
ing promoting cohabitation between majority Burmese and ethnic minor-
ity groups, the possibility of a special economic zone being created in the 
Dawei region, and the promotion of legalised cross- border trade between 
Myanmar and its neighbours to the east, specifically Thailand.
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lessons learned
The fieldwork completed for this chapter suggests a great deal of policy 
similarities between so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ actors in Myanmar peace-
building. Thus, collaboration between traditional actors and new actors is 
the most ideal framework to maintain, but the process should be under-
taken on as much of an equal footing as possible. New(er) actors have the 
comparative advantage of having not too distant memories/experiences, 
or even still struggling with their own peacebuilding processes, as in the 
case of Indonesia:
 1. Still relatively applicable for the host country.
 2. New actors have more ability to have ‘empathy’ with the host coun-
tries as they might also encounter the same problems/challenges 
before.
 3. Having the advantage to come in the position to ‘dictating’ or ‘pre-
scribing’ but rather ‘sharing’ lessons learned, experiences, including 
past mistakes—equal footing.
China, as well, is addressing Myanmar peacebuilding with a great deal 
of local and regional concerns:
 1. Safety of the Sino-Myanmar border, while ensuring cross-border 
trade can continue and grow.
 2. Stress over the rights and responsibilities of being a great power in 
East Asia and moving away from its persons of being a large devel-
oping state.
 3. Ensure it retains a place in the peacebuilding process despite the 
rapid introduction of new actors, including Japan, into the peace-
building milieu.
 4. Developing a more congenial identity in Myanmar after years of 
strong relations between Beijing and the Myanmar military regimes.
Traditional actors, on the other hand, also have their own comparative 
advantages, (including ‘first mover’ advantages which have been a boon 
some actors including Norway). These include:
 1. Capacity to provide funding and related support
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 2. Ability to develop a more systematic approach with clear instru-
ments to measure achievements and results.
 3. Have more energy to focus on peacebuilding efforts abroad since 
the developed countries have settled their own peacebuilding pro-
cess long-time ago.
conclusIon
On 8 November 2015, Myanmar held the second democratic election 
after the result of the first multi-party election in 1990 was cancelled by 
the military junta. Earlier anxieties that this election would end up in the 
same fate proved to be wrong as the ruling military government under the 
leadership of President Thein Sein congratulated the National League of 
Democracy as soon as the result indicated a landslight victory for Aung 
San Suu Kyi’s party.
The Indonesian government, through the press statement released by 
the Foreign Ministry expressed appreciation for the peaceful election pro-
cess taken place in the country. More importantly, Indonesia has reiterated 
its commitment to continue to suppport Myanmar in its efforts towards 
sustainable reform and democratization, through cooperation in bilateral 
and ASEAN framework (Kemlu 2015). However, such statement, accord-
ing to certain element in Indonesia has been considered as not only too 
late as it was released almost in the end of the month, but even worse was 
failed to send a clear message to indicate Indonesia’s ‘constructive engage-
ment’ approach to ensure the democratization process to be still on track. 
Such message is crucial because Indonesia, as elucidated in the editorial of 
the Jakarta Post published on 12 November 2015, is “constitutionally and 
morally responsible for helping all parties in Myanmar, including its army 
generals, reach this goal, no matter how painful the sacrifices they have to 
endure during the transition to democracy.” (Jakarta Post 2015) With this 
clear trajectory, then Indonesia can maintain its proactive role to continue 
sharing its experiences in sustaining democracy in the country.
Looking at the existing challenges faced by the country, it is most likely 
that its foreign policy will seek to invite more investments from different 
countries to pour into the country to boost its economic growth. But, at 
least there is one common position between the NLD and the Indonesian 
government regarding the foreign policy direction. Based on the 2015 
Election Manifesto of the NLD, foreign policy will be directed to ‘pursue 
an active and independent foreign policy, and to establish friendly and 
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close political relations.’ (NLD 2015) On this point, this is a good begin-
ning for the two countries to enhance their cooperation into a higher 
level, especially to maintain ASEAN unity the midst of competition among 
the major powers to spread their influences in the Southeast Asia region. 
However, the new Myanmar’s leadership interest towards ASEAN remains 
in question mark since the regional organisation has been perceived as 
being too accommodative to the military junta regime in the past due to 
non-interference principle upheld by ASEAN, which then limited its inter-
actions with NLD as the opposition party at that time. (Myint Thin 2013)
 notes
 1. The founding members of ASEAN when the organisation was created in 
August 1967 were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand.
 2. Indonesia donated around 22.4 tonnes of food, clothes and medicines and 
deployed medical team comprised of 30 personnel. See “TNI Hercules 
Delivers Humanitarian Aid to Myanmar [Hercules TNI Angkut Bantuan 
Kemanusiaan ke Myanmar],” http://tni.mil.id/view-9696-hercules-tni-
angkut-bantuan-kemanusiaan-ke-myanmar.html, accessed March 27, 2017
 3. Interview with Chief Military Training, Myanmar Armed Forces, August 
2015.
 4. Interview with Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, August 12, 2015.
 5. Interview with Hassan Wirajuda, August 11, 2015.
 6. Interview with Hassan Wirajuda, August 11, 2015.
 7. Interview with MoFA, Directorate of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, August 
10, 2015.
 8. Interview with Hassan Wirajuda, August 11, 2015.
 9. In some capacity building projects, such as in agricultural sector, economic 
development, women’s empowerment were funded by the Indonesian 
government. However, for trainings and workshops related to peacebuild-
ing were funded externally from the third parties. The Institute for Peace 
and Democracy, for example, has been working closely with funding agen-
cies from Australia, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, the United States and the European Union. Then, the latest spe-
cific training organised by the Indonesian government for the Myanmar 
police was supported by the government of the United Kingdom.
 10. So far, 58 countries have been listed as participants, namely Indonesia, 
Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Fiji Islands, Georgia, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, 
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Kirgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palau, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, The Philippines, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Tonga, Timor Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United 
Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen. See https://bdf.
kemlu.go.id/about/participants, accessed March 27, 2016.
 11. From 26 August to 1 September 2012, IPD in collaboration with the 
Presidential Advisory Council of Indonesia and the Indonesian Embassy in 
Yangon visited the country to conduct the scoping mission. During the 
visit, the Indonesian delegation,et with the Advisors of the President of 
Myanmar, the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, Myanmar 
Development Resources Institute, Group of Democracy (the group of 
political parties in Myanmar) and the Union of Election Commission. See 
http://www.ipd.or.id/democratic-transition-in-myanmar.htm, accessed 
March 27, 2016.
 12. Interview with former Indonesian Ambassador Sebastianus Sumarsono. 
The ambassador managed to do the observation in the Northern part, 
while other officials went to the South, West, East and Cental regions.
 13. Muhammadiyah activists have involved in intensive communications with 
colleagues from the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPCS) and 
The Center for Diversity and National Harmony (CDNH) and given 
access to utilise the Need Assessment Report of the Rakhine Province 
regarding peacebuilding in the area which can be used in creating the 
action plan for Muhammadiyah’s participation in dealing with Rohingya 
problem.
 14. For example, CSIS has received urgent request to continue its activities in 
Myanmar by creating a project to share its experiences in managing ethnic 
relations in conflict-prone areas.
 15. Interview with some lecturers in Department of International Relations 
from Yangon University, August 2015.
 16. Interview with Lt. Gen. (ret) Agus Widjojo, August 2014.
 17. Interview with Habibie Center, August 2015.
 18. Interview with Chinese government officials, Yangon, August 2015.
 19. Bertil Lintner, “Same Game, Different Tactics,” The Irrawaddy, July 2015, 
14–19.
 20. Interviews with Chinese Embassy officials, Yangon, April 2015; “Myanmar: 
Myingyan Power Plant Project,” Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/2016/myingyan-
power-plant.html, accessed September 26, 2016
 21. Interviews with administrators at the University of Yangon, Yangon, 
August 2015.
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 22. Interviews with Chinese Embassy officials, Yangon, April 2015.
 23. Interviews with Myanmar policy officials and education specialists in 
Yangon, August 2015; Interviews with Myanmar foreign policy specialists, 
Beijing, July 2015.
 24. Interviews with education officials and lecturers, University of Yangon, 
August 2015.
 25. Interviews with Norwegian Embassy officials, Yangon, August 2015.
 26. Interview with senior Indian Embassy official, Yangon, August 2015.
 27. Interviews with Japanese Embassy officials, Yangon, August 2015.
 28. Interview with senior Switzerland Embassy official, Yangon, August 2015.
 29. Interviews with Embassy of Switzerland officials, Yangon, August 2015.
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CHAPTER 10




The growing international profile of countries like India, Indonesia, 
Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa has drawn considerable attention in 
scholarly and policy circles in the past decade (Carmody 2013; Fernández 
Jilberto and Hogenboom 2010; Mody 2011; Vieira and Alden 2011). 
Each of these countries has deliberately sought to strengthen its posi-
tion in regional affairs and in global institutions (Flemes 2007; Hurrell 
2006; Schirm 2012). They are all democratic regimes that have (along 
with China and Russia) opened up their markets in the past two decades 
and experienced dramatic economic growth. These countries have grown 
their middle classes and reduced the portion of those in extreme poverty.
These rising powers have also become notably more active in facilitat-
ing the economic development of other, less powerful, countries. India’s 
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development cooperation increased fourfold in the decade between 
2003–2004 and 2013–2014 (Mullen 2013). India and Brazil created new 
agencies dedicated to development cooperation, and South Africa is in 
an advanced stage of creating a new agency, but it has been actively sup-
porting other African countries since at least 2000 through the African 
Renaissance Fund (Besharati 2013). Brazilian development cooperation, 
for instance, rose from US$160 million in 2005 to over US$900 million 
by 2010 (Leite et al. 2014, 7). Over that period, its technical cooperation 
grew almost fourfold and its humanitarian cooperation exploded from less 
than $US1 million to US$161 million (Leite et al. 2014, 7). Admittedly, 
these totals remain small compared to traditional donors, and financial 
or political crises in Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa call into question 
the sustainability of even this level of cooperation. Nevertheless, these 
expanded development roles are politically meaningful for rising powers 
and their development partners.
Less attention has been devoted to the roles these rising powers play 
in facilitating peace processes and supporting efforts to prevent and end 
wars in other countries. Since 2002, each of these countries launched 
efforts at what we may call “peacebuilding.” Turkey, for instance, played 
a high-profile role in mediation and post-war recovery efforts in Somalia. 
South Africa has supported peace efforts in Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), just as Indonesia has supported peace pro-
cesses in the Philippines and Myanmar. India is the fourth-largest donor 
in war-torn Afghanistan. Brazil has played leading roles in the United 
Nations (UN) Peacebuilding Commission and in UN peace missions in 
Haiti and the Guinea-Bissau.
All of these rising powers have emphasized the comparative advantages 
they bring to peacebuilding over traditional Western actors. Turkey and 
Indonesia, for example, see themselves as regional examples of transitions 
to secular democracy in Muslim majority countries. India and South Africa 
believe that their own anti-colonial struggles and liberation position them 
well to share experiences and capacities in an egalitarian and respectful 
manner.
Yet, little comparative and systematic research has been carried out on 
the peacebuilding roles of these new actors. New research on develop-
ment roles has not extended as far into the roles in their new programs in 
post-conflict countries or to advance peace in fragile or war-torn societies 
(de Carvalho and de Coning 2014; Mathur 2014; Richmond and Tellidis 
2013). This chapter offers some conclusions from the research carried out 
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in 2015 and published in this book by our contributing partners from 
India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey on their specific approaches 
to peacebuilding. We added a contribution on Brazil as well. The chap-
ter begins with some of the conceptual findings of the book as regard to 
the very definition of peacebuilding. It then highlights some of the com-
monalities across these countries’ policies and peacebuilding activities, fol-
lowed by an analysis of some of the differences among the countries and 
implications for ideas and the practice of peacebuilding. We believe that 
these conclusions might serve as hypotheses about the new role of emerg-
ing powers in the relatively new field of peacebuilding.
concepts: dIfferent states, dIfferent 
understandIngs
Rising Powers, Development Partners
This book focuses on the role of what we call “rising powers” in and 
around peacebuilding. No term adequately captures the group of states 
examined here. We initially referred to “emerging powers,” a term that 
derives from “emerging markets.” However, countries like Brazil, Turkey, 
and India eschew this label since they either are or have in the past been 
powers in their own right. The term “middle powers” also is appropriate 
for some of these states, but derives from a realpolitik framework that 
emphasizes traditional military prowess and aspirations that do not reflect 
the way that these countries see themselves today. Countries such as Brazil 
and Indonesia reject a world order assigning position based on military 
power, and see their contribution as helping address global problems (de 
Carvalho and de Coning 2014).
“Rising powers” capture the role of Indonesia, South Africa, Brazil, 
India, and Turkey better than “emerging” since it reflects recent move-
ment with a positive connotation. Turkish officials are more comfortable 
with a characterization that conforms to their self-image of increased 
regional influence. Nevertheless, diplomats of countries like Indonesia are 
uncomfortable with “rising power” since they do not wish to seem to 
elevate themselves above other countries in any way. Here, we use rising 
power to refer to the countries that have successfully sought to exercise 
a strategic influence in their regions and in multilateral fora. Although 
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countries such as Russia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Egypt might warrant  “rising 
power” status, we focus on countries that have played a particular role on 
peacebuilding issues—India, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa.
Peacebuilding
One important finding of the book is a concept of “peacebuilding” among 
policy circles in rising powers that diverges in clear ways from how the 
concept is used by traditional donors and the UN system. In our initial 
conversations, project partners in India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, 
United States, and Norway determined that we would not pre-determine 
a specific definition of “peacebuilding,” but would let each nationally 
focused line of research articulate its own definition based on the policy 
context of that country. The main guidance agreed among the partners 
was that some “theory of change” needs to exist that reflect how a given 
activity is intended to influence peace and order, for it to be considered 
“peacebuilding.” Thus, we did not beforehand seek to restrict the concep-
tual time frame to post-conflict, or limit its content in ways that excluded 
economic development activities or mediation support efforts or even 
humanitarian projects, so long as some theorized link to peace outcomes 
existed. What interested us was how policy communities in rising powers 
thought about peacebuilding and defined it themselves. We also did not 
pursue notions of peacebuilding defined as independent variables, that is, 
we were interested in peace-related outcomes rather than the impact of 
peacebuilding activities or their success.
Peacebuilding, it turns out, is not a clearly defined or well-developed 
concept in policy circles of virtually any rising power. In fact, it is rarely 
used in the domestic discourse of the rising powers studied. When it is 
used, it is most often in connection with discussions of UN peacebuild-
ing. Domestically, the preference seems to be for a wide range of concepts 
that are descriptive of the activities undertaken, for example, technical 
exchanges, training, mediation, rather than of the overall intent. Rarely is 
an attempt made to group several such activities together under an over-
arching concept like peacebuilding. The term is more widely used, with 
a shared understanding, by some (e.g., Brazil) than others (e.g., India), 
often as a result of exposure to and active participation in multilateral fora 
such as the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Yet even Brazilians use the 
term in slightly different ways, depending on if it is used in the corridors 
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of the UN, in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, or in mobilizing large 
infrastructure projects. In Turkey, the term connotes some link to ending 
human suffering in war-torn societies, and in South Africa officials are 
more likely to refer to post-conflict reconstruction.
Peacebuilding offers an example of concepts shaped by international 
organizations and their interaction with domestic bureaucracies. The tra-
ditional (viz., OECD) donors have shaped the Western understanding of 
peacebuilding as largely a category of programmatic activity that is funded 
for a specific purpose, different from “normal” development, and thus 
exempted from some of its requirements. Thus, the need, from a donor 
logic, to differentiate between funds spent on peacebuilding versus devel-
opment played an important role in conceptualizing what is and what is 
not peacebuilding. This element seems missing among the rising powers. 
Their bureaucracies have no need to distinguish peacebuilding from devel-
opment, mediation, or other categories, since they are not subject to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD’s) 
Development Assistance Committee regulations. In contrast, rising pow-
ers are incentivized to keep the concept vague and flexible, partly to avoid 
battles over turf and resources among ministries and departments. In the 
case of peacebuilding, it would appear as if international organizations 
have shaped the discourse in rising powers more than the reverse.
Perhaps it is best to begin with how the concept is deployed in the 
UN system and among traditional donors and the European Union (EU), 
albeit with differences. The UN’s concept of peacebuilding has evolved, 
from a narrow one focused on political aspects of post-accord, post- conflict 
processes toward a concept that encompasses state institution-building, 
economic recovery, national ownership, and, most recently, sustaining 
peace (Call and Collin 2015). Nevertheless, the UN concept, at least until 
very recently, tended toward top-down and state-centric approaches that 
emphasize political and security institution-building over civil society and 
long-term economic development. Among Western donors, the concept 
also shares a focus on political and security institution-building, with some 
economic activities, and a general focus on post-conflict recovery. The 
EU has a broader approach that emphasizes prevention. It uses “conflict 
prevention” and “conflict mitigation” alongside “peacebuilding,” which 
“tends to be associated with a wide range of long-term development activ-
ities designed to promote structural stability, or with short-term actions 
with direct conflict prevention objectives” (quoted in Stamnes 2016, 3).
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A More Holistic Concept
Rising powers’ concept of “peacebuilding” is closer to that of the EU but 
broader in time and content. The peacebuilding concept of the six rising 
powers studied in this book encompasses a broad swath of development 
and other activities in war-torn societies, as well as conflict prevention and 
mediation efforts in “pre-war” or peaceful societies seen as unstable. Thus, 
for them peacebuilding activities in war-torn societies extend to health 
projects, student exchanges, education support such as building schools, 
food security, infrastructure development of any sort, as well as political/
security cooperation like security advisers, mediation support, dialogue 
facilitation, and elections support. In their chapter, Nyuykonge and Zondi 
say, for instance, “In terms of peacebuilding support, South Africa has 
provided states with substantial assistance in the areas of good governance, 
dialogue and reconciliation, human resource and infrastructure develop-
ment, policy implementation, economic development and trade, informa-
tion sharing and exchange visits among South African dignitaries, as well 
as humanitarian assistance.” India’s concept is the broadest of the coun-
tries examined here, going beyond the others in breadth. For India, virtu-
ally all development in a war-torn society, or societies where conflict may 
arise, is considered peacebuilding. Singh’s chapter quotes one Indian offi-
cial as saying that the attempt to distinguish between peacebuilding and 
other development assistance is “academic hair-splitting,” a view “shared 
by others” in New Delhi.
At the UN, there is a process underway that is broadening the concept. 
In 2016, building on a review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, 
undertaken by an Advisory Group of Experts and a review of UN peace 
operations undertaken by a High-level Independent Panel, the Security 
Council and General Assembly adopted resolutions on the UN peace-
building architecture that embraced a new concept of “sustaining peace,” 
that comports more closely with that of rising powers.
The “sustainable peace” concept has been influenced by the process 
leading to the adoption of the UN’s Agenda 2030 including approval of a 
broad set of sustainable development goals (SDGs) in 2015. Among this 
new set of goals, 36 targets refer to the negative influence of violence and 
instability, and Goal 16 specifically aims to promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and 
build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels (UN 
2015). Although not well defined, “sustainable peace” moves beyond 
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post-conflict contexts to prevention, and suggests a greater emphasis on 
economic foundations for longer-term peace and addressing underlying 
causes of conflict. It also represents a shift in focus to local agency, as it 
operates from the assumption that to sustain the peace, local social institu-
tions need to have the resilient capacity to absorb tensions and shocks that 
would otherwise risk a lapse into violent conflict.
As Youssef Mahmoud and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin have noted, this new 
expansive definition recognizes that sustaining peace is an inherently polit-
ical process that spans prevention, mediation, conflict management, and 
resolution. They argue that with the sustaining peace concept, the UN 
approach to peacebuilding now puts UN member states and their popula-
tions in the lead; it further puts politics and political solutions front and 
center, gives prevention an uncontested home, and leverages the UN’s 
three pillars—human rights, peace and security, and sustainable devel-
opment—in a mutually reinforcing way (Mahmoud and Ó Súilleabháin 
2016).
The new UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who took office on 
1 January 2017, has embraced these developments and has made preven-
tion and sustaining peace a central theme of his office. In his first statement 
to the UN Security Council on 10 January 2017, he noted the strong 
support for an integrated approach that connects development, human 
rights, and peace and security in both the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions 
on sustaining peace.1 This broadening of the peacebuilding concept seems 
to fit well with the rising powers’ approach that tends to be quite com-
prehensive and/or holistic, that is, inclusive of political, security, peace, 
justice, development, and economic elements. This broadening of the 
peacebuilding concept seems to fit well with the rising powers’ approach 
that tends to be quite comprehensive and/or holistic, that is, inclusive of 
political, security, peace, justice, development, and economic elements.
Rising powers also see a closer link between humanitarian assistance 
and peacebuilding. This is the strongest in Turkey, where its efforts to sup-
port Somalia’s response to famine in 2003 led to major peace-related ini-
tiatives in Somalia (Achilles et al. 2015; Tank 2013). But it is also present 
in other countries, such as Brazil, which saw its response in Haiti deepened 
after Hurricane Tomas hit that country in 2010, and South Africa that 
combined offers of humanitarian assistance to, for instance, Somalia, with 
a range of other initiatives aimed at conflict resolution and post-conflict 
reconstruction (Kok 2014; Nyuykonge and Zondi 2016; van Nieuwkerk 
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2014). Alexandra argues in her chapter that the frequency of natural and 
other humanitarian emergencies in Southeast Asia makes it a fertile oppor-
tunity to open up work related to peace: “While humanitarian action, 
including disaster relief, is normally separated from peacebuilding efforts, 
in the context of Indonesia, humanitarian assistance has been utilized to 
pave the way to conduct peacebuilding.” Following Cyclone Nargis in 
2012, the Indonesian government and its Red Cross drew explicitly on 
the post-tsunami Aceh experience to dialogue with the Myanmar gov-
ernment about the importance of opening up to the international com-
munity, democratization, and addressing the conflict in Rakhine state 
involving the Rohingya.
Institutional/Legal Incentives
Divergent histories and legal/political contexts also shape the global 
South’s broader concept of peacebuilding. In the West, the need to jus-
tify ODA in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)  and 
national legal and parliamentary oversight contexts has resulted in the need 
to delineate between peacebuilding funding versus development funding 
versus humanitarian aid. Because rising powers do not share this same his-
tory, they can be more flexible in their approach to peacebuilding and are 
not under pressure to define or delineate it from “routine” development.
Not Just Post-conflict
Activities such as mediation support, dialogue facilitation, and cross-ethnic 
programs in non-war settings—which might be considered “peacemaking” 
and “conflict prevention” in the UN system—also fall under the rubric of 
“peacebuilding” for many rising powers. Indonesia’s efforts to facilitate a 
peaceful political transition in Myanmar, apart from the peace processes 
involving ethnic rebel movements in that country, are nevertheless con-
sidered a major peacebuilding activity undertaken by Indonesian officials. 
Mediation support efforts like Turkey’s in Somalia and Indonesia’s in the 
Philippines are also considered peacebuilding by many (Martin 2010). 
Similarly, many Indonesian, Indian, and South African officials make no 
distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They find it puz-
zling to exclude from “peacebuilding” the extensive operations historically 
undertaken by these countries in peacekeeping, dating back decades (India 
remains one of the largest troop contributors in the world). For instance, 
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in 2004, the South African minister of defense combined these approaches 
when she introduced the new concept of “developmental peacekeeping” 
(Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg 2004). Some Brazilian officials—
mainly those who have been posted to New York—routinely distinguish 
between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but many in Brasília do not 
(Charles Call interview with MRE officials, August 2015, Brasilia).
Context-Specific Usage
A tension also seems to exist between how rising powers use the concept 
at the UN in New York versus how they use it at home in their capitals. At 
the UN, rising powers tend to use the concept in a way that comports with 
the UN definition, and, at least before the latest “sustaining peace” evolu-
tion of the concept, eschews prevention which may be seen as an incursion 
on sovereignty. However, in their own foreign ministries and in exchanges 
with think tanks and civil society, these governments tend not to use the 
term much. When they do, it is a concept that is more pragmatic, flex-
ible, and all-encompassing of activities such as mediation support, direct 
mediation, peace-related economic development projects, and indeed any 
development and infrastructure projects in a post-conflict setting.
rIsIng powers’ peacebuIldIng polIcIes and operatIons
Rising powers’ recent experiences and their own characteristics have 
shaped their motives for embarking on new or expanded efforts to 
advance peace in other countries. Their experience shows a combination 
of distinct values and principles that mutually reinforced strategic inter-
ests. All these countries sought more influence in their own regions and 
in global affairs. Their greater role in providing development cooperation 
and in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts reflect a sense that such 
middle powers can and should play lead roles in handling international 
responses to specific countries. Turkey tried to mediate the very challeng-
ing war in Somalia and, in partnership with Brazil, a nuclear deal with 
Iran. South Africa sought to help bring stability to its continent partly 
to secure more stable environment for investment and trade. In the only 
UN peacekeeping operation in the Western hemisphere, in Haiti, Brazil 
sought and received command of the military forces in that country, a 
role sustained without interruption since 2004 (Santos and Cravo 2014). 
India’s  expansive support for Afghanistan’s transition took place in the 
shadow of its rivalry with Pakistan.
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These rising powers have all eschewed unilateral military action, openly 
backing peacekeeping as a multilateral alternative, preferably with the con-
sent of the host government. Their commitment to a less militarized world 
coheres with their comparative advantage of “soft power”—of which 
peacebuilding is one element—rather than traditional “hard” power of 
military troop deployments and operations. Civilian-led peacebuilding 
efforts offer a way to advance security objectives in a deliberately non- 
unilateral, non-militarized manner.
It is no coincidence that these efforts, and the expanded roles in devel-
opment and peacebuilding, occurred on the heels of the crisis of legitimacy 
of the UN Security Council following the US invasion of Iraq without its 
consent in 2003. The elections of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as prime minister 
of Turkey and of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as president of Brazil ushered in 
governments that sought more prominent and active roles in global poli-
tics. At times, these countries sought to alter the structure of global order, 
and at other times they sought to rise within that order (de Coning et al. 
2015). South Africa, India, and Brazil campaigned for a revamped UN 
Security Council in which they would have permanent seats (McDonald 
and Patrick 2010; Pouliot and Therien 2015).
Material interests also drive investment and technical cooperation in risky 
war-torn environments. Abdenur and De Souza (2014) argue that devel-
opment and peacebuilding interventions reflect direct economic gains as 
well as security or principled interests of rising powers. Brazilian diplomats 
acknowledge that opening markets in sub-Saharan Africa was a goal that 
converged with that country’s concern to assist post-conflict Lusophone 
countries like Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique (Charles Call 
interviews with various diplomats who requested anonymity, Brasilia, 
August 2015). China’s access to raw materials and markets in Africa is an 
acknowledged benefit of its increased peacebuilding engagement.
Yet, interviews conducted for this book reveal that values and principles 
underlie choices to carry out peacebuilding in ways that reflect less hier-
archy, less conditionality, less security-focus, and a greater commitment 
to longer-term accompaniment rather than urgent stabilization and exit. 
These motives and values are not the focus of this piece, but are relevant to 
the analysis that follows. Our aim here is rather to identify the main char-
acteristics of these selected rising powers’ approaches to peacebuilding, 
 putting into relief their differences from traditional, Western approaches. 
It is important to note that these rising powers are democratic regimes 
whose policies may be even closer to Western approaches than non- 
traditional donors such as China, Russia, and the Gulf states.
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dIvergent worldvIews and theorIes of change?
The different approaches of rising powers may best captured in the con-
text of broader understandings about development, and especially what 
was once known as “political development”—that is, how developmen-
tal states emerge over time and through what historical processes, and 
how stable polities and regional arrangements emerge and are sustained. 
In concrete terms, these are distinct “theories of change” in peace pro-
cesses, peacebuilding, and institutional development. The peacebuilding 
approach of traditional donors—embodied by the OECD—is focused on 
preventing lapses or relapses into violent conflict. While it recognizes that 
there may be deeper root causes at work that need longer-term attention, 
it tends to focus on addressing more immediate tensions that, if left unad-
dressed, can become triggers for violent conflict.
Recent best practice in the “traditional donor” approach in any given 
setting is that peacebuilding interventions need to be informed by a con-
flict analysis that seeks to map the conflict by identifying the main actors, 
the conflict drivers, the political economy of the conflict, and the political 
history of the conflict.2 This kind of technical analysis usually finds that 
conflicts are driven by political, social, and economic inequalities between 
groups. These groups are usually organized along ethnic, religious, or lan-
guage identities, and the conflict is typically linked to one or more groups 
feeling marginalized, for instance, due to center–periphery inequalities. 
Economic actors and factors are not ignored, but are placed in the con-
text of these group dynamics. They generally manifest an emphasis on the 
free flow of goods and services, especially capital. The traditional donor 
approach to peacebuilding in this context is typically aimed at trying to 
change the behavior of the political system that causes marginalization 
and inequality by introducing incentives that encourage greater political 
pluralism and political freedoms. It tends to focus on trying to address 
such inequalities in political processes and institutions, the civil service, the 
judicial and security sector, both by making these state institutions more 
representative of the population of a given country and by spreading state 
services to the periphery. The theory of change is that greater political 
access and participation will lead to greater social stability, which will be 
conducive to development and economic prosperity.
The rising powers seem to have a different theory of political, social, and 
economic change. Politics, development, and stability are seen as closely 
interlinked, with political complexity emerging in step with advances in 
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development. Their experience suggests that the level of political competi-
tion that a society can manage peacefully is closely linked to the complex-
ity of its social institutions, and thus its level of development. To ensure 
stability, political activity needs to be governed to stay within manageable 
levels, and the focus for social change should be on social and economic 
development. They argue that over time developmental progress enables a 
social system to become more political complex, and this enables a society 
to develop social institutions, which ultimately has to manifest in state 
institutions, to manage the political competition within society.3 This is 
why the peacebuilding approach of rising powers tends to focus on the 
development of state institutions and why they tend to focus on socio- 
economic development.
These differences in their respective theories of change may help 
to explain why the rising powers and traditional donors have different 
approaches when it comes to, for instance, differentiating between peace-
building and development, measuring results, or working with civil society. 
For instance, on civil society, while rising powers are concerned about the 
peaceful development of the whole society, and while it may be involved in 
projects that involve the community, it prefers to do so through the insti-
tutions of the state, because sustainable development and sustainable peace 
require the development of responsible state institutions. Fragmented 
power across state and social institutions will not, in this view, help move 
the country toward stability or institutional and economic development. 
Rising powers are concerned that working through non-governmental 
actors to deliver social goods undermine the development of state institu-
tions and thus ultimately delay and undermine self-sustainable peace and 
development. They thus prefer to work through state institutions and in 
this way try to stimulate and develop those institutions they view as most 
important to ensure self-sustainable peace and development.
When it comes to results, the lack of interest that rising powers seem 
to show for the kind of monitoring and evaluation systems favored by 
traditional donors could be partly explained by their theory of change 
that anticipate slow maturing long-term results. Rising powers realize that 
their approach to peacebuilding generates change over the medium- to 
long-term. While they may engage in community development (see India 
chapter) and other initiatives aimed at more short-term needs, their goal is 
to lay the foundation for peaceful development. They regard their peace-
building support as successful as it results in steady progress toward self- 
sustainable peace. Rising powers thus tend to be less concerned about the 
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politics and setbacks of the day. They prefer stability, so that the longer- term 
trajectory to development is not disrupted. They thus prefer to focus on 
infrastructure, agriculture, education, and public administration, because 
they argue that these are the basic socio-economic and governance capaci-
ties that any society and state need, regardless of the politics of the day. 
They also believe that infrastructure that links the periphery to the center, 
and education and agricultural development that uplifts all societies, will 
contribute to alleviate inequalities over the medium- to long-term. While 
this is not something they are concerned about monitoring in the short- 
term, they do, at times, articulate such goals (see Myanmar case study) 
that can be evaluated over time. At the same time, there does seem to be a 
growing interest among rising powers in the results frameworks employed 
by the traditional donors. The development agencies in Brazil, India, and 
South Africa have exchanges with their counterparts among the traditional 
donors. They seek to improve their tools and techniques, including their 
monitoring and results systems. This interest is driven by a functional or 
technical interest in improving practice, not by changes in their overarch-
ing theory of change.
The primacy of stable development in the approach of the rising pow-
ers to peacebuilding may also explain why they do not feel the same need 
as traditional donors to differentiate conceptually or in practice between 
peacebuilding and development. For the rising powers progress in the 
area of socio-economic development automatically means progress toward 
peacebuilding. Politics, development, and stability are understood as closely 
interlinked, with political complexity emerging in step with advances in 
development. The traditional donors have their own unique historic con-
text within which development originated. As peacebuilding is a fairly 
recent addition, and as it differed in important aspects from development, 
traditional donor bureaucracies felt the need to explain how peacebuild-
ing and development are different from each other. Growing impulses 
in Western capitals, especially legislatures, to monitor and measure the 
activities and outcomes of development assistance also drove distinctions 
to clarify distinctions between security-related and development-related 
efforts. This was driven in part by human rights concerns, and partly by 
bureaucratic tendencies to protect turf and budgets. The rising powers 
do not have these same bureaucratic pressures to differentiate between 
peacebuilding and development.
Another reason why the rising powers may have the “luxury” of a 
peacebuilding approach that is grounded in longer-term development and 
 CONCLUSION: ARE RISING POWERS BREAKING THE PEACEBUILDING MOLD? 
256 
stability is because they do not feel responsible, to the same degree as 
traditional donors, for the day-to-day management of global peace and 
security. Rising powers regard the day-to-day maintenance and manage-
ment of international peace and security as the responsibility of the UN 
and they contribute to that responsibility through peacekeeping and other 
contributions to the UN. They regard the UN Security Council, and the 
UN and related institutions, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, as 
dominated by Western powers, and thus view these powers as primar-
ily responsible for the day-to-day management of international peace and 
security. In addition, they project a solidarity to humanity that leads them 
to engage in bilateral peacebuilding and development; however, this is not 
driven by, or understood as, a contribution to maintaining or managing 
the global order on a day-to-day basis. Rather it is seen as contributing to 
the medium- to long-term human development.
Below are some of the core characteristics our book has identified of 
rising powers’ new approaches to peacebuilding.
 1. Each rising power’s approach to peacebuilding is shaped by its own 
identity and recent historical experiences.
Western powers’ history and values shape the content of their develop-
ment and peacebuilding approaches, so it is unsurprising that rising pow-
ers’ experiences should influence theirs. However, rising powers tend to 
explicitly cite their own experiences in their policy statements and in their 
dialogues with partner countries. Thus, Turkey’s peace efforts emphasize 
its recent experience in democratization and its unusual position as a secu-
lar Muslim democracy. India’s peacebuilding is informed by its own post- 
colonial struggle for independence, with an emphasis on sovereignty and 
development, rather than security. As Singh says in his chapter, “India 
shares her experiences of democracy, pluralism and tolerance with the host 
countries, without interfering in their internal politics and social dynam-
ics.” South Africa’s regional work advancing peace reflects the debt that 
the ANC-led government feels it owes to its African neighbors for their 
support during apartheid.
In her chapter, Alexandra points out that Indonesia’s interactions with 
partners are shared “based on Indonesia’s own experiences with democratic 
consolidation.” Its Bali Democracy Forum invites Asia-Pacific leaders to 
share their experiences to foster international cooperation in peace and 
democracy. Alexandra finds that Indonesia’s work on democracy is linked 
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to its policy to advance the stability of Southeast Asia: its “experiences of 
democratic transition, which included installing the civilian government, 
returning the military to the barracks, and settling internal conflicts, have 
been considered valuable lessons which can be shared with other countries 
that are currently struggling with similar challenges.” These lessons have 
shaped its relations with Myanmar more than discourse about stability 
or peace. The democratic character of these rising powers plays a special 
role in their peacebuilding policies. Indeed, recent democratization expe-
riences are also seen as comparative advantages over traditional donors.
 2. Longer time horizon for peacebuilding.
The UN and traditional donor approaches to peacebuilding have tended 
to focus on preventing relapse into violent conflict. This has resulted in 
a preoccupation with immediate risks and thus the short term. The UN 
approach until recently focused on “post-conflict” peacebuilding, rather 
than prevention, especially in forestalling relapse within six months to two 
years of war’s end. Although the average length of UN peace operations 
grew from 5.62 years at the end of 1995 to 7.97 years by mid-2016,4 these 
operations rarely privilege “root causes” and have more minimalist aims 
of demobilizing combatants, building basic state institutions and support-
ing elections before withdrawal of UN missions and return to a “normal” 
development process.
By contrast, the rising powers seem to have a longer-term approach to 
peacebuilding that reflects some degree of strategic patience and historic 
perspective. Their theories of change are typically long-term, believing 
that addressing underlying causes of conflict, which are often economic 
in nature, are the soundest way to prevent violent conflict. Of our cases, 
India is most emblematic of this long-range perspective. Singh argues in 
his chapter that for current Indian policy, development activities are peace-
building: “India has not made the same distinction between development 
assistance and peacebuilding activities that the traditional actors seem to 
make.” India is proud to count its scholarships for Afghans to study in 
India as part of its contribution to peace there. Somalia’s ambassador to 
Turkey praises Turkish scholarships for Somalis. Its investment in infra-
structure like the “ring road” in Afghanistan is also seen as a key contribu-
tion to peace. The road is useful for internal and international commerce, 
and useful for defense forces’ mobility. It is an investment to support an 
embattled allied government, and investment in both internal peace and 
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in regional stability. Turkey similarly invested in the Mogadishu port and 
in key roads there. Indonesia explicitly emphasizes its slow, deliberate sup-
port for dialogue in places like the Philippines and Myanmar.
At the same time, we see a contradictory aspect of rising powers’ 
approach. These countries tend to eschew the lengthy bureaucratic pro-
cesses of traditional donors, relishing quickly visible projects that govern-
ments have explicitly requested and that the population can see. Turkey’s 
road and ports projects in Mogadishu are a case in point. Turkish officials 
stress that other donors’ red tape led to many delays, and the Turkish gov-
ernment quickly approved a road project and the gift of four boats for the 
coast guard that Somalis saw as immediate, concrete contributions. Rising 
powers also envision a long-term relationship with the partner country 
that involves diverse sets of support to help economic development reach 
a level whereby stability is enhanced. They are less concerned with the 
immediate outbreak of hostilities and more concerned with a slow pro-
gression toward economic growth and stability that will have positive 
effects for the rising power’s own commercial interests and for regional 
stability.
 3. Heightened concerns about national sovereignty, and thus national 
ownership.
The rising powers uniformly emphasize national ownership in their 
peacebuilding approaches, often in the context of the UN Charter prin-
ciples of sovereignty and self-determination. When the UN Security 
Council considered invoking its authority under Responsibility to Protect 
to send in assistance over the objections of the Myanmar government, 
Indonesia argued forcefully against any action defying the government’s 
will. According to Alexandra, “consent from the host country is a must” 
in Indonesia’s approach to engaging with other countries. She goes on to 
argue that:
Indonesia’s role is to support each country as it crafts its own peacebuilding 
process, rather than pushing it from the outside. This approach contributes 
to the establishment of a sense of national ownership that is critical to ensure 
the success of any peacebuilding effort.
Brazil, India, and Turkey have all underscored their emphasis on national 
ownership repeatedly. In 2012, for instance, India’s acting Ambassador 
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to the UN said that it is “important for the PBC [UN Peacebuilding 
Commission] to align its objectives with national priorities and ensure 
that all plans and programmes are implemented under national leader-
ship and through national institutions so that gains are sustainable even 
if slow,” (quoted in Singh’s chapter). Over the past decade, a demand for 
greater national ownership from G7+ countries has converged with a simi-
lar stance among rising powers in the Global South to lead the UN, the 
EU and OECD countries to commit to national ownership in virtually all 
documents and discussions of peacebuilding.
The emphasis by emerging powers on sovereignty shapes their under-
standing of “national ownership.” It means taking priorities first from 
the central government, and then also channeling resources through the 
state. For rising powers, this notion translates largely to accepting the 
government of the day as the embodiment of national ownership, with 
less emphasis on local or inclusive ownership. India’s peacebuilding pri-
orities in Afghanistan, for instance, are shaped very heavily by conversa-
tions between the Indian ambassador in Kabul and the Afghan president. 
Turkey reaches out more to local leaders, whose priorities determine how 
Turkish assistance will be used. Typically, rising powers do not invest in 
much broader consultations with lower level community leaders, civil soci-
ety, or critics of the government in formulating priorities. They are con-
cerned more about the capacity than the legitimacy of the partner state. 
Their vision is to invest in the long-term development of the state, regard-
less of the government of the day. In implementation, countries like India 
and Turkey may well then reach out to and meet with local beneficiary 
communities. Indian officials, for instance, seek warm relations of solidar-
ity with partner countries and care about what local communities think 
of their programs and their effects. They may adapt their programs in 
response to dialogue with communities. However, in setting priorities, 
they principally and initially take their cues from the central government’s 
preferences.
This approach contrasts with the growing understanding that Western 
donors have of “national” and “local” ownership that includes non- 
governmental actors, especially civil society organizations representative 
of salient social groups based on ethnicity, gender, youth, and religion. 
Rising powers’ views on peacebuilding comport less with the trend among 
intergovernmental organizations, Western donors and the new SDGs 
emphasizing “inclusive politics.”
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 4. A rejection of conditions on cooperation, reflecting a less securitized 
and more egalitarian vision of global order.
One of the consequences of values that seek to democratize the global 
order and of histories of colonial occupation is an emphasis on equality 
and mutual respect for partner countries. The implications of this posture 
go beyond a refusal to tell other countries what they should do to eschew-
ing conditionality that has been and continues to be central to Western 
and traditional modes of aid and diplomacy. Rising powers openly reject 
conditioning their assistance on liberal political, democratic, electoral, 
or human rights benchmarks that have become the hallmark of North 
American and European assistance. As Singh points out in his chapter 
“Right from the outset, India’s basic philosophy towards development 
assistance was that any aid/assistance would be demand driven, given 
without conditionalities, be administered in a decentralized manner and 
would not constrain the sovereignty of its partners in any way.” Similarly 
Sazak and his co-authors argue that:
As often reiterated by Turkish Foreign Ministry, and intermediary organiza-
tions, Turkey does not discriminate on race, religion, language and gender, 
nor does it place political or economic conditions on its resources to allevi-
ate the suffering of victims of a catastrophe and restore human dignity.5
Yet, there is an apparent contradiction in the positions of rising powers. 
Their increased development and peacebuilding roles in the early 2000s 
reflected in part their desire to play a greater role on the world stage in 
order to democratize it. Thus, Brazil and South Africa are widely perceived 
to have expected some degree of support from new partner countries 
in their bids for permanent Security Council seats. Miguel Lengyel and 
Bernabé Malacalza (2011) point out the distinction between procedurally 
specific conditionalities on aid or technical cooperation, on the one hand, 
and implied or strategic conditionalities not tied specifically to aid but seen 
as part of a mutually supportive relationship on the other hand (Lengyel 
and Malacalza 2011, 15–16). Having denounced IMF conditionality on 
his own country and others, Brazilian President Lula embraced develop-
ment and peacebuilding policies that did not include conditionality, for 
instance. Yet, this renunciation of strict conditionality in Lula’s outreach 
to African countries can coexist with an expectation of partner countries’ 
support on broader global questions.
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 5. Mutual respect, equality, and cultural understanding.
There is an emphasis on cooperation that is seen as mutually beneficial, 
as aid that is seen as one (superior knowledge and tools) part coming to 
the aid of a (inferior knowledge and tools) party. The rising powers we 
have studied claim that their technical advice reflects an exchange among 
equals rather than that of a benefactor giving resources to a beneficiary. 
Indonesia emphasizes that this relationship is not a one-way transfer but 
involves mutual learning: Alexandra argues that “rather than acting as 
an expert conveying its success stories, Indonesia tends to apply a two- 
way approach in which it shares its own experiences, but also learns from 
the host country.” Alexandra further finds that “Indonesia emphasizes a 
mutual learning process when conducting peacebuilding activities.” One 
of the two principles Alexandra highlights in Indonesia’s approach to 
peacebuilding is the “comfort” level of the partner country: “The host 
government should reach the stage where it feels the need for and is com-
fortable enough to open up itself to receiving other countries’ assistance 
in the peacebuilding process.” Sazak and his co-authors quote one Somali 
non-governmental organization (NGO) official which they think reflect 
the Somali view of Turkey’s assistance: “When we work with Turkish orga-
nizations, we feel like equal partners. The Turks respect the Somalis as 
equals” (Interview with a Somali NGO representative, quoted in Wasuge 
2016, 23).
 6. More technical cooperation rather than aid.
One reflection of rising powers’ emphasis on mutual respect and equal-
ity is a greater reliance on technical cooperation than the transfer of aid. 
Traditional donors use technical advisers extensively, including in security 
ministries, courts, and finance ministries. However, the amount of bilat-
eral and multilateral aid and loans that traditional donors provide dwarfs 
the monetary value of their technical advisors. In contrast, rising powers 
draw on technical advisers and cooperation as a greater percentage of their 
peacebuilding work, usually bilaterally. In many cases, these advisers are 
sent to places of cultural, historical, or linguistic affinity, improving the 
chances that the exchange will be sustained. More research is needed to 
analyze the impact of South-South technical cooperation before we can 
judge if their approach is having the intended effects.
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Some partner governments and communities request or prefer Western 
aid, because it is perceived to result in more money or greater economic 
and social benefits for individuals or institutions involved, or because it 
addresses other political, economic or strategic interests (such as Myanmar 
seeking Western aid to counterbalance China’s role). In addition, the reli-
ance on technical advisers reflects a more constrained institutional and 
financial context than in many Western countries. It is less costly to pay 
the travel costs for one’s own government employees to work abroad for 
six to 12 months than to provide aid for projects or pay the salaries and 
transaction costs of others. Brazilian law, for instance, provides for techni-
cal cooperation, but not for actual aid except through international orga-
nizations. Resource and legal constraints thus help explain the penchant 
for technical cooperation and for multilateralism.
 7. Monitoring, evaluation, and impact.
Although more data are needed, rising powers also seem to differ from 
Western actors in the degree and character of their monitoring and eval-
uation of peacebuilding efforts. As seen earlier, rising powers’ motives 
for peacebuilding reflect variously their humanitarian impulses, their 
ideologically- framed regional or global roles, their desire for neighbor-
hood stability or their own interests in commerce or commercial and alli-
ance or regional interests. It is worth reflecting on the strategic purposes 
of peacebuilding for rising powers. Western powers and traditional donors 
provide aid and peacebuilding support for strategic reasons of course. 
They seek stability in other regions and countries for their own security 
and to maximize commercial opportunities. They also seek to strengthen 
alliances and partnerships with other governments, and to propagate their 
values. For instance, a recent review commissioned by the Norwegian par-
liament, entitled “A Good Ally—Norway in Afghanistan 2001–2014,” 
found that Norway’s engagement with Afghanistan had achieved a stra-
tegic purpose of strengthening Norway’s relationship with the United 
States, even as it largely failed to achieve virtually any of its project and 
programmatic goals on the ground in Afghanistan.6
Similarly, rising powers pursue peace-related programs for their own 
strategic reasons. These motives often reflect a desire to build relation-
ships or strategic partnerships or trade relations. Such benefits rarely are 
captured by monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Yet to the extent that 
peacebuilding programs reflect strategic relationships or solidarity with 
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countries in the global South, then those programs achieve their aims 
when relationships are strengthened. On a different level, the enhance-
ment of legitimacy of a partner government is often viewed as strategic 
for an external donor as well as assisting legitimacy internally. In this view, 
the positive expression of senior Afghan officials about Indian projects is 
the most relevant criterion for success possible. Myanmar’s governmental 
expressions of friendship and appreciation for Indonesia’s role are more 
important to the foreign ministry than project-based evaluations.
Similarly, some rising powers acknowledge that their peace-related 
activities have a side effect of enhancing opportunities for commerce and 
investment by their own private sector. To the extent that these opportu-
nities are seen as positive outcomes, they signify “successful” attainment 
of national interests quite apart from their impacts on peace. In addition, 
some rising powers’ approaches center on long-term projects such as eco-
nomic conditions and infrastructure.
Monitoring and evaluation of such projects will take years and not lend 
themselves to the sort of causal immediacy that conventional evaluation 
of short-term peacebuilding projects seek to ascertain. Instead, assess-
ment will examine visible products like roads or schools completed, with 
less ability to identify connections to peace. The foreign ministries of ris-
ing powers have little culture of evaluation. Although their development 
agencies have growing monitoring and evaluation, they remain less insti-
tutionalized than their Western counterparts. Conventional project-based 
monitoring and evaluation are less commonly practiced by rising powers 
than traditional ones, but their governments are often more comfortable 
admitting how peace-related projects advance national interests.
Yet, assessment and learning are evident among rising powers. Several 
chapters note examples of an openness to incorporating effective elements 
of conventional practices, including adopting some practices that were 
earlier eschewed following a similar learning curve followed by traditional 
donors in past decades. After an avowed resistance to taking political con-
siderations into its cooperation, for instance, China has in recent years 
recognized that it must heed issues of partisan and ethic exclusion or see 
its projects impeded. Turkey may yet confront some of the same  problems 
encountered by Western powers of a military presence provoking per-
ceived involvement favoring one side in Somalia. At the same time, Turkey 
has begun to recognize the need in Somalia for some degree of planning, 
coordination with other donors, and evaluation of its projects. And India 
is introducing ethical standards in its cooperation efforts. None of these 
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rising powers is averse to multilateral approaches, but they are wary of 
seeing Western-led donor coordination processes become mechanisms to 
dictate the content of their assistance.
One arc of evolution and learning bears further research—how rising 
powers’ peacebuilding activities redound on their internal policies regard-
ing violence and insecurity. Abdenur and Call’s chapter points out that 
Brazil’s approaches to community violence and development in its peace-
keeping mission in Haiti drew explicitly on the approaches of Viva Rio, a 
well-known NGO whose projects had helped improve household incomes 
and mitigate violence in Rio de Janeiro’s most violent slums. Yet, there are 
few feedback mechanisms that draw on lessons from rising powers’ peace-
building activities abroad to shape policies at home. Few think tanks exist 
in these countries, and they have understandably focused on the relatively 
recent forays of some rising powers into peacebuilding abroad. They are 
not financially incentivized (by external or internal funders) to examine 
the implications of such activities for domestic policies, an endeavor that 
might also prove politically sensitive. Greater transparency public debate, 
and engagement with civil society and research communities might stimu-
late enhanced feedback loops between domestic and foreign experiences. 
Given high levels of poverty and insecurity in large swaths of rising pow-
ers’ territories, their governments have also been hesitant to draw too 
much attention to sending their staff and money abroad.
conclusIons
This book seeks to identify and analyze the peacebuilding concepts, 
policies, and practices of a selected group of rising powers: Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey. Although the development practices 
of these new actors have been analyzed by scholars, their peacebuilding 
activities have not received much scrutiny. Our book finds a number of 
common elements, starting with different understandings of peacebuild-
ing that bear further study and discussion. “Peacebuilding” for these 
countries is less narrowly understood than in Western settings or in the 
UN, and incorporates development, humanitarian, infrastructure, health, 
education, jobs creation, mediation, dialogue, and reconciliation activi-
ties, as well as more conventional post-war reconstruction and institu-
tional support. Their notion of “peacebuilding” covers pre-war, at-war, 
and post-war countries, as well as those experiencing mass violence that 
falls short of armed conflict.
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The peacebuilding policies and operations of these rising powers also 
reflect commonalities that distinguish them from traditional donors. They 
have a more holistic operational approach that draws on multiple min-
istries, including technical advisors from agriculture, health, and educa-
tion sectors. They have a longer time horizon and strong emphasis on 
national ownership, often interpreted to mean governmental consent, 
than Western approaches. Their heightened sensitivity to sovereignty and 
a lack of immediate conditionalities on their peacebuilding cooperation, 
even when that cooperation advances strategic and economic interests, 
reflect their post-colonial trajectories and South-South solidarity. The lim-
ited scale of their funding and programs, as well as divergent political 
agendas among traditional donors and rising powers, combine to limit 
the extent to which peacebuilding policies and practice have evolved dur-
ing their short lifetimes. However, important shifts in peacebuilding both 
converge with and have been influenced by the peacebuilding policies and 
activities of these countries as their roles have gained salience on the global 
stage.
A number of caveats are in order. First, it would be an exaggeration to 
say that the rising powers studied here represent all rising powers. This 
book systematically examined six important rising powers—Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey. These are all democratic countries 
whose recent (or not so recent in India’s case) political transitions shape 
their regional and global roles and policies. Other countries that have 
become more active as development partners and peacebuilding actors—
including Russia, China, Mexico, Colombia, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, 
and other Arab states, among others—are not analyzed here. These may 
have very different peacebuilding approaches that merit further study.
Second, although this book has identified some elements common 
to these countries, these countries exhibit variation among themselves 
in how they conceptualize and practice peacebuilding. Rising powers 
diverge, for instance, in the extent to which they equate peacebuilding 
with development. For most, peacebuilding is a distinct but related and 
overlapping concept with development. It is a particular peace-related set 
of activities that usually occur in the context of war-torn societies, and 
that aim to advance or sustain peace. India is an exception, as it equates 
virtually all of its development activity with peace support and peacebuild-
ing. India, like China, also has a longer time horizon given its historical 
reference points; therefore, the longer-term emphasis means less concern 
with junctural political events and more concern with longer-term social 
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and economic conditions for peace. Other variations exist in the extent 
to which countries contrast themselves explicitly with Western or tradi-
tional approaches, with Brazil being more prone to such statements, for 
example, than Indonesia.
Another area of variation among the rising powers is in the degree 
to which their cooperation is provided bilaterally versus multilaterally. 
One study shows that Turkey, Brazil, India, and Russia all shifted from 
bilateral assistance toward multilateral channels between 2005 and 2010 
(White 2011, 7). Indonesia and China shifted in the opposite direction, 
and South Africa remained highly multilateral according to its official 
development aid figures (White 2011). Multilateral often does not mean 
working with and through the UN. These countries remain comfortable 
working in coordination with the UN, but this is not necessarily the pre-
ferred mode of cooperation. Rising powers have fostered work with and 
through regional organizations like the AU and ASEAN, partly because 
of greater influence in those fora. In addition, they work through multi-
lateral groupings such as the BRICS and its New Development Bank, the 
India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA)  fund, the AU’s New Economic 
Partnership (NEPAD), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 
, the Brazilian Development Bank, and in the case of China, its Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank. Most of these mechanisms are relatively 
new, and hold additional potential to shape the peacebuilding priorities 
and financing.
Recent events raise doubts about whether rising powers will sustain 
their new roles in development and peace-related cooperation. Corruption 
indictments of senior officials have rocked the administrations of President 
Zuma in South Africa and sparked the impeachment of President Rousseff 
in Brazil. China has faced economic slowdown, and political crises plagued 
the government Recep Erdoğan in Turkey. Indonesia’s development 
cooperation fell from $27 million in 2012 to $12 million by 2013. Brazil 
has cut the budget of its Ministry of Foreign Relations dramatically since 
2013, slashing its program budgets (Charles Call interviews with Brazilian 
diplomats, August 2015, Brasilia). As a result, some scholars call into 
question the future impact of rising powers on global governance and 
international practices of development and peacebuilding (Chandhoke 
2014; Quadir 2014; Stuenkel 2014).
What then can we say about the impact of these new peacebuilding 
roles in the institutions and policies and practice of peacebuilding glob-
ally? The dialogues and discussions thus far indicate that these rising 
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powers have influenced the discourse and practices of development, but 
not transformed them. One area of apparent impact is the content of the 
SDGs, approved at the UN General Assembly in September 2015. Rising 
powers did not veto goals regarding peace and security, but they exercised 
important influence on the wording of those goals and targets, including 
Goal 16 on “just, peaceful, and inclusive societies.” Rising powers helped 
shape Goal 16’s “targets” to exclude the term “security” and to include 
capacity-building, commitment to a stronger role for developing coun-
tries in the institutions of global governance, violence prevention, and 
reduced illicit arms flows. Work on peacebuilding in the next 15 years will 
reflect these targets. Beyond the SDGs, rising powers have helped achieve 
more holistic notions of peacebuilding in policy statements that reinforce 
the work of development agencies and funds in this area. Their longer 
time horizons also support the role of the development and humanitarian 
actors in peacebuilding, in contrast to a narrower concept that privileges 
the UN’s peace and security institutions.
The participation of rising powers in the peacebuilding architecture at 
the UN also contrasts with their reluctance to engage the OECD and its 
New Deal processes. Brazil has chaired the PBC, and Indonesia, India, 
and South Africa have all played prominent roles in PBC debates and deci-
sions. That role has strengthened a commitment to national ownership 
in the rhetoric and work of the UN’s peacebuilding work, including a 
tone of mutual respect in UN dealings with recipient governments. These 
countries’ holistic notions have also helped ensure that economic recovery 
and jobs programs remain a part of the agenda of the UN peacebuild-
ing and peacekeeping programming and discourse, including the UN 
Peacebuilding Fund. Their emphasis on national ownership has ensured 
a central place for that concept in all UN and other multilateral fora, vis-
ible also in the 2015 reviews of peace operations and peacebuilding. Their 
role has not, however, led to an end to conditionality. The tug-of-war 
between an expansive understanding of “national ownership” (as backed 
by Western donors) versus a narrow government-centered understanding 
of that term (reflecting usage by rising powers) persists in the UN.
Which direction, one might speculate, will the peacebuilding poli-
cies and engagement of the rising powers take in the coming years? At a 
workshop in The Hague in 2016, researchers debated whether the future 
would witness a convergence or persistent different tracks between tradi-
tional approaches and rising powers’ approaches to peacebuilding. Much 
of that, of course, depends on the role and relative power of specific rising 
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powers in global affairs in coming decades, discussed above. However, the 
role of partner countries themselves, and the understandings within mul-
tilateral institutions, will play an important role in determining whether 
and how alternative ideas will prevail in this mix. It is possible that some 
convergence will occur as traditional donors choose or are forced by the 
“development cooperation market” to accommodate longer timelines, 
less conditionality, more deference to governments. It is also possible that 
rising powers will “learn” to adopt more results-based and shorter-term 
approaches in response to their own domestic constituencies. They may 
also broaden their understandings of national ownership to include more 
NGOs. In the near term, distinct but overlapping parallel approaches are 
likely to persist. These need not be competitors, but may prove to be 
complementary and cooperative.
Ultimately, the impact of rising powers on peacebuilding institutions, 
policies, and practices is likely to derive more from their discourse, con-
cepts, and moral authority as their resources. Their “talk” may influence 
more than their “walk,” although the influence of their programs may vary 
depending on the resources devoted. From a partner government’s per-
spective, a small alternative source of funding goes a long way to undercut 
conditionality even of a much larger donor. The research presented in 
this book documents how rising powers have set forth a common set of 
principles and rationales as the basis for a new approach to peacebuilding. 
That set of principles around the peacebuilding concept and its practice 
are likely to continue to serve as reference points for debates in the halls 
of Western donors, the UN and regional organizations, bolstered by non- 
governmental organizations. The pace and character of those interactions 
will shape peacebuilding on the ground in varied and important ways in 
coming years.
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